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Abstract
This thesis is based on works in econometrics and the use of original data. It focuses
on three themes: the economics of natural disasters, the relationship between
the price of crude oil and the price of gasoline, and the effects of internships on
employability, wages and satisfaction at work.
Keywords: Applied Economics, New Sources of Data, Econometric Modeling.
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Résumé
Cette thèse s’appuie sur des travaux économétriques et l’emploi de données origi-
nales. Elle se concentre autour de trois thématiques: l’économie des catastrophes
naturelles, les relations entre les prix du pétrole brut et des carburants, et l’effet
des stages sur l’employabilité, les salaires et la satisfaction au travail.
MotsClés: Économie Appliquée, Nouvelles Sources de Données, Modélisation Économétrique.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of 3 articles in applied economics. It sheds new light on practical
issues, with a reflection on the data and econometric methods.
The first article, co-authored with Eric Strobl, studies the determinants of da-
mage associated with natural disasters. With climate change awareness, a new
applied literature has emerged measuring the effects of risk and development on
the observed increase of damage. However, there is a lack of data concerning losses
(monetary and human) associated with natural disasters. This article explains the
low robustness of the results of this recent literature, analyzing the accuracy of
the data as well as the econometric methods used. Monetary losses are indeed
misinformed, which can be explained by a lack of accounting standards measuring
this damage, and by the threshold effects for inclusion in databases as well as the
difficulty to obtain reliable statistics in developing countries. Estimates for the
number of casualties are more accurate but the results from conventional econo-
metric models focus on a medium effect. There are some extreme natural events
with several thousand dead people. The use of quantile regression highlights that
the determinants of casualties are not the same for disasters that are rare and of
great intensity, and those of low intensity but more frequent.
The second article, co-authored with Erwan Gautier, is a study of the fuel mar-
ket in France, and focuses on price rigidity and asymmetry in price transmission.
The data, taken from a website are original and had never been exploited. They
correspond to the daily price observation which has taken place for more than 2
years in 10.000 fuel gas stations. This new data allow developing a new methodo-
logy. A model of price rigidity linked to economic theory is estimated for each fuel
gas station. Individual price paths are then aggregated and simulated to study the
adjustment periods and the effect of an increase or a decrease in the price. Prices
appear rigid and consistent with new models of price stickiness with variable menu
cost and information costs. We do not detect asymmetry in price transmission. Ag-
gregation paths give close results to those obtained with the macroeconometrics
models using aggregated data.
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The third article, co-authored with Elise Coudin, examines the role of intern-
ships on academic choices, employability, and job satisfaction of young graduates
in France. While compensation for internships has been the subject of recent le-
gislation, there are no studies measuring their economic impacts. Each academic
background includes a number of mandatory internships. It is therefore not pos-
sible to observe a counterfactual. In the French engineering schools, students can
make the choice to undertake an optional full year of internship between the two
years of the Master diploma. This selection is used to measure the impact of in-
ternships. A sequential schooling decisions framework highlights several potential
effects of internships. Our data come from an original survey about the labor mar-
ket integration of graduates matched with the students’ attainments during their
schooling. This enables us to account for student’s abilities. They correspond with
the observation of 6 classes in a French engineering school. Performing a full year
of internship is less valued by employers than a real year of professional experience.
This year of internship improves the ability to find a job faster. It is possible to
refine the major choices when several internships are made in different areas. Pub-
lic policies implemented, which ban unpaid internships or more than six months,
appear consistent with our results.
Published work and Coauthoring
The first chapter is co-authored with Eric Strobl. The second chapter is co-authered
with Erwan Gautier and has been accepted for publication at Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking. The third chapter is co-authered with Elise Coudin.
This thesis has been written with the Lyx layout created by Matthieu Perreira
Da Silva.
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The death toll and the damage of
natural disasters : beyond the
averages

Chapter 1
The death toll and the damage of
natural disasters: beyond the
averages
This chapter discusses the accuracy of data and the econometric tools used to
link natural disasters mitigation with economic development or risk exposure. It
is argued that these methods do not take into account measurement errors and
falsely do not distinguish the large events with thousands of death and billions
of damage from other relatively minor ones. Using a database widely used in the
literature, we show that damage are less informative for developing countries and
thus are less robust in predicting or explain losses for these ones. Using censored
quantile regressions for the number of death due to natural disasters, we find
that results are mainly valid for extreme quantiles, thus suggesting that different
behaviors for preventing exposure may exist towards large and rare disasters, and
small but more frequent ones.
1.1 Introduction
Climate change has been argued to potentially lead to an increase in natural
disasters. This view has in part been reinforced by some recent dramatic events
with that resulted in thousands of deaths and billions of dollars in damage, such
as the Europe heat wave in 2003, the Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or the United-
Kingdom floods and storms in 2014. But the nature is not underlying factor. A
similar tropical cyclone in United States, in Haiti or in Bangladesh is not likely
to have the same impacts. As a matter of fact a significant part of the observed
damage due to natural disasters that have been witnessed since the 1980’s can be
attributed to the growth in vulnerability due to socio-economic factors. That is,
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more assets and people in exposed areas mean higher damage too. The economic
analysis of losses (human and monetary ones) induced by these events appears to be
essential to effectively guide public policy, including adaptation to climate change.
Understanding the role of development and risk can improve the evaluation of the
impacts of climate change and the costs associated to it. In this regard it appears
necessary to identify the countries that will be the most affected by climate change.
This paper investigates so the link between damage from natural disasters and
economic development and risk exposure. The existing literature seems to suggest
a negative correlation between the number of death and development, but the
findings are not consistent for damage. Our aim here is so to reconcile and challenge
these different results by analyzing the accuracy of data and the econometric tools
used to analyze them. More specifically, natural disasters appear to be an unusual
economic aspect that is characterized by a lack of standards to measure impacts
and extreme events. Here we explain why actual and observed data for natural
disasters differ and implications of this for the econometric analysis. We also
examine the role of largest and most extreme events on results. We conclude by
analyzing the implications for the on-going literature and future research.
Beyond questions of econometrics methods, we show that the accuracy of data
on damage is dependent on countries’ level of development. This causes a se-
lection bias and a lack of predictability and robustness of econometric results.
More specifically, one can falsely identify a positive link between development and
damage. Concerning the econometric method, we use censored quantile regres-
sion (Chernozhukov and Hong 2002) to explicitly discern the role of extremest of
events. We find that results are mainly valid for these extreme quantiles. Thus
there may be different behaviors for preventing exposure towards large and rare
disasters, and small but more frequent disasters. Indeed, while a global database
on natural disasters maybe provide a good overview on losses of natural disasters,
researchers still need to practice caution in applying econometric tools to it. In
this regard, we find that data on deaths are better than those on damage for which
an accounting framework should be defined.
Data on natural disasters are not widely available. A global database is crucial
to have some figures and to compare countries facing natural disasters. However
the few available global databases have been largely used to explain determinants
of losses on natural disasters, without detailing the accuracy of data under the
econometrics methods used (Cavallo et al. 2010; Kahn 2005; Kellenberg and Mo-
barak 2008; Neumayer et al. 2013; Raschky 2008; Schumacher and Strobl 2011;
Strömberg 2007; Toya and Skidmore 2007). Furthermore, these data are used too
to measure the impact of shocks on growth (Noy 2009; Loayza et al. 2012; Cavallo
et al. 2013; Ahlerup 2013) or as an exogenous instrument on several macroe-
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conomic indicators (Felbermayr and Gröschl 2013 for international trade). This
article contributes to this literature also, as it gives reasons why losses are not ex-
ogenous and measured with errors (this has been partly mentioned in Loayza et al.
2012 and Cavallo et al. 2013), which could alter previous results of macroeconomic
studies.
Section 2 describes the basic concepts (classification and measurement methods)
and provides an account of a simple outline of the economics of natural disasters.
Section 3 describes the data and its limits. Section 4 details the distinction between
actual and observed data and the potential implications for econometrics. Section
5 analyses the determinants of damage and number of death from natural disasters.
Section 6 concludes.
1.2 What are natural disasters?
CRED (Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters) defines a disaster
as "a situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request
to national or international level for external assistance; An unforeseen and often
sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering." This
definition is not restricted to natural events, but it underlines the fact that a
disaster only exists when there is a significant impact on human activity. That
is why database on disasters (Tschoegl 2006, Beckman 2009) use thresholds on
mortality or damage (or declaration of a state of emergency) to define a natu-
ral event as a natural disaster or not. This approach can thus be described as
socio-economic rather than physical, where the definition would be solely based on
the physical definition of events (maximum wind speed, Richter scale...). Thresh-
olds may however vary between databases considered. There is indeed a lack of
international standards to define and classify disasters (Wirtz et al. 2009, Gall
et al. 2009). Moreover, the duration and location of an event are sometimes also
used to characterize disaster, where there are distinctions between extensive events
(repeated, localized and mean intensity) and intensive events (large intensity and
areas affected). Differences in predictability can be denoted. For example, while
an earthquake seems unpredictable with current knowledge, tracks of hurricanes
can be observed directly and have improved recently in short-term predictability.
Furthermore, some of events are extreme events (thousands of deaths, billion of
damage), for which no probability of occurrence can be computed. Our following
analyses are based on the CRED classification, distinguishing climatological events
(drought, extreme temperature, wildfire), geophysical (earthquake, volcano), hy-
drological (flood) and meteorogical (storm).
There is currently no widely accepted system for compiling a comprehensive
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database containing the losses of natural disasters. Total damage is sometimes
deduced from insured losses, and thus neglects uninsured losses1. Thus, CRED
uses several sources to compile information on monetary and human losses. These
data do not separate the types of loss (property by sectors, agricultural products,
cleanup and response costs, and adjustment cost such as temporary living aids) and
do not identify who bears the loss. This issue is not new but remains unresolved2.
Although this of course does not mean that these data cannot be used for analysis,
it is arguably still necessary to know what types of costs are considered, what is
included or not, and what metrics can be used to assess damage and impacts of
natural events. What is really measured when estimated damage of a disaster are
published is not clear (Rose 2004, Hallegatte and Przyluski 2011). Actually, each
study seems to adopt its own definition of cost, but generally distinguish or at least
acknowledge the direct and indirect effects. Direct effects refer to consequences of
physical destruction, including both property damage and business interruption,
whereas indirect effects are due to the chain reaction associated with business
interruption (lack of inputs, changes in demand and supply) and can be seen as a
"multiplier" of direct damage.
Impacts of a natural disaster come from several factors (cf. Figure 1.1, Cavallo
and Noy (2010) and Kousky (2013) for complete surveys on economics of natural
disasters). In this regard two main concepts must be taken into account. One is
the hazard associated with a natural event, as for example the maximum wind
speed at landfall for hurricanes. The second is the vulnerability of the area where
the natural event takes place. This vulnerability depends on physical exposure
(high ground, distance to the sea. . . ), socioeconomic factors (population and as-
sets in exposed areas for example) and measures of risk reduction. Benson and
Clay (2004) note that vulnerability is a dynamic process, which depends on the
type of natural hazard, the overall structure of an economy (including natural re-
source endowments), the geographic size of a country, the country’s income level
and stage of development, environmental change (destruction of ecosystems which
modify ecosystem services), disaster management, and resiliency. National policies
to reduce or to prevent damage from natural disasters can hence explain large dis-
crepancies between countries. At the international level, a comprehensive initiative
to reduce disaster risks is led by the United Nations with the Hyogo Framework
for Action, adopted in 2005, which intended “the substantial reduction of disaster
losses, in lives and the social, economic and environmental assets of communi-
1Hallegatte et al. (2011) assume for industrialized countries that “uninsurable losses represent
about 40% of insurable losses”.
2In 1999, National Research Council (USA) proposed a framework for loss estimation. In 2003,
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
has proposed a standard methodology to assess damage and human losses from natural dis-
asters.
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ties and countries.” Some international reports (World Bank 2005, UNISDR 2009)
have thus identified factors of vulnerability and built indices of risk associated to
natural disasters for nearly every country in the world.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 The EM-DAT global database on natural disasters
Three main global databases on natural disasters exist. Two of them depend on
reinsurance companies and are private, Nathan (from Munich Re) and Sigma (from
Swiss Re). The other one is public, EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International
Disaster Database – www.emdat.be - Université Catholique de Louvain - Brussels
- Belgium. The latter has been maintained by the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the School of Public Health of the Université
catholique de Louvain located in Brussels, Belgium, since 1988. EM-DAT includes
all disasters from 1900 until present at a country level, which fit at least one
of the following criteria: 10 or more people killed, 100 or more people affected,
declaration of a state of emergency, call for international assistance. If a disaster
occurred in several countries, the disaster event will result in several country-level
disasters data points. The database is compiled from various sources, including UN
agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes
and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments and
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
We have accessed the EM-DAT raw data on all natural disasters worldwide from
1900 to 2007. The data includes the following information: disaster type, disaster
sub-type, event name, localization, start and end date, people killed, estimated
damage, disaster magnitude scale. The type of the event is geophysical (earth-
quake, volcano, mass movement dry), hydrological (flood, mass movement wet),
meteorological (storm) or climatological (extreme temperature, drought, wildfire).
Disaster magnitude scales are Richter scale for an earthquake, maximum wind
speed (kph) for a storm, and km2 affected for a flood. The estimated damage is
entered in US $ (in thousands) in the value of the year of occurrence. We assume
here that the indirect losses are small compared to the direct damage in these
estimated damage or at least that they are strongly correlated. All damage figures
are deflated with the Implicit Price Deflator of USA real chained GDP for the base
year 2005 (from US Bureau of Economic Analysis).
One should note that the data are by construction not homogenous. There is no
single threshold on damage for the inclusion in the database. The four criteria are
indeed “10 or more people killed”, “100 or more people affected”, “a declaration
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of a state of emergency” or “a call for international assistance”. One event with
high damage but with only few killed and no needs for international assistance
will not be include. Gall et al. (2009) call this a threshold bias that exists in
other databases on natural disasters. For example, if we compare data on tropical
cyclone on EM-DAT for the USA and data from the NOAA (National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration) formatted by Pielke et al. (2008) and Nordhaus
(2006), it can be easily seen that tropical storms and small hurricanes (category 1
on Saffir-Simpson scale) are generally excluded from EM-DAT. For example, before
1980, there are 133 observations from NOAA and only 37 from EM-DAT. Quality
in the EM-DAT is also probably questionable prior to the creation of the database
(1988). More precisely, CRED has compared the three main global databases,
EM-DAT, Nathan and Sigma (Guha-Sapir and Below 2004) and found significant
discrepancies between them. The report underlines that observations before the
1980’s have greater discrepancies than those from the 1990’s. Most of the existing
econometric analyses are indeed based on EM-DAT begin at 1980. We have sim-
ilarly chosen to use the period 1980-2007 for our main econometric works, after
checking that the determinants of non-response weren’t different for the periods
1980-2007 and 1988-2007. Climatological events (extreme temperature, drought,
wildfire) are excluded as their duration can be longer (several months) than other
disasters. Furthermore, the Global Assessment Report: Risk and Poverty in a
Changing Climate (UNISDR 2009) has underlined that a drought is a much more
complex type of hazard often linked with the local political situation. We finally
restricted our analysis to earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones, as we can ob-
serve a measure of disaster magnitude for those events and it is consistent with our
risk exposure index defined at country level. Some countries have been excluded
since there are no economic data easily available for islands or territories that
are not independent (Guadeloupe, Reunion, New Caledonia. . . ), former commu-
nist countries (before 1990), small pacific islands (Kiribati, Nauru. . . ), or unstable
counties (North Korea, Myanmar, Somalia. . . ). We also did not include small
countries with no events (Malta. . . ) and those for which our risk exposure index
is not available. The final sample used for our econometric analysis contains 3898
natural events for 121 countries.
1.3.2 Risk exposure, socio-economic and geographical data
In order to characterize the level of development of a country, several indicators
have been collected, such as real chained GDP from Penn World Table and Hu-
man development indicator (HDI) from the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP). For vulnerability to natural disasters, we use the index computed by
Schumacher and Strobl (2011), which measures the expected hazard of a natural
disaster from the natural disaster global hot-spots data (World Bank 2005). As
10
1.4 Distinguishing actual and observed data on natural disasters
robustness checks we also used an index computed by the UN, i.e., the Mortality
Risk Index (UNISDR, 2009), which ranges from 1 (negligible) to 10 (extreme). It
should be noted that since it is based on modeling hazards in both frequency and
intensity, human exposure and identification of their vulnerability, it is determined
endogenously. The linear correlation between the two indices is low, being around
0.21. Moreover, the global hot-spots index is more correlated with mean deaths
and damage (0.24 and 0.31) than the Mortality Risk Index (0.21 and -0.05).
1.3.3 An unequal distribution of risk
One important fact is that only few disasters cause most of the damage and killed.
Two main indicators enable us to check this. The first one is the Gini index,
where the closer this index is to one the more the distribution is concentrated.
For data we find that damage is less concentrated (0.890 for positive values) than
human impacts (0.922 for positive values). In all case, the Gini index is notably
very high. The other severity indicator is the categorical variable from Munich
Re, where extreme natural catastrophes are those with more than 2000 killed or 2
billion real $ of damage. These represent only 3.4% of disasters but 78% of damage
and 73% of killed. Compared to real chained GDP, only 8.5% of disasters (with
known damage) have damage greater than 0.5 % of GDP. Human impacts mainly
appeared in developing countries. In developed regions, damage can be costly (11%
in Europe for 9% of natural disasters) but human impacts are lower (1% in Europe).
Moreover, 8 of the 10 more expensive disasters took place in developed countries
(United States, Japan. . . ) whereas the more deadly ones are all in developing
countries. This unequal distribution is confirmed with the distribution of Risk
Index. Southern Asia and some countries of Southern America appear to be the
riskier countries in the world. Northern America and some countries of Sub-Sahara
Africa appear a little less risky. Europe has a relatively low risk exposure.
1.4 Distinguishing actual and observed data on
natural disasters
1.4.1 What does a zero value mean?
EM-DAT Frequently Asked Questions mention “Empty fields are usually the way
missing values or non reported information are entered into EM-DAT. A “0” in EM-
DAT does not represent a value and can mean that no information is available.”.
It is strangely never discussed in the articles using this database (or other ones
on natural disasters). However, we find that non-response (or real zeros) is large
in our sample, accounting for 57% for damage and 26% for the number of deaths.
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In terms of the disaster magnitude scale, non-response appears to depend on the
type of the event, where it is low for earthquakes (around 6%) but higher (around
60%) for floods and cyclones.
We discuss here what is included and observed in a natural disaster database
and its impacts for econometrics works. Two endogenous thresholds (i.e. linked
with the level of development or the index of risk of the country) can explain that
damage from a natural disaster remain unknown. The first one is linked with the
threshold used for the inclusion in the database, there is no threshold on damage
with EM-DAT. The second one is directly linked with the level of development as
statistics have often less accuracy in developing countries.
Figure 1.2 illustrates this phenomenon, detailing 4 cases (high/low risk and
developing/developed countries). In this example, 100 events occurred in countries
with a high risk of disasters and 50 in those with a low risk, which can be controlled
in econometrics works using an index of risk.
However, a potential natural disaster can occur without being included in the
database (black blocks in figure 1.2). Several explanations are possible. One is that
an event never translated into a natural disaster, as for instance when it takes place
in an unpopulated area. The other is that a natural disaster occurred but did not
meet the cut-off criteria to be classified as one. For example, in developed countries
some disasters with high damage but no deaths can be unobserved. A declaration
of a state of emergency or a call for international assistance is more likely in
developing countries than in developed ones. If death are lower in developed
countries, events won’t be included that would be observed in developing countries.
For a country with a low risk of natural disaster, preventive measures may be less
strong and explain more deaths for a similar event. This rate for non-inclusion
would be lower in developing countries and for countries with a low risk of natural
disasters. For deaths, we only unobserve small events, which is not a major issue.
For damage, we potentially unobserve events with high damage, which is related
endogenously with economic development and risk exposure. Another possibility is
too that a natural disaster occurred but was not recorded because of measurement
error (potentially systematic).
But even if the event is included, damage could be unknown (white blocks in
figure 1.2), if there is a lack of statistical institutes for instance. In our database,
this non-response rate is linked with the Human Development Indicator rank (cf.
figure 1.3). A higher rank of 10 places increases non-response rate of damage
nearly 2.4% and reduces the zero rate of people killed by 1%. Nevertheless, an
event with no deaths cannot be considered as an error whereas a natural disaster
with no damage is impossible. If there is “10 or more people killed”, “100 or more
people affected”, “a declaration of a state of emergency” or “a call for international
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assistance”, it is difficult to argue that there are no damage but it is possible there
are a lot of people affected but no death in particular in developed countries.
In figure 1.2, actual damage in developing countries is higher than in developed
ones but observed damage is lower. Thus one could falsely conclude a positive
relationship between development and damage and there would be an upward bias
in the case that unknown damage is of comparable size.
For known damage, there are major events, which may be assumed to be ob-
served for all countries. In this case, if damage is over-dispersed, potential re-
lationships between development and damage may result from these events only
(and the two previous selection bias would be low). Also political limitations can
affect figures, especially for developing countries. For example, in order to increase
humanitarian aid, political authorities could overestimate damage when they are
declared (Stromberg 2007). It can engender a downward bias.
Zero values can come from several phenomena: censorship (events which never
translated into a disaster due to prevention), truncation (no events with less than
10 people killed), selection and measurement errors (non-response and accuracy of
data linked with development). All in all, there may be significant biases, mainly
for damage. It is difficult to assess the direction of this bias, as high damage can
be unobserved due to a threshold inclusion bias in high-developed countries but
other damage can be over-estimated in developing countries.
1.4.2 A characterization of a selection bias
We now examine the possibility of a selection bias using a probit model of non-
response to estimated damage and people killed. We model the probability to
observe estimated damage (or people killed) higher than 0 with a Probit model as
P (Damageit > 0/X) = F (α + β ·Xit) estimated with maximum likelihood, F the
c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution and Xit including the ranking compared
to the Human Development Index (HDI, to account for the level of development),
log of people killed (for the size of the events), log of population (for the size of
the country), a trend and the type of events. For damage, we model the prob-
ability for each type of disaster including the disaster magnitude (Richter scale
for earthquake, km2 area impacted for flood, maximum wind speed for cyclones)
in predictors. Results (probit average marginal effects) are presented in table 1.1.
The four main conclusions are 1) the probability of non-response is reduced in very
high developed countries (compared to low developed countries), 2) the probability
of non-response is reduced for large scale disasters, coefficients are negative and
significant for magnitude disaster and level of killed (or damage), 3) the effect of
years is ambiguous and small, 4) data quality for people killed seems to be higher
than for damage. As a conclusion, a selection bias will exist if we do not take into
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account non-response for econometric analyses on damage. Nevertheless, it will be
probably small because non-response is more important for small-scale disasters.
Furthermore, the maps (figure 1.4) show the unequal distribution of non-response
for damage with higher rate in Africa and South-America. For the number of
deaths, the geographical distribution appears more random. In view of this we
will test different samples, one for all countries, the other one for countries with a
non-response rate less than 60 %. Observations will be also considered as censored.
1.4.3 A low predictive power for damage
We have also tried to correct non-response by linking damage and people killed as
in Cavallo et al. (2010). They make an assessment of the damage caused by the
2010 earthquake in Haiti with the information available at the date of the earth-
quake (nowcasting). They model the damage as Log of Damageit = α+β ·Xit+εit
estimated with OLS and Xit including the log of people killed (information is more
readily available), real GDP per capita, population, a trend and the number of
previous events. Results are presented in table 1.2. The model for damage and
main events is similar to Cavallo et al.. There is a positive effect of number of
death, development and population and a negative one for past events. As the
number of deaths and damage are simultaneous events, the number of death is
endogenous. If we apply their methodology to predict damage of the 2010 Haiti
Earthquake, we find a higher estimation of 12-14 2005 billions dollars. Neverthe-
less, one should note a mistake in Cavallo et al. (2010) as the prediction is done
with e ̂Ln(Damages), instead of the log-model corrected prediction e ̂Ln(Damages) · eσ̂2/2
(as E (Log (y) /x) = Log (y) but E (y/x) = y · eσ2/2). The prediction in Cavallo et
al. (2010) is so underestimated. We find an estimation of 35-39 2005 billions dol-
lars with the corrected prediction. The adjusted R2 is similar with the model for
all events, and even better for the ratio damage/population. The trend becomes
significant in these models. We can note that there are some leverage points (i.e.,
outlier observations for predictors) in those models which mainly correspond to
small islands and some bad individual predictions (figure 1.5). The damage is of-
ten overestimated (96% of cases) but major events are often underestimated. The
use of log transformation avoids having non-robust model (results with a median
or a weighted regression are similar) but does not provide a good quality of pre-
diction out-of-sample for extreme events. We apply the model for all events at the
observations with no known damage and find again that those unknown damage
is probably smaller than the known damage. Lastly we estimate the model with a
two-step Heckman methodology to control for selection bias (table 1.2, column 5),
where it is found that the estimator of the GDP/Population is 32% lower. Thus
it seems difficult to obtain a precise estimate for the link between damage and
14
1.5 Take into account the role of major events
development.
1.5 Take into account the role of major events
1.5.1 Linking damage with development and risk exposure
Concerning the role of development3, Kahn (2005) and Toya and Skidmore (2007)
conclude that direct losses of natural disasters are larger for emerging countries
than for industrialized ones, which can be explained by the increasing demand
for safety with higher incomes, the increasing resources spent on prevention ef-
forts and disasters reduction plans, and better institutions. Other determinants
identified are factors such as economic inequalities, degree of openness, or the av-
erage level of education. More precisely, Schumacher and Strobl (2011) construct
a theoretical risk model to explain this fact and to study the links between risk,
development, and direct costs of natural disasters. The adaptation expenditure
to prevent damage of natural disasters are thus explained by development, cost
of adaptation, probability, and expected intensity of a disaster (this probability is
assumed to be known). Their econometric analysis shows a non-linear relation-
ship between damage and wealth, which depends on the risk of natural disasters
faced by countries. An inverse u-shaped link between direct damage and GDP is
found for low and medium risky countries whereas there is a u-shaped link for high
risky countries, which is consistent with their theoretical model. Using quantile
regression, Neumayer et al. (2013) find a positive link between development and
damage but no clear relationship for small disasters. They thus consider small
damage as random and unpreventable. In order to predict damage for the 2010
Haiti earthquake, Cavallo et al. (2010) use OLS linking damage, killed people and
development. They find a positive link between development and damage. Taken
together, these articles conclude that there is a negative correlation between num-
ber of deaths and development, but the findings are not similar for damage4.
3A lot of descriptive approaches have been published from the late 1990s, which aimed at nor-
malizing damage with different variables (general price index, population, wealth, housing...).
Their conclusions differ as the presence or absence of an increasing trend after normalization
of data over the last 30 years, which may be associated with climate change (Bouwer 2011,
Neumayer and Barthel 2011).
4Raschky (2008) analyses too the role of institutions, better institutions implying less damage.
Stromberg (2007) explores the determinants of aids. Ambarci et al. (2005) found negative
correlation between development and people killed for major earthquakes and controlling by
exogenous measure of disaster magnitude.
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1.5.2 Censored quantile regressions
The aim of this part is to extend the econometric analysis of Kahn (2005), Toya
and Skidmore (2007) and Schumacher and Strobl (2011) linking risk exposure,
development, and losses by using the censored quantile regression methodology
as adapted from Chernozhukov and Hong (2002). More specifically, the use of
the observed events (raw data) does not take into account the hazard exposure to
natural disasters faced by countries, even when controlling for the hazard associ-
ated with a natural event (e.g., for example the maximum wind speed at landfall
for hurricane). If, for instance, one compares a rich country with a high risk of
natural disasters to a poor country with a low risk of natural disasters then one
could falsely conclude there being a positive link between development and dam-
age. Exclude the years with no death or damage observed would thus create a
classical selection bias. The use of panel data with zero values for years without
disasters can correct this bias and can explain some divergent results.
We estimated the panel model proposed by Schumacher and Strobl (2011) from
their theoretical risk model with our new data:
y∗it = log
(
1 +
Damagei,t
Popi,t−1
)
= α+ β1log
(
GDPi, t− 1
Popi,t−1
)
+ β2log2
(
GDPi, t− 1
Popi,t−1
)
+
∑
j
δjX
j
i,t−1 + εi,t
Where i is a country and t a year (from 1980 to 2007)5, damage is the sum of
estimated damage from EM-DAT (deflated with index price deflator from BEA)
for year t and type of disasters considered, log value of GDP per capita come from
chained accounts of the World Penn Tables, per capita variables are considered to
take into account growth of vulnerability. For variables of population and GDP,
the previous year is considered to avoid potential problems of endogeneity, X are
a set of control variable, which include log value of population, a trend, a measure
of risk. In order to be consistent with our index of risk, only earthquakes, floods
and tropical cyclones are taken into account.
In the theoretical model of Shumacher and Strobl (2011), observed damage (the
costs of natural disasters) can be seen as the solution of a maximization problem
depending on economic development and prevention expenditure. The censoring
point is partly a corner solution (but can be seen too as a selection process due
to the hazard exposure). No damage is observed due to economic development
and prevention expenditure. To deal with censorship of the data (years with no
disasters or no damage associated to a disaster), Schumacher and Strobl (2011)
5We have adopted three measures for the year of occurrence of a disaster, such as 1) the start
year, 2) the end year, 3) the end year if the disaster ends before October, else the end year
+1. It doesn’t change the results.
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use a Tobit I model yit = max (0, y∗it). Kahn (2005) uses a zero inflated negative
binomial model (for deaths), which assumes that the process contains two parts,
one that explains if a natural disaster occurred with a logit model and the other
to explain the deaths with a negative binomial model. The ZINB model is more
appropriate when data are over-dispersed and there is an excess of real zero. In
this latter model, we do not observe deaths either because no natural disaster has
occurred or because there were no deaths associated with a disaster. Furthermore,
robust standard errors are implemented by within country clustering of the error
term and a random effect assumption6.
The selection bias as shown in the description of data is not taken into account
with these approaches. It is difficult to solve selection bias with a high rate of non-
response (more than 60%) and no valid instrumental variables with a generalized
Tobit. We so use predictions as defined in the previous section, to check if results
change on a large scale.
Furthermore, Tobit and ZINB models measure a mean effect whereas the effects
may be heterogeneous between small and large disasters even without outliers.
They are based on a parametric choice. If the errors are not correctly specified
(for damage and selection equation), estimators are biased and not consistent.
We estimate censored quantile regressions in order to study heterogeneous effects
with a methodology robust to a misspecification of the error term. Instead of
defining the conditional mean of the dependant variable E (Y/X) = X ′β, quantile
linear regressions (QR) define the conditional quantiles such as
QY/X (τ) = infvR
{
v : FY/X (v) > τ
}
= X ′β (τ)
where QY/X (τ) is the τ conditional quantile of Y and the conditional quantile
of the error term is 0. With n observations (Yi, Xi), the QR estimator of is found
by solving
min
∑
i
ρτ
(
Yi −X ′iβ (τ)
)
with ρτ = τ − 1
{
Yi < X
′
iβ (τ)
}
.
Using uncensored quantile regression with endogenous censored data gives biased
estimators (appendix for an illustration with simulations). This bias exists even
for high quantiles, if for some value of the predictor the dependent variable is
almost always censored. The bias will be low if the rate of censoring is overall low.
6Our hazard exposure index is not time-varying. We so do not used a fixed effect model. The
number of events affecting multiple countries is few. Spatial dependencies between countries
are so assumed to be weak and are not taken into account.
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Powell (1986) has defined a censured quantile regression (CQR) model for cen-
soring points known Ci as
QY/X,Ci (τ) = max (Ci, X ′β (τ))
whose consistent and asymptotically normal estimator is found by solving
min
∑
i
ρ
′
τ (Yi −max (Ci, X ′β (τ)))
with ρ′τ = τ − 1 {Yi < max (Ci, X ′β (τ))}.
Unfortunately, only a few applications exist due to computational difficulty.
Some computational algorithms have been designed such as Fitzenberger (1997,
2007), but these are efficient only for a low degree of censorship. This is not the case
of our EM-DAT, which has a very high degree of censorship of around 73%. We
thus used the three-step censored quantile regression developed by Chernozhukov
and Hong (2002) with a separation restriction on the censoring probability. This
estimator is easy to compute. Furthermore, it is asymptotically as efficient as
Powell’s estimator and has good finite-sample properties. The three steps are the
followings with a censoring point Ci = 0:
Step 1: Estimate a parametric classification model P
(
Y > 0/
.
X
)
, of being not
censoring with logit, probit, or extreme value model, and desired transforms of
explanatory variables
.
X (polynomial, interactions. . . ). A sub-sample
J0 =
{
i : P
(
Yi > 0/
.
X i
)
> 1− τ + c
}
is thus selected with c between 0 and τ .
Step 2: Obtain the initial (inefficient) estimator βˆ0 (τ) with standard QR on
sample J0 and select a new sample J1 =
{
i : X ′i βˆ0 (τ) > δn
}
where δn is a small
positive number as δn ↘ 0 and √nδn →∞ .
Step 3: Obtain the CQR estimator βˆ1 (τ) with standard QR on sample J1, after
checking that J0 ⊂ J1.
We have computed it for quantiles 0.75 to 0.99 with the Stata Package cqiv
(Chernozhukov et al. 2012)7. We do not compute lower quantiles due to the
eventual degeneracy of the selected design matrix. Uncensored quantile regressions
have been estimated. Standard errors are obtained with block bootstrap (Bilias et
al. 2000) at the country level.
Censored quantile regression can be related to a Tobit model. More precisely,
censored quantile estimators converge to Tobit estimators of the latent dependent
variable y∗ if the “real” model is a Tobit model. Comparing average marginal
7Gustavsen et al. (2008), Fack et Landais (2009) for examples of application.
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effects is difficult as these ones depend on parametric choices for Tobit (cf. ap-
pendix). There is however no direct link with the negative binomial estimators of
the ZINB model.
1.5.3 Results and robustness to measurement errors
Using classical (non censored) and three step censored quantile estimators, we
found interesting and consistent results. In figure 1.6, the continuous black line
represents the three-step estimates of βˆ1 (τ) , i.e., the coefficients of the QR for
the (conditional) quantile of the direct damage, and the grey one the non censored
QR estimate. Each QR explains this conditional quantile by log value of GDP per
capita (and its square), the index of risk exposure, log value of population, and
year dummies.
For the number of deaths, the estimated parameters of GDP per capita are
positive and its squares are negative, which is consistent with previous study of
Schumacher and Strobl (2011). The number of deaths rises with GDP for coun-
tries with GDP lower than a threshold and decrease after this threshold. This
result is only significant for higher quantiles, and rises with quantiles. Thus, the
relationship found with Tobit or ZINB model is mainly valid for higher quantiles,
i.e., for larger deaths or major events. For lower quantiles (<0.95) the relationship
between development, risk exposure and deaths does not appear so clear. Risk
exposure has a higher effect for higher deaths too. For damage, we find inconsis-
tent results, which confirm the lack of robustness of the analyses conducted using
damage. We have not included the analysis on imputed data, as the imputation
does not reproduce the distribution of the observed damage but its mean.
Results for uncensored and censored quantile estimators are close, which is dif-
ficult to explain. It would be the case if the censorship threshold was weakly
endogenous or if the rate of censorship was low (cf. appendix for more details).
But that is not the case here, as the rate of censorship is high and linked with
economic development. One may argue that predictors have low power to explain
censorship and that specification of the model may be improved. However, we
note that the parameters of GDP per capita (and its square) are underestimated
for the number of deaths with the uncensored quantile estimators.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 give the average marginal effects of the Tobit and the ZINB
models for losses (monetary and human ones) due to earthquakes, floods and
tropical cyclones8. Using a Tobit model, we find consistent results with previous
8In the theoretical model of Shumacher and Strobl (2011), observed damage (the costs of natural
disasters) can be seen as the solution of a maximization problem depending on economic
development and prevention expenditure. The censoring point is partly a corner solution
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study of Schumacher and Strobl (2011). At a global scale, GDP per capita has a
positive effect while its squared value has a negative effect. The exact coefficients
suggest that damage rises with GDP for countries with GDP lower than 17,400
2005 dollars per inhabitants and decrease after this threshold. The amount is
smaller for the number of deaths, i.e., around 4,000 2005 dollars. Population
and the risk index have a positive impact. If we use imputed damage (table 1.3,
columns 4 and 5), the threshold drops to around 9,000 2005 dollars per inhabitants.
The coefficients for uncorrected damage thus would result in an upward bias. If we
restrict the sample to countries with a rate of non-response lower than 60% (tables
1.3 and 1.4, column 2), the coefficient on GDP per capita become negative but
insignificant and its squared value positive but insignificant. The exact coefficients
would imply a null or negative correlation between losses and development. Using
the ZINB model (tables 1.3 and 1.4, column 3), one discovers inconsistent results
for damage with a negative coefficient for population and a positive (but not
significant) correlation with development. For deaths, results remain consistent
but coefficients for GDP per capita are 13 times higher. This may be due to the fact
that Tobit model is not suitable to model over-dispersed variables. Nevertheless,
the implied elasticities would be unrealistic. All in all, results for damage thus
seem to be more non robust. Heterogeneous effects are highlighted for deaths.
For further robustness we experimented with including interactions between the
measure of risk and GDP. Additionally we used a time trend rather than year
dummies, as well as our alternative measure of risk, and different samples. We
found that results to be robust for the case for deaths but not for damage, which
is consistent with the main finding that results for damage are not robust.
1.5.4 Implications of the results
We find a non-linear relationship between disaster mortality, development and risk
exposure only for higher conditional losses. It may suggest that different behav-
(but can be seen too as a selection process due to the hazard exposure). No damage is
observed due to economic development and prevention expenditure. We are so interested in
the marginal effects on the expected value for y (censored and uncensored), which is for the
Tobit model ∂E(yi)∂xk = φ
(
Xiβ
σ
)
βk where φ is the standard normal cdf. The marginal effects
are not constant and depend of the predictors, we so use average marginal effects. Average
marginal effects for Tobit models correspond to a scale factor of the estimators. There is
not such a scale factor for ZINB models, which assume that the process contains two parts,
one that explains if a natural disaster occurred with a logit model and the other to explain
the deaths with a negative binomial model. The signs of the average marginal effects can be
different of the estimators for the count process (that is the case for damage). Finally, the
dependent variable is not the same in both models, log (Y ) with the Tobit model, Y with
the ZINB model. In order to have homogenous quantities, we compute ∂log (y) /∂x for ZINB
models (instead of the usual marginal effect ∂y/∂x).
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iors may exist between large and rare disasters and small but more frequent ones.
Neumayer et al. (2013) find a close result for damage using quantile regression too.
Due to market failures caused by collective action, information asymmetry and my-
opic behavior, countries with a higher risk exposure will experience lower damage
for a same hazard magnitude but for large natural disasters only. They argue that
“small-scale damage is often unavoidable and essentially random. Where disaster
preparedness should have its strongest effect is in the mitigation and prevention
of large-scale damage.”. They use MunichRe database for which non-response is
low, but still have a lack of measurements standards. Their results entail two main
drawbacks. They exclude all country-years with zero damage observed, which may
only be valid to study extreme events and not the all distribution. In the theoret-
ical model of Shumacher and Strobl (2011), observed damage (the costs of natural
disasters) can be seen as the solution of a maximization problem depending on
economic development and prevention expenditure. Using this framework, exclud-
ing zero values engenders a classical selection bias. Furthermore, Neumayer et al.
(2013) argue that for high quantiles, all conditional damage is positive which may
remove this selection bias. Appendix 1 gives details why it is not the case. Using
censored quantile regression is so an improvement, which takes into account partly
this selection bias.
We differ too concerning our interpretation of higher effects for higher condi-
tional quantiles. One may argue that this result comes from a higher variability of
higher losses. But the finding of strong impacts (of development and risk exposure)
at high losses indicates the presence of a threshold, with three possible explana-
tions corresponding to other assumptions that the model of Schumacher and Strobl
(2011). Different behaviors may indeed exist between large and rare disasters and
small but more frequent ones. All countries could prevent the small-scale events
but not the larger ones. First, there is the irreversible nature of some damage.
Damage will not be a linear function of the natural hazard. For instance, building
standards allow that damage associated to an earthquake is null up to a threshold.
If the building collapses, damage will be very high. This threshold, which can be
seen as the maximum damage prevented, would be endogenously determined with
characteristics of countries. Secondly, large and rare disasters can be seen as an
emerging risk whose probability is not really known. There would be two types of
disasters, those for which the probability of occurrence is known (as in the model of
Schumacher and Strobl (2011)) and the unpredictable events. Uncertainty to pre-
dict future climate and trends in natural disasters can cause an under-investment
to adapt and mitigate their potential effects (Hallegatte 2009). The long-term
prospective could be better in riskier or developed countries. Furthermore, due to
the absence of short-term political benefits, prevention measures are not adapted
to the worst case scenario (Neumayer et al. 2013). Thirdly, risk perception can
21
Chapter 1 The death toll and the damage of natural disasters: beyond the
averages
be different towards rare and more frequent disasters. The perceived probability
can be different from the objective probability. The "memory of risk" is not good
for large disasters. People can simply forget the actual risk. It appears so that
large-scale damage is much more random than small-scale disasters. Occurrence
of small-scale disasters could be easier to predict and so to prevent and mitigate.
They may be less related to economic development.
Natural disasters are used to measure the impact of shocks on growth (Noy
2009; Loayza et al. 2012; Cavallo et al. 2013; Ahlerup 2013) or as an exogenous
instrument on several macroeconomic indicators (Felbermayr and Gröschl 2013 for
international trade). Our article shows these analyses have two main limits. First,
losses are measured with errors and there is a selection bias associated to the inclu-
sion in the database. Loayza et al. (2012) and Cavallo et al. (2013) use the people
affected or killed to take into account the low accuracy of damage. However, losses
(human and monetary ones) are not exogenous and are linked with development
and risk exposure. Defining major events using observed losses does not allow
inferring causal effects. Ahlerup (2013) uses the number of events registered as a
measure of shock, noting that there is less endogeneity then. Figure 1.2 shows that
is not obviously the case. The use of measures independent of losses (geophysical
or meteorological data) appears to be necessary to infer causal effects of natural
disasters on growth and may explain the divergent results of this literature (Cav-
allo et al. 2013). Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) create such a database (named
GeoMet) containing measures of the physical strength for each disaster worldwide.
They find too a selection bias associated to the inclusion of observed events in a
database such as EM-DAT. Strobl (2012) defines a meteorological measure for the
hurricanes in the United States. Two meta-analyses on the link between natural
disasters and growth (Lazzaroni and van Bergeijk (2014) and Klomp and Valckx
(2014)) have shown that the divergent results come especially from the estima-
tion technique, the use of panel or not, the consideration of outliers, the period,
or the sample of countries. However, the problem of correcting for endogeneity
with geophysical or meteorological data is not taken into account as Klomp and
Valckx (2014) note, “there are too few observations to obtain reliable estimation
results examining these measures separately”. Further studies using such measures
independent from losses can solve the disagreement between these studies.
1.6 Conclusion
Many existing empirical studies of the economics of natural disasters suffer from
two main drawbacks. One is the accuracy of data. We show that the rate of
non-response for damage is very high and correlated with the level of develop-
ment. This fact is rarely discussed. It causes a selection bias that is difficult to
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correct, even if its non-response seems more prevalent for small events. It also
seems difficult to find robust econometric results for damage in the absence of an
accounting framework to measure them. The use of this damage as predictors in
macroeconomic studies appears questionable too because of measurement errors.
The use of measures independent of losses (Strobl 2012, Felbermayr and Gröschl
2014) could be more adapted to infer causal effects of natural disasters on growth
and other macroeconomic indicators.
The other weakness in many existing studies is that commonly used econometric
models do not seem to be adapted for studying determinants of human losses of
natural disasters. Rather their results apply mainly for extreme quantiles. Thus
quantile regressions seem to better fit such data on natural disasters. At last, if
the theoretical model is not completely consistent with our results, the finding
of strong impacts (of development and risk exposure) at high losses indicates the
presence of a threshold. This threshold can be explained by the irreversible nature
of some damage (infrastructures. . . ), or could be endogenously determined with
characteristics of countries. Moreover, different behaviors can exist in terms of
large and rare disasters and, small but more frequent disasters. Thus theoretical
models need to be developed to take account of this.
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1.7 Tables and graphics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Zero Damages Zero Damages Zero Damages Zero Damages Zero Killed
HDI rank 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Trend -0.004∗ -0.006∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Log(Population) 0.006 -0.024∗∗ 0.003 0.004 -0.040∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.019) (0.021) (0.007)
Log(1+Killed) -0.090∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.024)
Log(1+Damages) -0.021∗∗∗
(0.001)
Flood Ref Ref
Earthquake -0.021 0.079∗∗
(0.034) (0.036)
Cyclone -0.202∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.027)
Disaster magnitude -0.069∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.139) (0.033)
Observations 3898 574 935 373 3898
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.255 0.126 0.205 0.132
Ref. probability 0.570 0.633 0.495 0.325 0.255
Note: Column 1 is the average marginal effects of the probit model for zero damage, for all countries and for
earthquakes, floods and cyclones from 1980 to 2007. Column 5 is for zero killed. Columns 2, 3 and 4 are the
average marginal effects of the probit model for zero damage taking into account disaster magnitude (Richter scale
for earthquake, km2 area impacted for floods (x1000000), maximum wind speed for cyclones (x100)). Standard
errors (clustered by country levels) are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Table 1.1 : Zero damage and zero killed determinants - probit average marginal
effects
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Damages) Log(Damages) Log(Damages Log(Damages Log(Damages
/Population) /Population) /Population)
Main Events All Events Main Events All Events All Events
Log(Killed) 0.581∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.042)
Log(Killed/Population) 0.928∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.078) (0.137)
Log(Gdp/Population) 0.924∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.154) (0.103) (0.161) (0.207)
Log(Population) 0.347∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.070)
Log(Population/Area) 0.248∗ 0.204 0.185
(0.131) (0.136) (0.131)
Trend -0.017 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
Flood Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Earthquake 0.127 0.097 0.059 -0.407∗ -0.309
(0.250) (0.233) (0.241) (0.243) (0.240)
Cyclone 0.394∗∗ 0.575∗∗ 0.276∗ 0.476∗ -0.030
(0.155) (0.229) (0.154) (0.266) (0.248)
Past Event 1960-1979 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -1.446 -4.710∗∗∗ -1.151 -2.648∗ 2.185
(1.367) (1.243) (1.051) (1.484) (1.904)
Observations 761 1675 761 1675 3898
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.397 0.588 0.430 .
Note: Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 are estimated with OLS, clustered by countries. Earthquakes, floods and cyclones
with positive damage from 1980 to 2007 for all countries are taken into account (columns 2 and 4). Main events
are natural disasters with damage higher than 10 millions dollars and 10 people killed (columns 1 and 3). Column
5 is Heckman two-step estimators to control for non-response. Exclusion variables are those uses in table 1.1.
Standard errors (clustered by country levels) are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Table 1.2 : Main determinants of damage as in Cavallo et al. (2010)
25
Chapter 1 The death toll and the damage of natural disasters: beyond the
averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Damages Log(Damages Log(Damages Log(Damages Log(Damages
/Population) /Population) /Population) /Population) /Population)
All Countries NR<60% All Countries All Countries NR<60%
Tobit Tobit ZINB Tobit Tobit
Log(Gdp/Population) 4.178∗∗∗ -0.227 1.532 4.139∗∗∗ -0.991
(1.592) (2.827) (1.918) (1.574) (3.644)
Log2(Gdp/Population) -0.214∗∗ 0.014 -0.028 -0.227∗∗ 0.051
(0.093) (0.160) (0.111) (0.094) (0.205)
Log(Population) 0.648∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.066) (0.081) (0.065) (0.097)
Risk Index 0.016∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Trend 0.029∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.022∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015)
Observations 3161 1389 3161 3161 1389
Censored 2310 896 2310 1618 691
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.047 . 0.047 0.040
Note: Earthquakes, floods and cyclones from 1980 to 2007 for all countries are taken into account in columns
1, 3 and 4. In column 2 and 5, only countries with a non-response rate lower than 60% are taken into account.
Columns 4 and 5 use predictions for non-response for damage. Standard errors (clustered by country levels) are
in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Table 1.3 : Determinants of damage - Tobit and ZINB average marginal effects
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(1) (2) (3)
Log(Killed Log(Killed Log(Killed
/Population) /Population) /Population)
All Countries NR<60% All Countries
Tobit Tobit ZINB
Log(Gdp/Population) 0.948∗∗∗ -0.335 12.423∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.540) (2.572)
Log2(Gdp/Population) -0.058∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.755∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.030) (0.152)
Log(Population) 0.100∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.114
(0.012) (0.015) (0.097)
Risk Index 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Trend 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.011
(0.001) (0.002) (0.018)
Observations 3161 1389 3161
Censored 1932 832 1932
PseudoR2 0.060 0.056 .
Note: Earthquakes, floods and cyclones from 1980 to 2007 for all countries are taken into account in columns 1
and 3. In column 2, only countries with a non-response rate lower than 60% are taken into account. Standard
errors (clustered by country levels) are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Table 1.4 : Determinants of killed people - Tobit and ZINB average marginal effects
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Source: Author’s own representation
Figure 1.1 : A simple representation of economics of natural disasters
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Note: In the high risk and developing country, 100 “potential” natural disasters occurred. 10 are not observed in
the database, 60 are observed but damage is not known (“zero values”), 30 are observed with known damage. 10
are major events.
Figure 1.2 : Observed and actual data for damage
Note: Earthquakes, floods and cyclones from 1980 to 2007 are taking into account. The rank of HDI (Human
Development Index) is for the year 2005. We compute frequency of events without damage (or killed) for each
country. Fitted line is the linear trend between variables. The horizontal line represents the 60% exclusion rate.
Figure 1.3 : HDI (Human development Index) rank and percent of events without
damage or killed
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Zero Damage Rate Zero Killed Rate
Note: Map is done with SAS.
Figure 1.4 : Map of the word for zero damage and zero killed rates
Leverage, studentized residuals Absolute residuals
and cook’s distance
Note: Earthquakes, floods and cyclones from 1980 to 2007 are taking into account. In the left figure, the bubbles
are weighted with the cook’s distance. The horizontal lines represent the 0.5% quantile of a standard normal
distribution. The vertical line is 3p/n with p the number of predictors and n the number of observations. In the
right figure, absolute residuals are ̂Damage−Damage with ̂Damage = Exp
(
̂Log (Damage)
)
· Exp
(
σ̂2
)
.
Figure 1.5 : Diagnostics tools for determinants of damage with more than 10 mil-
lions $ of damage and more than 10 people killed
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Killed / Population
Log(GDP/Population) Log^2(GDP/Population) Risk Index
Damage / Population
Log(GDP/Population) Log^2(GDP/Population) Risk Index
Note: The X-axis is (conditional) quantiles of direct losses. The Y-axis is coefficients of the quantile regression
(QR) for the (conditional) quantile. The continuous lines represent the three-step estimates of censored QR
(black) and non-censored QR (grey). The dashed lines represent the confidence interval of non-censored QR
estimators, obtained with block-bootstrap at country level. Tobit (black horizontal line) estimators are included
to comparison.
Figure 1.6 : Three step censored quantile regression estimators
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Chapter 2
The Dynamics of Gasoline Prices:
Evidence from Daily French Micro
Data
Using millions of individual gasoline prices collected at a daily frequency, we ex-
amine the speed at which market prices of refined oil are transmitted to retail
gasoline prices in France. For that, we estimate a reduced form model of state-
dependent pricing where thresholds triggering price changes are allowed to vary
over time and depend on the duration since the last price change. We find that
the degree of pass through of wholesale prices to retail gasoline prices is on average
0.77 for diesel and 0.67 for petrol and depend on local market characteristics. The
duration for a shock to be fully transmitted into prices is about 10 days. There is
no significant asymmetry in the transmission of wholesale price to retail prices. Fi-
nally, the duration since the last price change has a significant effect on thresholds
triggering price changes but a large variance of idiosyncratic shocks on thresholds
is also crucial to replicate the size-distribution of price changes.
2.1 Introduction
At which speed agents incorporate specific or common shocks into their prices
is a crucial issue in macroeconomic models. Why are prices sticky and fail to
adjust immediately to their fundamentals? Using more than 5 million of individual
gasoline prices collected at a daily frequency in thousands of gas stations in France,
we examine in this paper to which extent retail gasoline prices are rigid and how
long it takes for a gas station to incorporate an oil price shock.
Our paper is a contribution to the empirical literature on price rigidity models.
We first document that gasoline prices adjust on average once a week whereas
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the price of wholesale gasoline fluctuates every day. Different theoretical models
are used in macroeconomics to rationalize that retail prices respond sluggishly to
shocks. The choice of a particular model of price rigidity has often large conse-
quences on the macroeconomic dynamics (see Nakamura and Steinsson (2013))
and several papers have recently examined patterns of micro prices to assess the
relevance of the different models.1 However, at the micro level, one difficulty is to
observe firm-level determinants of pricing behaviour: do prices adjust infrequently
because shocks are rare or because adjustment costs are large? The market of
gasoline is an unusual clean case to test the relevance of price rigidity models
since a precise and economic meaningful proxy for marginal costs is available at
a daily frequency. Our aim is here to investigate in details microfoundations of
price rigidity and provide more evidence on the sources of this price rigidity.2
While in many recent empirical papers, sectoral inflation is often used to identify
aggregate shocks on marginal costs (see for example Fougere et al. (2007)), we
here use daily prices of diesel and unleaded petrol set at the Rotterdam market
to approximate the marginal cost of retail gasoline firms. We then relate prices
to costs by estimating a reduced form of a menu cost model.3 In this type of
model, the probability of price changes depends on the gap between the nominal
price and the price that would be observed without frictions. If this gap exceeds
a certain threshold, prices are adjusted; the threshold triggering price changes is
assumed to depend positively of the adjustment cost. In gas stations, the physical
cost of changing prices may be rather small. Moreover, a standard menu cost
model (e.g. Golosov and Lucas 2007) would not predict the M -shape distribution
of price changes we observe in our sample but rather a bimodal distribution of
price changes. Two types of theoretical models that both incorporate imperfect
information in price rigidity models help to reproduce more flexible price change
distributions. First, Woodford (2009) provides some microfoundations for random
menu cost model: firms have fuzzy information about current economic conditions
and they might change their prices not exactly when the loss in profits exceeds the
menu cost since they only receive a noisy signal on the current price gap. Contrary
to Woodford (2009) where the observation and menu costs are lumped together,
some recent models (e.g. Alvarez et al. (2011) or Bonomo et al. (2011)) consider
separately a price adjustment cost and an observation cost. In those models, price
1See Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for the United States or Dhyne et al. (2006) and Vermeulen
et al. (2012) for the euro area.
2One caveat is that our results obtained using daily price data might have relatively small
consequences for the dynamics of aggregate business cycles. However, Abe and Tonogi (2010)
show that using daily price data instead of monthly data can have large implications for our
assessment of the aggregate frequency of price changes and for CPI inflation.
3We here extend the model used by Davis and Hamilton (2004) on gasoline prices by examining
both the extensive and the intensive margins of price adjustments.
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change decisions depend on the price gap but also on the elapsed duration since
the last price adjustment. This prediction would be quite consistent with periodic
spikes in the hazard function as observed in our data at half a week, one week and
two weeks. In our microeconometric model, we allow thresholds triggering price
changes to vary over time (for a given gas station): they depend on the elapsed du-
ration since the last price change (as predicted by Alvarez et al. (2011)) and on a
random idiosyncratic shock (as in Woodford (2009) model). This empirical model
is rather flexible since it encompasses a simple Calvo model when the threshold
varies a lot but also a standard menu cost model when the threshold does not
vary at all (Gautier and Le Bihan, 2011). We estimate our model for about 8, 500
French gas stations and we provide a distribution of parameters. First, we find
that the degree of long-term pass-through of wholesale prices to retail prices is on
average 0.77 for diesel and 0.67 for unleaded petrol and depend on local market’s
characteristics. Moreover, we find that adjustment thresholds are quite large but
also vary a lot over time. The elapsed duration since the last price adjustment
explains a significant part of this variability which is consistent with predictions
of Alvarez et al. (2011) model but the large variance of the idiosyncratic shock on
thresholds is also a key ingredient to reproduce the distribution of price changes
as predicted by Woodford (2009).
The recent increase in the volatility of raw material prices raises some issues
on its transmission to inflation (see for instance ECB (2010) for a discussion of
some policy implications). Our second contribution is to examine how long it takes
for gas stations to incorporate a shock on wholesale prices to their retail gasoline
prices. For that, we use simulated trajectories of our microeconometric model and
study the aggregation of non-linear pricing strategies followed by heterogenous
firms. We find that, on average, it takes about 10 days for a shock to be fully
transmitted into retail gasoline prices. We also compare the aggregate responses
of prices obtained when we assume different models of price rigidity. Using ag-
gregate data and time-series analysis, several papers examine delays and possible
asymmetry in transmission of a shock to retail gasoline prices. Results are quite
contrasted depending on the methodology used (Frey and Manera, 2007). Geweke
(2004) also points out two possible aggregation issues in this type of literature.
The first one is related to aggregation of observations over time and arises when
the frequency of observations is lower than the frequency of price adjustments.
The second issue is related to aggregation across firms: most studies use average
national prices and do not investigate the heterogeneity of gasoline price dynamics.
Using daily individual data, we are here able to take into account non-linearities in
the price-setting behaviour and replicate the infrequency of price changes. We then
examine the heterogeneity across firms in price responses to shocks. We compare
the aggregate response of prices obtained using simulated individual trajectories
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and the response obtained using a linear error correction model on aggregate data
and find rather small differences. Moreover, we investigate the role of adjustment
costs as possible source of asymmetric transmission of cost shocks to retail prices.
Using parameter estimates of our microeconometric model, for a given cost shock,
we test whether the threshold triggering price increases is lower than the threshold
triggering price decreases. We find no significant asymmetry.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe our micro data
set and provide the main stylized facts on gasoline price rigidity in France. Section
3 presents our estimated empirical model of price rigidity. Our main results are
presented in Section 4. In section 5, we estimate the delay for retail prices to
respond to aggregate shocks for different price rigidity models and investigate
possible asymmetric response of retail prices to cost shocks. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Daily Micro Data On Gasoline Prices
2.2.1 Data
Our data set consists of individual prices reported by all gas stations selling more
than 500 m3 of gasoline per year in France. Since January 2007, gas stations have
to report all their price changes for unleaded petrol and diesel to the Ministry of
Economy. The data collected are then made available on a governmental web site
(www.prix-carburants.gouv.fr). This web site is intended to foster competition by
providing a public and free information on prices. Some other private web sites
offer similar services but the updating of prices is only voluntary whereas in our
case, the public administration may force retailers to report their price changes.4
We use historical data extracted every day at 23:59 from this governmental web
site for the period from January 1st 2007 to May 31th 2009. The main variables
available in our data set are the following. First, the price of a liter of diesel
and unleaded petrol; this price includes all taxes, expressed in euros with three
decimals. Another variable is the date of the report expressed in DD/MM/YY,
which enables us to follow the same price in a given retailer. An identification
number is associated to each retailer. We have some information on the retailer:
brand name, location and services. Our data set is not exhaustive in terms of gas
stations because there is a threshold requirement for participation; it still covers a
4The French competition authority is in charge of the website and the accuracy of information.
For instance, between January 2011 and June 2011 about 6,000 gas stations were controlled
and 72 notices of violation were issued by inspectors. Moreover, 600,000 consumers visit
regularly the website and can declare (via mail and phone) if the price is different on the
website.
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large majority of gas stations operating in France.5 The French market of gasoline
consists of four types of retailers: (i) gas stations belonging to supermarkets; (ii)
gas stations belonging to major oil companies like Total, Elf, Shell...; (iii) small
independent retailers which do not depend from major oil companies; (iv) gas
stations located on motorways which often belong to oil companies. One important
feature is that the level of prices is on average lower in supermarkets than in other
gas stations. We have no information on the demand addressed to each individual
gas station.
The retail gasoline price can be decomposed in three main elements: (i) the
wholesale price of fuel (after refining) which represents about 75% to 85% of to-
tal operating expenses of the gas stations (according sectoral national accounts
published by Insee). We approximate this cost by using the price of refined fuels
quoted in Rotterdam; (ii) distribution costs include costs of operating the outlet
(rent, wages...) and transportation costs. They are not observed per se in our
study, those costs might not change at a daily frequency and depend on each gas
station, they will be considered as idiosyncratic; (iii) taxes. The two main taxes
(VAT and TIPP) represent about 65% of the unleaded petrol prices and 60% of
diesel prices. TIPP (domestic tax on petroleum products) is an excise tax of 42.84
cents per liter of diesel and 60.69 cents per liter of unleaded petrol whereas VAT is
a proportion of prices including TIPP (19.6%). Both tax rates were not modified
during our sample period. We use prices excluding all taxes according the follow-
ing formula: pexcl_taxes = pinclu_taxes1+V AT −TIPP where pexcl_taxes is the price excluding
taxes, pinclu_taxes the price including all taxes, V AT the VAT rate and TIPP the
TIPP excise. Gas stations usually list their prices with three decimal places.
Data are corrected for some measurement errors.6 We also exclude from our
sample prices observed on Sundays. Many gas stations are opened on Sunday but
very few price changes are observed on Sundays since employees are not present
to decide price changes. Moreover, for identification reasons, we also restrict our
sample to gas stations that are observed at least 300 days (excluding Sundays)
which represent more than 85% of gas stations of our initial data set. All in all,
our sample consists of 8, 802 gas stations for diesel and 8, 565 for unleaded petrol,
on average each gas station is observed during 615 days for diesel and 619 days for
5We test the consistency of our micro data set by comparing the average price computed
on our data to the weekly aggregate price of unleaded petrol and diesel published by
the Ministry of Economics (Figure B1 in Appendix B). The two series are highly cor-
related. The online appendix is available upon request or at the following address:
https://sites.google.com/site/erwangautiereconomics
6We drop gas stations where price durations are longer than one month (a little less than 10%
of gas stations). Occurrences of large price increases (larger than 8%) followed by large price
decreases the next day have been corrected. These adjustments concern less than 0.2% of all
price adjustments.
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unleaded petrol. Our data set contains more than 5.4 millions of individual price
quotes for diesel and about 5.3 millions for unleaded petrol.
2.2.2 Stylized Facts on Gasoline Price Rigidity
Table 2.1 summarizes basic findings on frequency and size of price changes and on
price durations. The average price duration is about one week (5.6 days for diesel
and 5.9 days for unleaded petrol).7 There is some heterogeneity across firms: the
average price duration is about 5 days in supermarkets versus 6 days in other gas
stations. Overall, retail gasoline prices are rigid: they remain unchanged during
several days whereas wholesale prices are modified every day.
Figure 2.1 plots the hazard functions of price adjustment for diesel and unleaded
petrol (i.e. the instantaneous conditional probability of a price change given that
a price was not modified since a given duration). The hazard rates are not mono-
tone and show regular peaks at durations equal to 3, 6, 12 and 18 days (which
corresponds to half a week, one week, two weeks and three weeks since Sundays are
excluded). This suggests that gas stations change their price following a regular
schedule: collecting and processing information might be costly8 and gas stations
review their price only infrequently. This would be consistent with predictions of
observation cost models (e.g. Alvarez et al. 2011) where the hazard function of
price changes depends on the elapsed duration since the last price change. The
timing of price adjustment would be not only driven by changes in wholesale Rot-
terdam prices but also by the duration since the last price adjustment.
On the size of price changes, price increases are almost as frequent as price
decreases for diesel whereas for unleaded petrol, the frequency of price decreases
is smaller than the frequency of price increases (9.5% versus 10.6%). The average
price increase (3.4% for diesel and 4.6% for unleaded petrol) is close to the average
price decrease in absolute values (resp. 3.5% and 4.9%).9 Price changes are larger
for supermarkets than for other gas stations. Figure 2.2 plots the distributions of
price changes different from 0. One original pattern of those distributions is their
M−shape, where small price changes (in percentage) are rare.10 This pattern of
7Using US wholesale price data, Davis and Hamilton (2004) and Douglas and Herrera (2010)
find price durations shorter than one week.
8Zbaracki et al. (2004) and Levy et al. (2010) both mention that adjusting prices involve a
rather long process because managers have to collect information on costs or on prices of
competitors.
9We here provide figures controlling for the share of the wholesale price in total cost (i.e.
we divide price change by the estimated firm-specific share of wholesale price (see below)).
Without controlling, the average price increase (resp. decrease) is 2.6% (resp. −2.7%) for
diesel and 3.1% (resp. −3.3%) for unleaded petrol.
10Asplund et al. (2000) using Swedish daily gasoline prices find a similar distribution for price
changes.
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the data is not consistent with a standard menu cost model (e.g. Golosov and
Lucas, 2007) which predicts a strong bimodality of the price change distribution.11
On the contrary, a Calvo model predicts a size-distribution of price changes close
to the distribution of cost changes. In this latter model, the scarcity of small price
changes would be due to frequent large changes in production costs. However, the
distribution of wholesale price changes is close to a normal distribution with zero
mean (Figure 2.2). Finally, models assuming imperfect information (e.g. Alvarez
et al. 2011 or Woodford 2009) have more flexible predictions and are able to
reproduce the M−shape distribution of price changes. In those models, the shape
of price change distribution depends on the degree of imperfect information. In
particular, in Alvarez et al. (2011) where the menu cost and information cost are
separated, the shape of the distribution depends on the ratio of the two costs: if
the menu cost is much larger than the information cost, the size-distribution of
price changes is bimodal whereas if the menu cost is very small compared to the
information cost, the size-distribution is close to a normal distribution.12
2.3 Gasoline Price Rigidity: An Empirical Model
Gasoline prices appear as a textbook example to illustrate price stickiness models:
price changes in gas stations are infrequent whereas marginal costs are modified
every day, price changes are on average rather large and small price changes are
rare. In those models, firms set their prices in a monopolistic competition frame-
work. The price level that would be observed in the absence of rigidity (called
frictionless price) is given by a mark-up over marginal costs. In most empirical
papers dealing with price rigidity, one difficulty is to measure at the firm-level the
marginal costs. Some empirical studies relate prices to aggregate or sectoral infla-
tion (Cecchetti (1986) or Fougere et al. (2007) for example) whereas other papers
use more precise approximations of costs like aggregate wage costs or wholesale
prices (e.g. Fougere et al. (2010), Ratfai (2006) or Dutta et al. (2002)). Using
a statistical decomposition, Dhyne et al. (2011) identify the marginal cost to a
product-specific unobserved factor. In our case, the marginal cost of gasoline prices
is approximated by the wholesale prices of gasoline (diesel and unleaded petrol)
quoted at the Rotterdam market. An alternative index of marginal cost would
have been crude oil prices (e.g. Brent) but this index excludes refining costs and
the marginal cost measure would be the same for unleaded petrol and diesel, which
11Cavallo and Rigobon (2011) provide some results on bimodality of supermarket price change
distributions.
12Another possible explanation of this M-shape distribution of price changes might be related
to the number of digits used to display prices and pricing points (see Table D1 in Appendix
D for details).
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would provide less economically meaningful results on the pass-through. Moreover,
in France, a large share of diesel consumption is imported and Rotterdam is the
major trading area for refined products in Europe.13 Thus, some firms buy their
gasoline at the Rotterdam spot price and for those outlets, the marginal cost is
quite precisely measured. For unleaded petrol and diesel produced in France, the
wholesale price may vary across stations in the same area since it is determined
by the different refineries which supply gasoline retail outlets. Differences in the
wholesale price across refineries are unobserved and depend on specific refining
costs. However, according to Asplund et al. (2000), when stations are owned and
operated by a refiner, Rotterdam prices are often used as transfer price between
refineries and outlets.
We estimate a rather flexible form of state-dependent model. This model aims
at reproducing the main characteristics of gasoline price adjustments: (i) price
changes are infrequent; (ii) the timing of price changes depends on the evolution
of wholesale prices but also on the elapsed duration since the last price change;
(iii) small price changes are quite rare but price changes vary a lot over time for a
given firm. A standard adjustment cost model (Golosov and Lucas, 2007) would
predict that price adjustments are discrete, quite large and depend only on price
fundamentals. In that model, there is a cost to adjust prices and firms trade off
between the opportunity cost of deviating from the optimal price (i.e. the foregone
profit) and the adjustment cost. Firms tolerate that their actual posted price
deviates from the frictionless price (i.e. the price that would have been observed
without adjustment cost) as long as this deviation is not too large.14 The optimal
frictionless price would be defined as:
p∗it = αi + βipot + ε1,it (2.3.1)
where p∗it is the logarithm of the optimal price in the gas station i at date t, αi
is a gas-station specific effect correlated to the mark-up15, and pot the logarithm
of the price of refined oil product sold in Rotterdam at the spot market at day
t. ε1,it is a firm- and time-specific shock (ε1,it are supposed normally distributed
13As noted by Meyler (2009), 168 million tonnes of refined product were traded in Rotterdam in
2009. However, some Mediterranean ports handle also smaller amounts of liquid petroleum
products (Marseilles (66 million tons) and Trieste (36 million tons)).
14Another possible margin of adjustment are inventories. However, according to the French
competition authority inventory capacities are small at the retail level and firms most often
use a replacement value to set their prices (Hosken et al. 2008). Our frictionless price can be
considered as a replacement cost.
15If we suppose a Cobb Douglas cost function, the log-marginal cost of retailing one liter of
gasoline would be equal to: mc = βpo+(1−β)w where β is the share of wholesale gasoline in
the cost functon, po the log-price of a liter of wholesale price and w is the log-price of other
operating costs. The markup is then equal to: p −mc = p − βpo − (1 − β)w = α. Since we
do not observe w, we estimate α˜ = p− βpo and it implies that α˜ < α (if ln(W ) < 0).
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with mean 0 and variance σ21i). We could interpret pot as a common shock to
the frictionless price and ε1,it as an idiosyncratic shock to the frictionless price.16
Under some conditions shown to be of the (S, s) type (see Sheshinski and Weiss
(1977) or Hansen (1999)), the optimal adjustment rule is then to adjust the price
only if the difference between the optimal price p∗it and the price pit−τ modified at
period t − τ (where τ is the duration since the last price change), exceeds some
threshold Si (for price decreases) or si (for price increases). When prices are reset,
new prices are set at the optimal frictionless price. The firm’s pricing decision
depends on the distance covered by p∗it between dates t− τ and t.
However, the (S, s) model puts strong restrictions on the patterns of price ad-
justments. First, the size of the price change is the same for all price decreases
(Si) and all price increases (−si). This prediction is not consistent with the ob-
served variance of price changes over time (for a given firm). Second, in a standard
(S, s) model, the timing of the price adjustment only depends on the frictionless
price, which is not fully consistent with our observations. Thus, we rely here on a
time-varying thresholds model to reproduce the timing and the size-distribution of
price changes. In particular, we assume that the thresholds depend on a random
idiosyncratic shock (as predicted by Woodford (2009) random menu cost model17)
but also on the elapsed duration since the last price change (as predicted by Alvarez
et al. (2011) model). The price decision rule can be summarized as follows:
if pi,t−τ − p∗i,t ≥ Sit pit = p∗i,t
if pi,t−τ − p∗i,t ≤ sit pit = p∗i,t
if Sit > pi,t−τ − p∗i,t > sit pit = pit−τ
(2.3.2)
where upper and lower bands are defined as:
Sit = γiSXit − ε2,it (2.3.3)
sit = γisXit + ε2,it (2.3.4)
where Sit and sit are the upper and the lower stochastic bands, Xit are exogenous
variables that modify the timing of price adjustments (here the elapsed duration
16Theoretical models of price rigidity used in macro models often assume that idiosyncratic
shocks are persistent. Some recent models also assume that idiosyncratic shocks have fat-
tailed distributions in order to replicate the variance of price changes (Gertler and Leahy, 2008
or Midrigan, 2011). However, such assumptions would make the estimation of our empirical
model less tractable. Moreover, the log-difference of p0t shows also some persistence and p0t
might capture (at least partly) the persistence in shocks often assumed in macro models. We
here follow the empirical literature estimating reduced (S, s) models on prices and assume
the idiosyncratic shock as normal and transitory.
17As shown by Caballero and Engel (1999), thresholds that fluctuate over time can be obtained
under a random menu-cost assumption. In particular, they define an adjustment hazard
function which relates the probability of a price change to the gap between the current price
and a frictionless optimal price (see Figure C1 in Appendix C).
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since the last price change18) and ε2,it is firm- and time-specific shock to the timing
of price adjustment (ε2,it are supposed normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance σ22i).19 The exogenous shock on the timing of adjustment is assumed to
be independent from the shock ε1,it on the optimal price. Our model is rather
flexible. For instance, it encompasses the Calvo model: when the threshold varies
a lot (the variance of ε2,it is very large), the model predicts a constant probability
for a price change and generates small price changes. If the threshold does not
vary at all, the empirical model would reproduce the predictions of a standard fixed
adjustment cost model (see also Dhyne et al. (2011), Fougere et al. (2010), Gautier
and Le Bihan (2011) and Honore et al. (2012) for similar empirical models).
This specification is close to the model considered in Davis and Hamilton (2004)
or Douglas and Herrera (2010). However, we depart from those studies in one di-
mension. We here use the size of price changes to identify first the idiosyncratic
shock on the frictionless price and second to disentangle the volatility of the fric-
tionless price and the volatility of the adjustment cost over time. We here also
extend Dhyne et al. (2011) by allowing S and s to be not necessarily equal in
absolute values: a lower absolute value of s compared to S would imply a quicker
adjustment to wholesale price increases than to wholesale price decreases. This
potential asymmetry in the thresholds triggering price changes is introduced to
mimic possible asymmetries in adjustment costs. However, in the long term, all
firms will incorporate the wholesale price variations in their prices and the degree
of long-term pass-through is equal to β.
We estimate a pricing decision rule for every single gas station (separately for
diesel and unleaded petrol) since the time dimension of our sample is large (prices
are observed during more than 600 days on average for a given gas station). We
are then able to estimate the distributions across gas stations of α, β, σ1, γs, γS
and σ2 and to examine the heterogeneity in the pass-through of oil prices to re-
tail prices and in adjustment costs. There are two main stochastic processes in
our econometric specification and two groups of parameters to estimate: the first
process is associated to the frictionless price and we estimate for each gas station
i, α, β and σ1. The second group of parameters is associated to the time-varying
adjustment thresholds where we estimate γS, γs and σ2. Formally, our model is
a bivariate sample selection model where the first equation gives the price change
18We here consider 8 dummy variables corresponding to durations equal to 1 day, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7 days and more than 7 days in order to reproduce the shape of the hazard function (Figure
2.1).
19Some recent theoretical papers suggest different assumptions on the distribution of menu costs
to replicate the variance of the size of price changes (e.g. Midrigan (2011)). However, the
mapping between these alternative distributions of menu costs and the form of threshold
processes in our reduced-form model is not obvious. We assume normal transitory shocks to
the thresholds because we also want to keep the estimation of our model tractable.
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decision and the other one the size of the price changes.20 If the same regressors
appear in both equations, the identification comes from the functional form. We
here use an exclusion restriction and we assume that the adjustment thresholds
vary with the duration since the last price adjustment. Following Alvarez et al.
(2011) or Bonomo et al. (2011), in presence of observation costs, firms decide the
date of the next price review and the hazard of price adjustment depends on the
duration since the last price change. Observation costs prevent firms from moni-
toring economic conditions at a daily frequency. In our case, we find some periodic
spikes in the hazard of price durations at half a week, one week and two weeks that
cannot be easily related to changes in costs. These delays between price changes
may correspond for oil companies to the duration for monitoring and processing
information and deciding a new price; Levy et al. (2010), Zbaracki et al. (2004) or
Asplund et al. (2000) provide direct evidence on information costs paid by firms
when they change their prices. These regularities in the price revision process
would affect the timing of price adjustment but not the frictionless price which
is mainly governed by wholesale prices. We estimate this model using standard
maximum likelihood function procedures. Details on the likelihood function can
be found in Appendix A.
2.4 Results
Table 2.2 reports statistics on the distribution of parameters estimated firm by
firm using the time-varying (S, s) models separately for diesel and unleaded petrol
prices.
2.4.1 Frictionless Price
The first three lines of Table 2.2 report results associated with the frictionless
price p∗. The long-term pass-through of the wholesale market price (Rotterdam
prices) to retail prices is positive and significant in all firms. For diesel, the median
pass-through is 0.79 whereas for unleaded petrol it is lower (0.68). This parameter
captures in our model the weight of wholesale gasoline in marginal costs. Using
national accounts in the retail gasoline sector, the share of wholesale gasoline cost
in total costs is about 75 to 85%, which is quite consistent with our results.
Figure 2.3 displays the whole distribution of β parameters estimated using gas
station data. For both diesel and unleaded petrol, the distribution displays two
20We assume that α, β, and σ1 parameters associated to the frictionless price are the same in
both equations (probability and size of price changes), which gives us additional degrees of
freedom for the estimation and allows us to identify threshold parameters γ associated to all
duration dummy variables and also σ2.
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modes. This heterogeneity corresponds to differences in the degree of pass-through
between supermarkets and other gas stations: the pass-through is a little higher
in supermarkets than in other gas stations (e.g. for diesel, 0.82 in supermarkets
versus 0.71 in other gas stations, see Table 2.3). The heterogeneity of βi can also
be related to local competition, demand characteristics and services provided in
gas stations. Tables E1 and E2 in Appendix E present results of OLS regressions
relating βi to those variables for diesel and unleaded petrol. We find that local
competition affects significantly and positively βi.21
The parameter αi captures the average firm’s mark-up. We find rather small
values for this parameter: about 2% on average for diesel and around −2% for
unleaded petrol. Since we do not observe all costs at the gas station-level, the
parameter α will also capture the effect of other costs on the frictionless price,
which reduces the estimated mark-ups.22 However, we assume that other costs such
as labour costs are not modified at a daily frequency and did not move significantly
during our sample period. So, the parameter αi should be correlated with mark-
ups and we interpret heterogeneity in αi among gas stations as differences in
mark-ups. For instance, we find that mark-ups are lower in supermarkets than
in other gas stations for both diesel and unleaded petrol (Table 2.3). Tables E1
and E2 in Appendix show further results on the heterogeneity of mark-ups among
gas stations. In particular, we find a negative correlation between the degree of
competition and αi and the presence of a store, car services or high quality gasoline
in the station has a positive effect on markup because those services might lead to
a more pronounced product differentiation.
Finally, the estimated values of parameters σ1 (Table 2.2) are on average 1.58%
for diesel prices and 1.92% for unleaded petrol prices. We can interpret the impact
of the market Rotterdam price as a common sectoral shock and ε1 captures all
firm- and time-specific shocks. During our sample period, the standard deviation
of Rotterdam price changes over a week is about 5 to 6%. So, idiosyncratic shocks
appear to play a less important role in triggering price changes compared to recent
results obtained using macro models (e.g. Golosov and Lucas (2007) or Midrigan
(2011)).
21Detailed comments are provided in Appendix E.
22The estimated markup could even become negative for unleaded petrol. Suppose markups
are given by p −mc = p − βpo − (1 − β)w where p is the log retail price, β is the share of
wholesale gasoline in the cost functon, po the log price of a liter of wholesale price and w the
log price of other costs. For unleaded petrol, we find β = 0.67 on average, if p = ln(0.47), we
observe on Figure A that po = ln(0.34). We obtain a markup equal to −0.03 − 0.33w. If w
is unobserved, we estimate a negative markup close to −3% whereas if w is negative, we can
obtain a positive markup, for instance if w = ln(0.6), markup is closer to 10%.
46
2.4 Results
2.4.2 Thresholds
The second part of Tables 2.2 and 2.3 reports the parameters associated with the
adjustment thresholds. In a standard constant adjustment threshold model, large
values of the bands reflect large costs of price changes and all price changes are
equal to the size of the inaction band. In our framework, adjustment thresholds
are time-varying, allowing for variability in the size of price changes over time for
a given gas station. However, in that case, the mapping between those parameters
and the adjustment cost is not trivial because price adjust more frequently when
thresholds are small than when they are large. Thus, a large variance of thresholds
may imply frequent price adjustments even if the average threshold is large. For
instance, when both the mean and the variance of adjustment thresholds are large,
the price setting behaviour is very close to a Calvo price setting model (Gautier
and Le Bihan 2011). We compare our results obtained with a time-varying (S, s)
model with results obtained from a standard (S, s) model, a Calvo model and a
time-varying (S, s) model without idiosyncratic shock on the thresholds (Tables
F1, F2 and F3 in Appendix). Our main results are the following.
First, the average estimated adjustment thresholds in time-varying (S, s) models
are much larger than those obtained for a fixed menu cost model. If adjustment
costs are supposed random, firms are more likely to change their prices when
the cost is small. So, adjustment thresholds are on average smaller when prices
actually adjust than when prices are not modified. Thresholds in a time-varying
(S, s) model are thus larger on average than in a standard fixed (S, s) model
(Gautier and Le Bihan, 2011).
Second, the thresholds vary with the duration since the last price change: they
are lower in absolute values for durations of 3 and 6 days but much larger for
durations of 1 day, 2, 5 and 7 days. For diesel prices, the median of the threshold
triggering price increases (γs) is a little larger than −4.3 and −4.4 for durations of 3
and 6 days whereas it is close to −5 for other durations. Results are very similar for
price decreases and when considering supermarkets or other gas stations separately
(Table 2.3). The parameters associated to thresholds reproduce the patterns of
the hazard function (Figure 2.1). Variations in thresholds over the duration since
the last price adjustment are consistent with predictions of price rigidity models
assuming both a menu cost and an observation cost.
To examine in more details the heterogeneity of thresholds across gas stations,
we present in Tables E1 and E2 in Appendix OLS regressions of estimated band
width (average of S and s) on competition, firms’ characteristics and local vari-
ables. In particular, we find that the degree of competition has a significant neg-
ative impact on the thresholds: competition may provide more incentives for gas
stations to quickly review their prices and pay more frequently the information
cost. Moreover, firms that use only attractive prices (ending in 0 or 9) are likely
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to have larger adjustment cost and show larger inaction bands (see Knotek (2010)
for similar evidence).
Finally, the median variance of the shock ε2 on thresholds is quite large about
3.2% for diesel prices and 3.9% for unleaded petrol prices (Table 2.2). Though we
here restrict our analysis to one homogenous product and we take into account
quite precisely the fluctuations of marginal cost, price changes vary a lot over
time for a given firm.23 A high value of σ2 helps to replicate the large variability
in the size of price changes over time (for a given station). This result would
be consistent with predictions of Woodford (2009) where firms do not necessarily
adjust their prices at the exact date when the loss in profits exceeds the menu
cost. In this model, price changes are not only driven by variations in marginal
costs but also by idiosyncratic shocks on information about the price gap. As a
consequence, the size of price changes can vary a lot over time for a given firm.
In our case, variations in thresholds associated to the elapsed duration since the
last price adjustment help to reproduce the variability of price changes but are not
sufficient.
2.4.3 Fit of the Model
In this subsection, we assess the goodness of fit of our model by testing its ability to
replicate some moments of the data. We run Monte Carlo simulations on the basis
of our parameter estimates and explanatory variables are taken at their sample
values.24 Then, we compute aggregate statistics like the frequency of price changes
and several statistics on the distribution of price changes. Moreover, we compare
the simulated statistics obtained with our time-varying (S, s) model with aggregate
statistics obtained using estimates from three other models (Calvo25, fixed (S, s)
model26 and elapsed duration fixed (S, s) model27).
Results are summarized in Table 2.4. First, the Calvo model does better in
reproducing the average frequency of price changes whereas (S, s) models over-
estimate the frequency of price changes. This overestimation is however quite
23We decompose the variance of price changes (conditional on the day of the week) and find
that on average, about 80% of the total variance of price changes comes from the variance of
price changes within firm (over the sample period).
24We simulate each price trajectory 150 times.
25Prices are modified only if the outcome of an idiosyncratic process is above an estimated
constant threshold which determines the exogenous probability of price change. This model
is also an extreme case of the Woodford (2009) model where information imperfections are
very large.
26The thresholds trigerring price changes are assumed not to vary over time and σ2 is set to
zero.
27The thresholds trigerring price changes are assumed to vary over time only because of the
duration since the last price change and σ2 is set to zero.
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limited for the time-varying (S, s) model. On the average size of price changes,
the time-varying (S, s) model and the Calvo model are very close to the average
sample sizes. The Calvo and the time-varying (S, s) models differ in replicating
the distribution of price changes. The Calvo model is unable to replicate the small
fraction of small price changes whereas in simple menu cost models, most price
changes are quite large. The time-varying (S, s) model is better able to reproduce
the sample distribution of price changes, in particular its bimodality and its large
variance. Moreover, this model can replicate regular peaks in the hazard function
of price changes.
2.5 Aggregate Dynamic Response Of Gasoline
Prices
How gasoline prices respond to a cost shock? We here simulate price trajectories
using our microeconometric model and examine the aggregate response of prices
to different shocks to the Rotterdam wholesale prices.
2.5.1 Simulation Exercise
Our simulation exercise consists of two steps: first we simulate individual price
trajectories using our parameter estimates then aggregate those trajectories to cal-
culate a simulated inflation rate. First, for all gas stations present in our sample,
we simulate individual trajectories of prices. For that, we use parameter estimates
obtained for every gas stations and run Monte Carlo simulations. Shocks ε1i,t and
ε2i,t are drawn from two independent i.i.d. normal distributions with mean 0 and
variances σ̂1i and σ̂2i. We also assume Rotterdam wholesale prices to be constant,
price decisions are only driven by the two idiosyncratic shocks. Each individual
price trajectory is simulated for 55 days and the first 15 days are dropped to elimi-
nate some possible initial conditions issues. We simulate each trajectory 500 times.
We then compute the log difference of simulated prices for all trajectories and cal-
culate the average of those differences to obtain an aggregate inflation rate. Then,
we run again the same exercise but we introduce a permanent shock on the whole-
sale gas price (i.e. compared to the previous exercise, Rotterdam prices increase
by a given percentage at date 16). We consider different shocks on the wholesale
Rotterdam prices: −1%, +1%, +2% and +5%. For each experiment, we calculate
the average aggregate inflation rate. Finally, we compute the difference between
the average inflation rates obtained including exogenous shocks with the aggre-
gate inflation rate obtained without any shock. This difference will capture the
aggregate response of inflation to different shocks. We also compare the aggregate
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response of prices in our time-varying threshold model with aggregate responses
obtained using two limiting cases of our flexible threshold model, the Calvo model
and a fixed (S, s) model.28 Finally, we compare our results with standard impulse
response functions obtained from the estimation of a dynamic model on aggregate
data. For that, we first compute the average price across firms on our sample pe-
riod. Then, we relate the average price of diesel or unleaded petrol to Rotterdam
prices by estimating a standard linear error correction model (ECM): we first esti-
mate a long-term relation between the average retail prices and Rotterdam prices
(in logarithms), then we regress the first difference of the average retail price on
its lagged values, on the first difference of Rotterdam prices and its lagged values
and on the stationary residuals from the first regression which are interpreted as
deviations from the equilibrium level (Engle and Granger, 1987).29
2.5.2 Speed of Adjustment
Figure 2.4 displays the inflation response of diesel and unleaded petrol prices to a
1%-shock on Rotterdam prices for our three types of models. In all three models
the long-term impact of the shock is equal to the average value of β (i.e. 0.77 for
diesel and 0.67 for unleaded petrol). Using an ECM on the average gasoline price,
we find a similar long-term pass-through of wholesale price shock to retail prices
for both diesel and unleaded petrol.
Table 2.5 provides details on the delay of adjustment of retail prices, it gives the
proportion of the shock absorbed in inflation after a certain duration. Using the
time-varying (S, s) model as a DGP for the simulations and a 1%−shock, about
85% of the total response of retail gasoline prices is observed after 5 days and 95%
of the total response is incorporated into prices after 10 days. There are some
differences in the transmission delay of a shock between the different models used
as DGP for the simulation. The transmission is shorter in the case of the fixed
(S, s) model and longer in the Calvo model: 95% of the total response is obtained
after 3 days in a fixed (S, s) model versus 15 days in the Calvo model (Figure
2.4). The time-varying threshold model appears as an intermediate case. Those
differences in delays to incorporate shocks are consistent with the macro literature
28In the Calvo model, we assume that the decision of price change does not depend on the
frictionless price but is only driven by an estimated constant parameter. In the constant
(S, s) model, we estimate a constrained model where the variance of the shock on thresholds
is zero. We assume that the thresholds are either constant for all durations or constant for the
different values of durations but simulation results are quite close in both cases. Estimation
results are provided in Tables D, E and F in Appendix.
29Using standard selection criteria, we select seven lags for Rotterdam prices and for the en-
dogenous variables. The long-term equation relates the average price of diesel or unleaded
petrol at date t to Rotterdam prices at date t − 6 to take into account the infrequency of
price changes.
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on state- versus time-dependent models. In the Calvo model, the probability of
price change is constant over time and exogenous, so it is not modified after a shock.
Consequently, firms change their prices gradually and the inflation adjustment
comes from the size of price changes when prices are modified. In a standard
menu cost, the reaction is quicker because of a selection effect: firms adjusting
their prices are those the closest to the threshold implying an increase in the
frequency of price changes proportional to the shock. Thus, for (S, s) models,
larger shocks are more quickly incorporated into prices since when the shock is
large, the proportion of firms adjusting their prices is higher (Table 2.5). The
random (S, s) model reduces the selection effect and makes the adjustment delay
longer. If σ2 is extremely high, price changes are not driven any more by changes
in fundamentals but only by idiosyncratic shocks on thresholds and in that case,
the model is close to a Calvo model.
We also investigate the heterogeneity in the transmission delays across gas sta-
tions. Figure 2.5 displays the cross-sectional distribution of durations before a full
price adjustment to a 1% shock to Rotterdam prices assuming Calvo, constant
(S, s) or time-varying (S, s) models. In all cases, the variance of the distribution is
quite large. In the time-varying (S, s) model, the first quartile of the distribution
is 5 days and the third quartile 11 days whereas the average delay is about 8.5
days. In supermarkets, the average delay before a full adjustment is 7.2 days for
diesel (resp. 7.8 days for unleaded petrol) versus 9.2 days in other gas stations
(resp. 9.4 days).
Finally, we compare our inflation responses obtained by aggregating individual
responses to the impulse response function obtained using our error-correction
model on the average gasoline prices. Overall, the dynamic response obtained
with aggregate data shows a rather quick adjustment: after 10 days, 90% of the
shock is transmitted, which is quite consistent with our results using a time-varying
(S, s) model or Calvo model. However, some differences appear: two days after the
shock, the response obtained using aggregate data is quite slower than responses
obtained by aggregating individual responses. This slow initial reaction may be
explained by stronger reductions of margins the first two days. Then, 3 days after
the shock, the shape of the response is quite similar to the average of individual
responses in Calvo or time-varying (S, s) models and the response is even a little
quicker than the response obtained using a Calvo model.
2.5.3 Asymmetry of Adjustment
Using aggregate data, several empirical papers assess the asymmetry in the re-
sponse of gasoline prices to oil shocks. Since the seminal paper of Borenstein et
al. (1997), results are quite contrasted since they often depend on the frequency
of data used (see Geweke (2004) or Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) for a discus-
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sion) and on the estimation methods (Frey and Manera (2007) for a survey). In
most studies, the sources of asymmetry are not clearly identified. We here inves-
tigate asymmetry in adjustment costs as a possible cause for asymmetric response
of prices to shocks. For that, we use the estimates obtained for the adjustment
thresholds. If there is some downward price rigidity, it would imply that on av-
erage, for a given absolute value of the price gap |pi,t−τ − p∗i,t|, a firm would be
more likely to hit the threshold triggering price increases than the threshold trig-
gering price decreases. In other words, it would imply that in absolute values, the
threshold associated to price increases is smaller than the threshold associated to
price decreases. To assess empirically the degree of asymmetry in price changes,
we test that the difference between thresholds triggering price increases and de-
creases is significant at each duration (for every gas station) using a simple Wald
test (γs+γS = 0 versus γs+γS > 0). Table 2.6 presents the proportion of firms
for which the asymmetry is significant at a 1%-level. Only between 5% and 10%
of gas stations selling diesel have asymmetric thresholds for durations between 3
and 7 days. This proportion is a little higher for unleaded petrol (between 8% and
12%). We also find that asymmetric behaviour is less frequent in supermarkets
than in other gas stations. To compare those results, we run the same test on the
standard fixed menu cost model and we find that only a very small proportion of
gas stations have an asymmetric behaviour.
To test consequences of this small degree of asymmetry in price thresholds on
the aggregate response of prices to a shock, we run simulations with a positive
and a negative 1%-shock on Rotterdam prices for diesel and unleaded petrol. As
expected, we obtain no difference in the speed of reaction of retail prices to a
positive or a negative market price shock (Table 2.5). In all cases and for all models
considered, after a positive or a negative shock, we find very similar average delays
in the transmission of shocks.30
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the degree of price rigidity in French gas stations using
a data set of millions of price quotes collected at a daily frequency, for more than
8, 500 gas stations on the period between January 2007 and June 2009.
For every gas station, we estimate a time-varying (S, s) model which allows us to
replicate the infrequency of price changes and the large variance in the distribution
of price changes. We find that the degree of pass-through of wholesale market
30As robustness exercise, we also run linear error correction models allowing for asymmetries in
the short run dynamics, we find small differences in the response of average price of diesel
or unleaded petrol to positive or negative wholesale shock but no specific asymmetry in the
long run.
52
2.6 Conclusion
prices to retail gasoline prices is consistent with the share of wholesale gasoline
cost in total costs: 0.77 on average for diesel prices and 0.67 for unleaded petrol
prices. This pass-through is somewhat larger in supermarkets than in other gas
stations. Moreover, local competition variables play a significant role to explain
differences in pricing strategies across firms. Lastly, thresholds triggering price
changes are rather large on average but vary substantially over time.
Finally, we simulate the aggregate response to shocks of gasoline retail prices.
The adjustment of gasoline prices to wholesale price shocks is rather quick: it takes
about 10 days for a shock to be transmitted into prices. We also compare responses
obtained with alternative models of price rigidity and the impulse response function
from a linear macro model. We also test for the asymmetry in the response of retail
gasoline prices to market wholesale price shock. We assess whether thresholds
triggering price increases and decreases are different. A larger threshold for price
decrease implies that firms react more slowly to a decrease in costs. A small
proportion of gas stations show some asymmetry in their price-setting behaviour
and when it is the case, the asymmetry is small. Overall, there is no significant
difference in the speed of retail price reaction to a positive or a negative wholesale
price shock.
From a macroeconomic perspective two types of conclusions can be drawn. First,
gasoline prices, often considered as highly flexible, are somewhat rigid. This rigid-
ity might have small quantitative effects on business cycle since the delay of price
response to a shock is rather short. However, contrary to other empirical studies,
we are here able to investigate the sources of this price rigidity: menu costs and
information imperfections play a significant role to account for the specific distri-
bution of price changes. In particular, to reproduce the size-distribution of price
changes, we need some variations over time in thresholds triggering price changes.
We find that the duration elapsed since the last price adjustment has a significant
impact on price adjustment thresholds as predicted by Alvarez et al. (2011). How-
ever, the large variance of idiosyncratic shocks on the thresholds triggering price
changes is also crucial to reproduce the variability of price changes over time (for
a given firm). This latter result is more consistent with models assuming random
menu costs (e.g. Woodford (2009)). Second, gasoline prices have often a large
contribution to the volatility of CPI inflation and Geweke (2004) underlines the
need to better understand the implications of firm heterogeneity on aggregate dy-
namics of gasoline prices. We here find some significant heterogeneity across firms
but it seems to have only a limited impact on the aggregate response of prices to
a shock.
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Frequency Implied Size
Nb obs. All Increases Decreases duration Increases Decreases
- Diesel
All 8,802 21.50 10.61 10.88 5.55 3.35 -3.54
Supermarkets 4,269 23.81 11.75 12.06 5.14 3.40 -3.58
Other stations 4,533 19.32 9.54 9.78 5.93 3.30 -3.51
- Unleaded petrol
All 8,565 20.10 10.57 9.53 5.93 4.61 -4.94
Supermarkets 4,195 22.09 11.54 10.55 5.55 4.82 -5.11
Other stations 4,370 18.20 9.65 8.55 6.30 4.41 -4.77
Note: We compute firstly frequency and size of price changes for each retailer. Then
we compute the average of sizes and frequencies. For the durations, we first compute
the inverse of individual frequencies and then compute the average of durations. Size
of price changes are calculated using prices excluding taxes. Size of price changes are
divided by the estimated firm-specific share of wholesale prices into retail prices (β) (see
Table 2.2) to control for differences in the cost structure of the different gas stations.
Table 2.1 : Price durations (in days), frequency and size of price changes (in %)
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Diesel Unleaded petrol
Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 Mean Q25 Q50 Q75
α 2.15 1.15 1.92 3.12 -2.17 -3.29 -2.28 -1.18
β 0.77 0.71 0.79 0.83 0.67 0.62 0.68 0.72
σ1 1.58 1.41 1.55 1.72 1.92 1.67 1.87 2.10
1 day -8.02 -7.94 -5.29 -3.73 -10.61 -9.96 -6.55 -4.59
2 days -6.45 -6.86 -4.65 -3.33 -8.74 -8.71 -5.91 -4.32
γs 3 days -6.20 -6.29 -4.31 -3.12 -8.58 -8.07 -5.63 -4.10
4 days -6.40 -6.31 -4.50 -3.28 -8.37 -8.03 -5.76 -4.27
5 days -6.24 -6.47 -4.80 -3.59 -7.67 -8.00 -5.99 -4.50
6 days -5.63 -5.95 -4.41 -3.20 -6.88 -7.35 -5.46 -4.01
7 days -7.66 -7.30 -5.27 -3.89 -9.59 -8.55 -6.22 -4.67
> 7 days -5.14 -6.29 -4.89 -3.83 -6.32 -7.61 -5.96 -4.71
1 day 8.42 3.81 5.37 8.30 10.89 4.65 6.68 10.53
2 days 7.00 3.37 4.71 7.05 9.17 4.35 6.05 9.05
γS 3 days 6.20 3.17 4.38 6.50 8.12 4.23 5.84 8.44
4 days 5.97 3.24 4.49 6.36 8.39 4.36 5.99 8.36
5 days 6.66 3.52 4.71 6.40 8.93 4.56 6.24 8.45
6 days 5.62 3.08 4.28 5.81 7.84 4.07 5.63 7.67
7 days 7.54 3.71 5.07 6.99 9.52 4.72 6.44 8.92
> 7 days 5.04 3.74 4.82 6.18 6.43 4.73 6.03 7.76
σ2 3.33 2.64 3.22 3.96 4.05 3.14 3.89 4.82
Note: We estimate for each individual gas station a time-varying (S,s) model and then
compute statistics on the parameter estimates we obtained. We consider all gas stations
with more than 300 individual observations of prices (excluding Sundays). For diesel
prices, 8, 802 values of parameters estimates are available and 8, 565 for unleaded petrol
prices.
Table 2.2 : Estimation results - Time-varying (S, s) model
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Diesel prices Unleaded petrol prices
Supermarkets Others Supermarkets Others
α 1.32 2.97 -2.75 -1.73
β 0.82 0.71 0.71 0.63
σ1 1.60 1.49 1.93 1.80
1 day -5.80 -4.87 -7.46 5.88
2 days -4.66 -4.64 -6.16 -5.75
γs 3 days -4.11 -4.42 -5.48 -5.76
4 days -4.16 -4.75 -5.41 -6.03
5 days -4.40 -5.09 -5.67 -6.23
6 days -4.03 -4.69 -5.10 -5.73
7 days -4.98 -5.51 -6.01 -6.39
> 7 days -4.75 -4.99 -5.85 -6.01
1 day 5.89 4.98 7.70 5.93
2 days 4.74 4.66 6.38 5.85
γS 3 days 4.17 4.52 5.63 5.96
4 days 4.17 4.72 5.59 6.24
5 days 4.32 4.99 5.74 6.55
6 days 3.97 4.52 5.17 5.98
7 days 4.65 5.37 6.12 6.71
> 7 days 4.62 4.95 5.92 6.11
σ2 3.22 3.23 4.01 3.92
Note: We estimate for each gas station a time-varying (S, s) model and then compute
statistics on the parameter estimates. We consider all gas stations with more than 300
individual observations of prices (excluding Sundays). For diesel prices, 4, 269 and 4, 533
parameters estimates are available for supermarkets and other stations respectively and
4, 195 and 4, 370 for unleaded petrol prices. We report in this table the median of the
distribution of parameters.
Table 2.3 : Estimation results - Time-varying (S, s) model - Supermarkets versus
other gas stations
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F+ F− dp+ dp− Prop. of |dp| (in %)
]0; 1] ]1; 2] ]2; 5[ [5; +∞[
Diesel
Sample 11.17 11.37 2.95 -3.04 13.31 28.62 43.04 15.04
Variable menu cost 12.80 12.68 3.53 -3.38 12.84 15.71 43.98 27.47
Duration menu cost 14.72 14.94 7.40 -6.79 0.11 0.92 22.24 76.73
Fixed Menu Cost 15.01 15.31 7.73 -7.04 0.03 0.55 19.30 80.12
Calvo 11.52 11.33 2.84 -2.93 24.43 19.62 36.43 19.52
Unleaded Petrol
Sample 11.08 10.00 4.13 -4.24 8.28 15.90 49.28 26.54
Variable menu cost 11.96 11.51 4.91 -4.68 8.94 10.44 34.12 46.50
Duration menu cost 14.26 14.01 10.59 -9.80 0.05 0.21 6.68 93.06
Fixed Menu Cost 14.61 14.37 11.00 -10.16 0.02 0.11 4.95 94.92
Calvo 10.82 10.49 4.11 -3.89 18.01 15.13 33.25 33.61
Note: We compute simulated price trajectories using our parameter estimates and taking
exogenous variables at their sample values. We then compute the average frequency of
price increases and decreases (F+ and F−), the average size of price changes (dp− and
dp+) and the proportion (Prop. of |dp|) of small and large price changes. Size of price
changes are divided by the estimated firm-specific share of wholesale prices into retail
prices (β) (see Table 2.2) to control for differences in the cost structure of the different
gas stations. We use simulations from the time-varying threshold model ("duration
menu cost" refers to the model with thresholds depending on past duration whereas in
"Variable menu cost" model, we add the idiosyncratic shock ε2 to the model), the fixed
(S,s) model and the "Calvo" model.
Table 2.4 : Simulated aggregated statistics
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Fixed (S,s) Time-varying (S,s) Calvo
nb days -1% 1% 2% 5% -1% 1% 2% 5% 1% -1%
Diesel
1 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.82 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.53 0.22 0.22
2 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.95 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.74 0.38 0.38
3 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.84 0.50 0.50
5 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.93 0.67 0.67
10 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.86 0.86
15 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.93
Petrol
1 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.44 0.20 0.20
2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.66 0.36 0.36
3 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.77 0.47 0.47
5 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.64 0.64
10 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.84 0.84
15 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.91
Note: We compute simulated price trajectories using our parameter estimates and ag-
gregate those price trajectories. Then we run the same exercise but adding a permanent
shock on market prices. We compute the difference between the two aggregate price
indices obtained. We then calculate the cumulated response of retail prices to a shock
as the cumulated difference. Finally, we compute the ratio as the cumulated response
after a certain duration from the date of the shock on the total response measured as the
cumulated response after 45 days. We use simulations from the time-varying threshold
model, the fixed (S, s) model and the "Calvo" model.
Table 2.5 : Dynamic response of gasoline prices to shocks on wholesale market
prices
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Diesel Unleaded petrol
All Supermarkets Other stations All Supermarkets Other stations
1 day 19.10 14.58 22.65 18.53 17.90 19.00
2 days 14.75 9.83 18.61 15.75 15.18 16.18
3 days 9.20 6.12 11.63 11.69 10.78 12.37
4 days 7.46 4.93 9.46 10.32 9.97 10.59
5 days 5.59 4.08 6.78 7.51 6.95 7.93
6 days 5.32 3.41 6.82 7.71 7.20 8.09
7 days 5.35 4.13 6.31 7.51 7.50 7.52
> 7 days 7.21 4.54 9.32 10.37 10.10 10.57
Fixed Cost 1.84 0.82 2.64 2.39 2.15 2.57
Note: We compute the proportion of gas stations for which the hypothesis γsi+γSi > 0
is not rejected at a 1%-level. For the time-varying threshold models, we compute this test
duration by duration and for the fixed (S, s) model we test the hypothesis γs+γS > 0.
Table 2.6 : Proportion (in %) of gas stations with significant downward asymmet-
ric reaction (Wald test γs+γS > 0)
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a) Diesel
b) Unleaded petrol
Note. Solid black line for all gas stations, dashed grey line for supermarkets, dashed
black line for other gas stations. Censored price paths are excluded.
Figure 2.1 : Hazard functions for gasoline price changes
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a) Diesel
b) Unleaded petrol
Note. Observations are individual non-zero price changes. Grey bars represent the
distribution of retail price changes (in %) and grey lines are the kernel density estimators
for distributions of Rotterdam price changes (in %). Retail price changes are calculated
using prices excluding taxes. Size of price changes are divided by the estimated firm-
specific share of wholesale prices into retail prices (β) (see Table 2.2) to control for
differences in the cost structure of the different gas stations.
Figure 2.2 : Distributions of individual retail price changes (in %)
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Note: Each observation is a value of β estimated for an individual gas station. White
bars are for prices in supermarkets and black bars for prices in other gas stations.
Figure 2.3 : Distribution of βi (degree of pass-through) using the time-varying
threshold model
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a) Diesel
b) Unleaded petrol
Note: dashed line for the time-varying (S, s) model, short dashed line for the Calvo
model, solid dark line for the fixed adjustment cost model and grey line for the IRF
obtained using an error correction model.
Figure 2.4 : Aggregate responses of gasoline inflation to a 1%-shock on Rotterdam
price for the fixed (S, s) model, Calvo model and time-varying (S, s)
model
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Note: Each observation is a value of the delay to achieve 95% of the full adjustment
estimated for every individual gas station. White bars are for durations obtained in the
fixed menu cost model, black bars for the time-varying (S, s) model and dashed bars for
the Calvo model.
Figure 2.5 : Distributions of delays (in days) before a full price adjustment to a
1%-shock on Rotterdam price assuming a fixed (S,s), Calvo or time-
varying (S,s) models
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Internships, major choices and labor
market outcomes of French
“Grandes Ecoles” graduates
We study the role of internships in students’ orientation and career beginning. On-the-job expe-
riences accumulated during schooling and before specialization, via internships, give to students
some information they may exploit to choose their majors, and to employers some insights on the
skills of potential future co-workers. In recent years, more and more French “Grandes Ecoles”
students made the choice to undertake an optional full year of internships between the two years
of their Master degree. We use this selection process to test potential effects of internships on
subsequent major choice and labor market outcomes, with an original survey about the integra-
tion of graduates from a French “Grande Ecole” matched with students’ attainments obtained
during the schooling program. A full year of internships is less valued by employers than a real
year of professional experience. Internships are perceived as a signal of ability by employers more
than a return to experience and a gain in human capital. A year of internships improves the
ability to find a job faster. It is possible to refine the major choices when several internships in
different areas are made. Public policies implemented, which ban unpaid internships or more
than six months, appear consistent with our results.
3.1 Introduction
Whereas internships have always represented one of the main foundations of vo-
cational and professional formations, e.g. apprenticeship, their occurrence has re-
cently increased in general higher education in France, far above what is required
to graduate. In particular, choosing to undertake a full year of internships between
the two years of a Master degree, which is not a requirement of the Master program,
has greatly expanded in the recent years in some French “Grandes Ecoles”. Beyond
formal education, on-the-job experiences accumulated during schooling, via intern-
ships, increase the student operational and practical skills in a professional setting.
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These are also privileged periods during which students gather information about
the characteristics of a given job, firm, industry, and their preferences for them.
In parallel, employers gather information about a potential future co-worker that
they may employ at the end of his/her studies. So, internships are likely to first in-
fluence students’ own decisions about their future field of specialization and future
career, and second, their wages and job conditions.
However, when comparing labor market outcomes for students who undertake
or not a full year of internships, the effects appear much more mixed. In forty five
engineering schools1 for which this year of internship is common but not compul-
sory, we found no effect on satisfaction at work and only a small increase of wage
with a 3% premium. There are 2% more likely to find a job before graduating (50%
versus 48%). These low benefits are unlikely to justify entering the labor market
one year later and the associated financial loss. It is not possible to understand
the choice of taking-up a one year internship with these aggregated comparisons.
Using detailed data on labor market outcomes matched with students’ attainments
and characteristics for one “Grande Ecole”, we study the effect of internships un-
dertaken during general higher education studies, on student choices about their
specialization, and on their employability and wages after graduation. This anal-
ysis is important for two main reasons. While many political debates were held on
internships in France, little is known about their potential effects. In France, each
academic background includes a number of mandatory internships but it is there-
fore not possible to observe a counterfactual. In the French engineering schools,
students can make the choice to undertake an optional full year of internship be-
tween the two years of the Master. This selection is used to measure the impact
of internships. The second reason is that the special case of a full year internship
helps to understand how are perceived the first work experience and internships
by firms, whether they are seen as a signal or as a gain of human capital, which is
a sensitive issue in economics.
Internships were largely studied in sciences of education and psychology. Taylor
(1988) underlines that internships improve employment opportunities, and in a
more partial way, knowledge of interest and work values. In management studies,
Gerken et al. (2010), Narayanan et al. (2010) and Gault et al. (2000) focused
on internships in business schools. To design effectiveness of internships, three
actors are involved: firms, universities and students. For firms, internships may
be help for special projects and a signal for future employees. For universities, it
engenders a stronger connection with the corporate world and a better reputation.
For students, this allows less time to get first job, a gain in wage, knowledge
of interest and work values. Those results are mainly based on qualitative and
1These figures come from surveys "integration of graduates" described below.
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descriptive analysis with few data. The effects on wages and employability are so
not clear. Gault et al. (2000) surveyed 223 students graduating during 1994-1996
and found positive effects on wages (9% higher), job search duration (less of more
than 2 months) and satisfaction at work. Sandvig (2005) found a 10% returns of
internships during boom period but 27% during poor period from 126 graduates
during the years 1997-2003. But other studies (as Fang and Lee, 2005) found no
significant effects. These parsimonious and inconsistent results can come from a
lack of theoretical background of these studies. In economics, Saniter and Sandler
(2014) find a positive effect on wages in the german labor market, using IV analysis
with the introduction and abolishment of mandatory internships. We are not
aware of other papers studying workplace training periods outcomes for students
in higher education/ university programs.2 Most of the literature on youth training
in the workplace focuses indeed on apprenticeship, that is, fully designed programs
alternating workplace based training and formal education periods3, see Wolter-
Ryan (2011) for a complete recent review and the seminal work of Becker (1962)4.
The main concern of these studies is to account for the endogenous selection of
individuals between apprenticeship and full-time formal vocational education. Our
approach is close, as we consider the optional full year as an endogenous selection
process too.
A closely related literature concerns the determinants of college majors and as-
sociated returns (see Altonji et al. (2012) for a complete review and a general
but mainly theoretical approach of sequential-decision schooling models). Edu-
2Stevens (1994) considers apprenticeship in the British engineering industry but from the firm
point of view.
3Wolter-Ryan (2011) define “apprenticeship as programs that comprise both work-based train-
ing and formal education, in most countries at upper-secondary level, and lead to a qualifi-
cation in an intermediate skill, not just to semiskilled labor.”
4The questions addressed include where to develop specific-occupation skills in the workplace or
at school, the firm behavior in entering and financing an apprenticeship system, the outcomes
for apprentices. Answers greatly depend on the country-level institutional context. Some
other papers compare secondary education apprenticeship to full-time formal vocational high
school in terms of labor market outcomes, especially risk of unemployment. In France, Bonnal
el al. (2003) show a positive impact of apprenticeship versus full-formal vocational high
school on getting rapidly a first job, and Alet and Bonnal (2011), a positive impact on
subsequent schooling outcomes. Studies are more numerous in German speaking countries,
in which the system of apprenticeship is widespread. Developing a full structural approach,
Adda et al. (2010) find an increase in wages and an accelerated experience gain profile in
Germany. Exploiting apprentice vacancies, Parey (2009) finds lower risk of unemployment for
apprentices fading out with time. Exploiting small firms closures and consequent exogenous
variations in apprenticeship durations, Fersterer el al. (2008) find a 5% pay increase of
apprenticeship. A parallel literature focuses on the advantages of developing some occupation-
specific skills, through some vocational courses, in general high school, to increase students’
cognition and motivation, see, e.g., Altonji (1995), Mane (1999) and Bishop and Mane (2004).
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cation decisions are made sequentially and outcomes are uncertain, see Altonji
(1993), Heckman et al. (2003). Preferences, beliefs, abilities, expected earnings
and non-pecuniary employment conditions revealed along the schooling process,
are expected to affect students’ choices at the next step of the schooling process,
and especially when they choose their specialization majors. Arcidiacono (2004)
analyzes the role of ability in major choices, distinguishing verbal and maths abili-
ties. Stinebrickner (2003) shows that students change majors after observing their
grade performance in the first years. For France, Beffy et al. (2012) find very
low, though significant, elasticity of college major choice to expected earnings and
conclude that non-pecuniary factors are the key determinants. For the U.S., Ar-
cidiacono et al. (2012) show that uncertainty about wage expectations generate
inefficient decisions. Optional internships may provide the occasion for students
to revise their beliefs about their preferences, their occupation-specific abilities,
their expected earnings and some non-pecuniary employment conditions. They
consequently help to reduce the uncertainty of related decisions.
We analyze the effect of a full year of internships on student’s subsequent choice
of specialization, and labor market outcomes after graduation, i.e. unemployment
risk, wages, satisfaction at work in a French Grande Ecole. Our data come from
an original survey about the labor market integration of graduates matched with
the students’ attainments during their schooling. This enables us to account for
student’s abilities. We consider that schooling decisions are sequential. The de-
cision of undertaking an optional full year of internships is indeed done before
the major choice one. During their first years of schooling (or other experience),
students receive information about their abilities and preferences. At the end of
the first year of the Master degree, they decide whether or not they would do an
optional year of internships between the two years of their Master degree. At the
beginning of the second year, they choose a major after having or not done a year
of internships the year before. Graduates finally enter the labor market or decide
to do a PhD (or other studies).
The sequential schooling decisions framework highlights several potential effects
of internships, that we test using reduced-forms models. Students who undertook
a full year of internships between the 2nd and the 3rd years of their program
may have higher wages or reduce their job search duration at their labor market
entry for several reasons. 1) Students may have delayed their entry into the labor
market in times of economic slowdowns. This effect is nevertheless expected to
be weak (Gaini et al., 2012). 2) It may be a signal to employers. With similar
characteristics and in the absence of other available information, firms are likely
to choose graduates who completed internships, as the individual ability is not
commonly observed by the employer. 3) The experience accumulated as an intern
may be valued by employers, which can be compared to the return to experience.
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4) Doing a full year of internships may improve opportunity of careers (a first
job effect) and the returns to experience. Hence, we can compare the return to
experience with and without doing a full year of internship. 5) Students may have
improved their orientation, and choose their major specialization in a much precise
accordance with their preferences and abilities. There will be a better matching
between graduates and their job. Students who did a full year of internships are
likely to be more satisfied of their job.
Empirical results indicate that the gross wage return of a full year of internships
is higher than 60 % of the return of one year of work experience but is lower than
a real year of professional experience. The effect is mainly determined by the
revelation of abilities. Internships are perceived as a signal of ability by employers
more than a return to experience and a gain in human capital. The econometric
analysis takes into account the ability bias and the endogeneity of the choice of
making a full year of internship. With IV analysis, the wage return of a full year
of internships appears higher than a real year of professional experience, but this
result has only a local interpretation. This year of internship improves the ability
to find a job faster. It has a small positive effect on job satisfaction (but only
significant with IV analysis and monetary component). It is possible to refine
the major choices when several internships in different areas are made. Public
policies implemented, which ban unpaid internships or more than six months,
appear consistent with our results. Compensation for internships of one third of
potential wage output seems necessary to financially equalize the loss. Perform a
full year internship should help to refine these major choices. It therefore seems
logical to ban internships more than 6 months, which can be considered as a real
job and not as an internship.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains contextual elements. It
describes the French higher education system with Grandes Ecoles and universities
and the place of internships. It also describes the schooling program of the Grande
Ecole studied. Section 3 presents the data used. Descriptive statistics are reported
in section 4. Section 5 presents the reduced-form estimation strategy and results.
Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional context
3.2.1 Overview of French higher education system
Universities and Grandes Ecoles. (cf. figure 3.1) Two types of French higher
education institutions can deliver graduate degrees: the universities, which are
large state-financed structures, and the "Grandes Ecoles", which are smaller either
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private or state-financed structures. The "Grandes Ecoles" contain "engineering
schools" or "business schools". Their particularity is that they are selective. To
enter one of them, students prepare for a contest entry during 2 years. This com-
petitive entry and the ranks of admitted students contribute a lot to the reputation
of the Grande Ecole and to the delivered degrees. French Grandes Ecoles students
represent about 15% of students in higher education in 2010 (about 8% in 1980).
Some of the "Grandes Ecoles" are quite generalists, others are more specialized.
Their schooling programs usually last 3 years, leading to a master degree or the
grade of Engineer, which is in France equivalent to a master degree. Event though
there is a lot of variability making comparison difficult, labor market outcomes of
Grandes Ecoles students are in average better than those of students from uni-
versity. In 2010, the employment rate and the average wages six months after
graduation for students from "Grandes Ecoles" are 84% and 35.800 euros (bonus
included). The selection at the entrance is one argument in favor of these better
labor market outcomes; the fact that Grandes Ecoles programs contain on-the-job
training periods is another. A Grande Ecole curriculum is usually composed of pe-
riods of formal education and compulsory periods of internships. The load of each,
and the sequence in which they intervene depend on the particular program. Even
though curriculum contains some work-place experience periods, Grandes Ecole
schooling programs do not correspond to some vocational training, neither to ap-
prenticeship, which corresponds most often to certifications below the bachelor’s
degree.5
In some Grandes Ecoles and especially in the one we consider here, a student
may choose to undertake internships for a longer duration than the one compulsory
to graduate. Our aim is to study the schooling and labor market outcomes of such
a choice.
Internships in the French higher education system. Internships are compulsory
part of many training programs, but their duration and content really depend on
the program, and the type of program. Internships are widespread in Grandes
Ecoles programs as some of them are constitutive of the programs. Programs in
these schools are labeled by external commissions, which check and insure that
the program fits different requirements including a certain number of weeks of
internships. Those labels are very important for schools as they entail the real
recognition of a certain level of education and equivalences. So all schools do their
best for their programs to satisfy those requirements. Most Grandes Ecoles contain
so an "internships office", some administrative staff who receive, find, check and
5The apprenticeship system has been greatly developed in France in recent years, although it
remains low in the higher education: apprentices accounted for 0.9% of students in higher
education in 1995, 2.4% in 2000 and 4.8% in 2010. The majority of these apprentices are
below the bachelor’s degree (90% in 1995, 75% in 2010).
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screen internship offers sent by firms and transmit them to the students. In 2010,
while almost all students from "Grandes Ecoles" undertook at least an internship
(there is usually a compulsory 6-months internship at the end of the last year of
the program), they were only 61% to undertake an internship in the last year of the
Master in a university. 97% of students in "Grandes Ecoles" were paid for their last
year internships versus 76% for university students of equivalent education level.
57% earned more than 600 euros a month versus 29% for university ones.
In the recent years, a policy debate in France has accompanied a change in leg-
islation about internships minimum remuneration and their duration. It has dis-
cussed the drawbacks of unpaid internships. First, as stated by Richmond (2010)
for the UK, students with lower financial resources would have less opportunities
to undertake unpaid internships than their counterparts, which may in turn de-
teriorate their entry conditions on the labor market. Second, unpaid internships
may also be viewed as unfair competition with older workers for whom minimum
wage regulation applies. The Law for equality of opportunity of March 2006, im-
plemented in February 2008, forbids unpaid internships longer than 3 months. It
has been extended in November 2009 to forbid unpaid internships lasting longer
than 2 months. Internships have to be paid at least 400 euros per month, which
represents a third of the minimum wage. The Cherpion Law (2011) and the Fio-
raso Law (2014) prohibits (paid) internships that last more than 6 months and
strengthens the rights for interns but the laws are not yet implemented. In con-
trast, in the U.K. or in the U.S., there is no legal obligation for firms to pay an
internship that lasts less than 1 year if it is required as part of students studies.
However, if interns satisfy the legal definition of ‘workers’ in the United Kingdom
(i.e. they do work for which others employees are paid) or some equivalent re-
quirements defined from the Fair Labor Standards Act in the U.S., they should
normally be paid at least the minimum wage.
3.2.2 French Grande Ecole schooling program
We now describe more precisely the Grande Ecole (ENSAE-ParisTech, Paris Grad-
uate School on Economics, Statistics and Finance), on which rely the data, and
its schooling program. The school is a relatively small Grande Ecole. Around
150 students graduate each year. Students who succeed the examination entrance,
enter the first year of the curriculum. This first year differs slightly between stu-
dents upon their previous studies. Those who studied economics before, are taught
more maths and those who studied maths more economics. Some other students,
selected on records, directly enter the second year of the program. The second
year of the program is composed of common and compulsory general courses in
Economics, Statistics, and Humanities and students choose a minor in Economics
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or Applied Mathematics. The minor choice is made by the student upon his/her
preferences and expected abilities. There are no quota in registration in a minor,
neither restrictions based upon previous specialization. At the end of the 2nd year,
students choose either to undertake a compulsory 3-month internship and to enter
the 3rd year of the program, or to undertake internships for a complete year. If so,
they come back one year later in the 3rd year of the program, and will graduate
one year later. There are seven majors in 3rd year, which, due to the small number
of students per major, we will gather in two main fields, Finance/Actuarial Sci-
ences and Economics/Statistics/Social sciences. Those are equitably distributed
with 54% of students in the Finance oriented majors and 46% in the other ones.
Students choose the 3rd-year major at the beginning of the 3rd year. Again, there
is no quota, whatever her previous curriculum is, a student enters the major he
chooses.
3.3 Data
We use 5 surveys "integration of graduates" of the school (2009 to 2013), which
we match with the administrative data of student schooling attainment.6 The
survey " integration of graduates" is organized every year in all French "Grandes
Ecoles", which represent approximately 200 schools (including both "engineering
schools" and "business schools") and 40,000 students. The survey focuses on the
labor market participation and job conditions at the time of the survey, wage and
job satisfaction. It questions exhaustively the two (for surveys 2009 and 2010)
or three (for surveys 2011, 2012 and 2013) promotions who graduated during the
year, the year before or two year before. A student is then interviewed 6 months,
18 months, and 30 months after graduation. Each year the questions are identical
using the same definitions.
We only use data on students who join the program in the first or the second
year and then have the possibility to choose to undertake optional internships. So
we exclude students who joined the program directly in the third year (around
23% of a graduating promotion). We also exclude some students who were regis-
tered in double degree programs through conventions with other institutions and
consequently replace the 3rd year of the program by a year of education of an
equivalent level in another institution (around 12%). We also exclude the very
few students who repeated a grade (less than 4%). Finally, we exclude the 14% of
civil servants trained by this school. In France, civil servants are selected before
6The survey has been declared to the French “Commission nationale de l’informatique et des lib-
ertés” (declaration number 1604776) with the precision that the survey data can be matched
with data coming from the administrative education software (“pamplemousse”). All data
are anonymous.
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their entry in the program and are chosen by a public contest. They are paid
during their studies. They were excluded as they cannot do an optional full year
of internship and have already a job with a non-negotiated fixed salary after the
program.
The sample contains both students admitted in the first year or in the second
year of the program. Students enter the first year of the curriculum after passing a
competitive examination. Students enter the second year with a selection process
based on records and past studies. These students are older of one year on average.
All students have a high background in economics or mathematics before the ad-
mission. At their entrance in the school, they take advanced courses in economics
and mathematics, both theoretical and applied, in order to homogenize their skills
and knowledge. This part of the program insures that students are homogeneous
even if they arrive with different background. In France, each “Grande Ecole” is
similar to a brand valuated by firms, for which a shadow “ranking” is obtained
according to the difficulties to be admitted.
Schooling attainments during curriculum come from the administrative data
(the education management software used), and are matched with the survey data.
These data also contain student’s choices of 3rd year majors, 2nd year minors; and
some basic information on previous studies and on social-demographic character-
istics: parental background and location, social scholarships, age, gender, etc...
Students do not take the same courses during the 3rd year of the program, their
scores are not comparable. So we rely on their achievements during the 2nd year
of the program. For each student, we have also computed an inverse ranking based
only on the schooling attainments upon common courses of the 2nd year of the
program. The best student is ranked 100 and the last one 0. These rankings
can be interpreted as quantiles. It makes them comparable to GPA and between
years. We have defined a global ranking based on the average score during the
year (all courses including group projects, and after the catch-up examinations),
and specific rankings based on the written individual evaluation in mathematics
(statistics and time series), and economics (micro- and macro-economics). Courses
included in the specific rankings have been selected using a principal component
analysis.
Finally, our dataset is composed of 452 students who graduated from 2007 to
2012. 39% are women. 65% were admitted in the first year, 35% in the second
year (i.e. the first year of a Master degree). The overall response rate is around
71%, lowering with the time after graduation: 82% for the more recent graduating
promotion, versus 65% for the others. This overall response rate is between 74%
and 78% for surveys 2009 to 2012, but only 57% in 2013. The comparison between
the survey response rate and the actual numbers of students per 3rd year major
confirms that the sample of respondents is representative. Student who majored
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in Economics/Statistics/Social Sciences respond more frequently than those who
majored in Finance (81% versus 64%). An explanatory model of non-response
(logistic model) confirms these observations (cf. appendix). With the exception of
the third year major and the number of years after graduation, the other observable
characteristics (gender, nationality, age, year of admission, schooling attainment,
full year of internships...) do not explain non-response. Hence, we have created
weights based on this model as what is usually done in sampling theory. We com-
puted two weights to measure the probability that the observation is included in
the sample. Unequal weights are directly based on the probability of the logistic
model. Stratified weights are equal weights in the groups defined by the year of
graduation, the major and the number of years after graduation. This is a post-
stratification weighting scheme based on homogeneity groups of responses. We
estimated weighted regressions of the wages equation and compared weighted and
unweighted regressions (cf. appendix). Results are close. We conclude that the
use of weights is not required, which is consistent with the fact that explanatory
variables of non-response are included in our models. In this case, the selection pro-
cess due to attrition is already taken into account (Solon, Haider and Wooldridge
2013). Partial non-response is very low,7 and responses to different survey quite
consistent.8 Job satisfaction was not surveyed in 2009.
Variables of interest. The full year of internships and the 3rd year major variables
come from the administrative schooling management software data, and labor
market outcome variables from the survey data. The wage variable corresponds
to the total annual real wages including bonuses. In average 62% of people report
bonuses, for approximately 12% of their annual total remuneration. The level of
bonuses increases with experience. Job satisfaction is measured by several indexes
ranging from 1 (worst) to 5 (best): satisfaction of the relations with colleagues,
of the location of the firm, of the remuneration, of the level of autonomy, and of
working conditions in general.
We have included job characteristics in the analysis, such as working abroad
(without distinguishing between different countries), working in the public sector
7equal for example to 6% for duration of the first job search and to 10% for wages.
8 Students are surveyed about their current job. However, there are additional questions for
those for whom this is not the first job. So, depending on the fact that he/she changes or
not of job, we either have repetitive information on the same job or information up to 4
different jobs he/she held. 78 students (17%) did not give any information, 157 (35%) one
response, 83 (18%) two responses, 99 (22%) three responses and 35 (8%) four responses. So
some of them answered several times at the same questions. We analyzed the consistency
of responses and memory bias. Concerning the first job search duration, answers between
surveys are consistent. They differ in less than 10% of the cases and in such cases for minimal
differences: answering “between 2 and 4 months” instead of “between 4 and 6 months”, for
example.
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or whether the job is a fixed term contract. Two main characteristics observed in
the survey have not been included, the firm size and the business sector because
responses were not exploitable. The firm size is misinformed for multinational
companies with a lot of institutions (as banks or insurances) where the majority of
graduates work (respondents did not know if the question was related to the size of
the firm or the subsidiary entity). One might think that this omitted variable has
little impact, because the number of graduates working in small innovative firms
is low. For the business sector, 18% of students studying in a major work finally
in an other employment sector (a student majoring in economics who works in the
banking sector for example). As this figure is low and the distinction between close
professional sectors difficult, we assume the major choice is associated to a choice
of employment sector. Some other features are unobserved. We do not observe how
employers define their wage proposal. The bargaining power of graduates can be
reduced by pay scales based on university or “Grande Ecole” followed, which may
explain a lower effect of internship. We do not know if the graduate works in the
firm where he did an internship because the name of the firm is misinformed. We
cannot therefore exclude the hypothesis that the effect of internship is primarily
obtained for these students and is different for graduates working in a company
different from the one in which they did an internship.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Figure 3.2 reports the increasing share of students choosing to undertake an op-
tional full-year of internships between the 2nd and the 3rd year of the curriculum.
23% of those who graduated in 2007 used this option and 62% of those who grad-
uate in 2011. 52% of students admitted in the first year completed a full year of
internships (32% in 2007 and 76% in 2011) and only 17% of those admitted in the
second year did so (almost none before 2010 and 38% in 2011).
3.4.1 Major choice
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 compare student’s abilities, given by rankings, and major
choices depending on the fact that students did or not a full year of intern-
ships. As noted before, 54% of the students major in Finance and 46% in Eco-
nomics/Statistics/Social Sciences. More students who did a full year of internships
chose to major in Finance during the 3rd year of the program (61% of cases vs.
49%) whereas there are no apparent relation between 2nd-year minors and the
choice of undertaking or not a full year of internships.
Students who chose to undertake a full year of internships seem to have lower
77
Chapter 3 Internships, major choices and labor market outcomes of French
“Grandes Ecoles” graduates
2nd year schooling attainments in average than others. Their average inverse
ranking is 46.1 versus 53.0 for those who did not. Note that we report an inverse
ranking to make rankings comparable to GPA. So the best student is ranked
100 and the last one 1. The average ranking is lower for all 2nd-year minors
(5.7 ranks for mathematics; 9.6 ranks for economics) and compulsory courses.
Students choose their specialization in line with their skills. Those who choose a
minor in economics have better ranking in economics courses than in mathematics
courses (54.4 versus 41.5), and vice versa for those with a minor in mathematics
(56.9 average ranking for mathematics courses versus 51.9 for economic courses).
Students do not take the same courses during the 3rd year of the program, their
scores are not comparable.
3.4.2 Full year internship
Table 3.3 describes the features of internships done between the two years of the
Master. 56% of students doing a full year internship makes two internships, com-
pared to 37% one and 8% three. Doing an internship in Finance is more frequent
for students making a full year internship (64% vs. 43%). 14% of students make
internships in Finance and in other field. The topics of the internships are linked
with minor and major choices.
3.4.3 Labor market outcomes
Table 3.4 reports the average labor market outcomes of graduates whether or
not they undertook a full-year of internships. Six months after graduating, 4% of
graduates who did a full year of internships were looking for a job compared to 10%
of those who did not. Student who chose to complete an optional year of internships
work also more often, 73% including volunteering versus 55%. Students who did
not continued more often their studies (19% of cases vs. 11%). In average over the 3
promotions interviewed in each survey, students who did a full year of internships
earn 13% more than those who did not (53.800 euros bonuses included versus
47.600 euros). Wages rose sharply in the early years of the career, 13% increase
between the first and second year, and 7% between the second and third year.
The evolution is nevertheless not the same whether or not graduates undertook
a full-year of internships. The increases are 28% (between the first and second
year) and null (between the second year and the third year) for graduates who
did a full year of internships while they are 7% and 13% for others. This may
be due to a later entry into professional life. Students majoring in Finance earn
in average 12% more. There is no effect (or only a small one) of a full year of
internships on the wage differential between specialization fields six months after
graduation. These figures suggest that the on-the-job experience acquired during
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the year of internships is valuated by the employers. Concerning satisfaction at
work, the results are less obvious. Internships seem to be associated with a better
satisfaction (for all components) but the difference is small, of the order of 0.1 on a
scale of 5 (for example with 100 students, 10 choose a score of 5 instead of a score
of 4). There is more satisfaction for non-monetary components (4.2 on average for
autonomy, working conditions and environment) than for wages (3.8 on average).
If we compare averages between responses of students with and without a full year
internship, we found a significant effect (at 10%) only for autonomy at work, with
a difference of 0.19 point (i.e. for 100 workers, 19 would answer 5 instead of 4 for
example). There is a non-significant positive difference for wages and the working
environment. There is no difference for the working conditions. Table 3.5 reports
the distribution of the job satisfaction categories for the 4 components, wages,
autonomy and responsibility at work, the working conditions and the working
environment (relations with colleagues). 5 response items are possible, from 1 (the
worst one) to 5 (the best one). It is an ordered scale. However, responses 1 or
2 are rare. There are 3% of responses 1 for wages, and 1% for the non-monetary
variables. There are 9% of responses 2 for wages, 6% for autonomy and the working
conditions, and 2% for the working environment. The response item 4 seems the
more stable, with 36% of response for wage, autonomy and the working conditions,
and 31% for the working environment. The highest satisfaction (5) is obtained for
the working environment (57%), then the working conditions (44%), autonomy
(38%) and finally wages (28%). We note low differences between distributions
whether students take or not a full year internship, with a significant difference
only for the response item 2 of autonomy.
Table 3.6 reports the distribution of the first job search duration. 63% of the
graduates who did a full year of internships found a job before graduating compared
to 53% of those who did not. They are also less likely to have a search period
lasting more than 6 months, 4% versus 10%. 28% of the students declare that
internships - including full-year, part-time and other compulsory ones - helped
them to find a job. Full-year of internships are also associated to longer job periods
after graduation. The first job - when ended - was also in average longer - of 3
months- for the graduates who did a full year of internships. These figures suggest
a better matching between the graduates who chose to undertake a full year of
internships and the employers occurred. 18% of students studying in a major work
finally in an other employment sector (a student majoring in economics who works
in the banking sector for example). As this figure is low and the distinction between
close professional sectors difficult, we assume the major choice is associated to a
choice of employment sector.
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3.5 Internships, major choice, and labor market
outcomes: reduced-form results
3.5.1 Estimation strategy
Our goal is to test the potential effects of internships. It is not to understand the
complete learning process of preferences associated with doing a full year of intern-
ship. As the labor market can be considered as an absorbing state (you cannot
return to school after entering in the labor market), the effects of undertaking an
optional complete year of internships on labor market outcomes after graduation
can be tested using a Mincer type model for wages (and close models for duration
of job search and satisfaction at work) and controlling for the endogenous selection.
For the effects on subsequent schooling decisions (major and full year internship),
Rust (1987) assumptions are the conditional independence (the unobserved fac-
tors at t have no effects one period later if you control by the decision variable at
t + 1) and that unobserved heterogeneity is a random effect. It means that there
is no omitted variable and no serial correlation of unobserved preferences. The
subsequent schooling decisions (major and full year internship) can then be then
estimated with a classical probit model. These assumptions are strong. One may
use an assumption of a type-specific unobserved heterogeneity to estimate a full
structural model (Arcidiacono and Ellickson, 2010, Beffy et al. 2012), but it will
be necessary to add some assumptions to define the learning process and to have
more data. We so limit our analysis for the subsequent schooling decisions (major
and full year internship) to this reduced-form approach.
3.5.2 Internships wages outcomes
The choice of the number of years of schooling has already been done by the student
at the entry of the "Grande Ecole" (more than 5 years depending on whether the
student goes on with a PhD or not). The failure rate is very low in French “Grandes
Ecoles” and the degree is obtained 5 years after high school graduation. The wage
of a graduate on the labor market is defined with a Mincer type analysis9
9A huge literature has focused on the returns to education, with estimates based on the tra-
ditional Mincer equation, which explains wages by years of schooling, experience and other
control factors. Due to the potential endogeneity of the schooling decision (as the student
ability is not observed), IV estimators have been proposed with instruments mainly based on
compulsory schooling laws. This approach has been debated (see Björklund and Kjellström
(2002), Dickson and Harmon (2011) for a brief review). Heckman et al. (2003) analyze the
assumptions of the classical Mincer model and conclude that derived returns to schooling es-
timates are not valid. Indeed, this static model neglects the major determinants of schooling
decision such as the uncertainty about the future wages, the cost of schooling, or the varia-
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log (Wmt) = α0mt+α1mt ·d+α2mAm+α3m ·d·Am+α4mexpt+α5m ·d·expt+Xtβ+εmt
with t, the year, m, the third year major, log (Wmt) the log of total wages
- bonuses included, d, a dummy equal to one if the student did a full year of
internships, A, the student ability, which is major specific (a student may choose a
major where his/her ability is higher) and can be split into a general and a specific
ability, exp the experience in the labor market (a squared term is not necessary for
the first years), andX a vector of other characteristics (job characteristics (working
abroad, second job since graduation, whether it is in the public sector, whether
the job contract is fixed-term or long-term), and student characteristics (gender,
nationality, year of graduation). Experience (in years 0, 1 or 2) accounts for the
sum of the duration of each job reported in the survey. The year of graduation
accounts for effects of economic conditions. Student’s ability is measured by their
ranking in the second year (the courses are partly common unlike the third year),
or their ranking on specific courses (economics and mathematics), which has been
defined using a principal component analysis. As robustness check, we also used
a potential experience variable.10 X is assumed to have the same returns for each
major and whether or not the student has done a full year of internships. The
other variables are major- and internship- specific. The constant term measures
the structural differences of wage returns between majors and the gain associated
with a full year of internships (to be compared to an additional year of experience).
This reduced-form model entails some predictions that can be tested.
• Waiting for good economic conditions (for duration of job search too): stu-
dents could delay their entry into the labor market if they think the economy
is not favorable. The year of graduation will so have an effect on wages, with
Wt+1 > Wt due to t;
• Signaling to employers (for duration of job search too): with similar char-
acteristics and in the absence of other available information, firms are likely
tion of these returns over the life cycle. Furthermore, the use of IV estimators to address the
problem of the omitted ability bias is not powerful, and quite different results occur depend-
ing on which instruments are used and which assumptions are made (Heckman and Urzua,
2010). Blundell et al. (2005) compare several methods linked with the evaluation literature:
matching, IV, and control function approach. They emphasize the importance of the detailed
test score and the family background differences to explain (heterogeneous) schooling returns.
Non-monetary benefits of education are generally not taken into account, despite the fact that
health and well-being can be improved with a higher education (Heveman and Wolfe, 1984).
10The Pearson correlation between the two experience variables is very high, 90%.
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to choose graduates who completed internships. The ability of the student
A is largely unknown by the firm. Doing an internship so reveals a part of
the student ability to the employer, with α2m = 0 and α3m > 0 in an ex-
treme case where the ability is completely unknown without internship and
revealed with internship;
• A cost-benefit analysis between the opportunity cost of entering the labor
market one year later, and the wage gain associated with the experience
accumulated as an intern: there would be a wage return to a full year of
internships. We can so compare the return to experience α1 and the return
to a full year of internship α4.
• A better return of experience: doing a full year of internships may improve
opportunity of careers (a first job effect) and the returns to experience. The
returns to experience also depend on first job opportunities, which may differ
depending on internships done and majors chosen. Hence, we can compare
the return to experience α5 with and without doing a full year of internship.
Results are reported in table 3.7. Note that this analysis enables one to inter-
pret only correlations. No causal conclusions should be entailed from it. In column
2, we add education characteristics (3rd year major chosen, inverse ranking). In
such analyzes, there may be an omitted ability bias. Students have different skills,
often unobserved. We add student achievements in the program. We use the in-
verse ranking of student in 2nd year i.e. 100 for the best student, 0 for the worst,
as proxy for ability. In column 3, we separate the overall ability in two specific
skills, mathematics and economics. In column 4, we cross the full year internship
dummy with each year of professional experience in order to check if the effect
could disappear with experience. In column 5, we use a LAD estimator (median
regression) to take into account extreme wages. A full year of internships has a
positive and significant effect of 6.1-8.6% on wages, which is reduced when we con-
trol for extreme wages. A rank increase of general ability by one decile corresponds
to a pay increase of 0.8% more, due to the economics skills (as the mathematics
skills have an unexpected negative value) with a 12.3% premia. Experience has
a positive and significant effect of 10.1% on wages, reduced when we control for
extreme wages. Consequently, with a static vision, one may infer that the wage
cost-benefit trade-off of undertaking a full year of internships is negative; it would
be rewarded less than the year of labor market experience it replaces, around 60%.
The students’ enthusiasm for it would remain a puzzle. The effect of a full year
internship does not disappear with experience. Other job characteristics have ex-
pected effects. Fixed-term contracts and working in the public sector entail smaller
wages whereas working abroad a 40% premia. Choosing to major in Finance is
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associated to 8.8-9.5% premia. Finally, over 2007-2012, the year of graduation has
no effect.
The effect of a full year of internship or to major in Finance could differ following
ability of students. Furthermore, returns to experience could not be the same. We
test those assumptions by including interaction effects in our analysis. Results are
reported in table 3.8. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the OLS estimates. Column 1
adds interaction effects between education characteristics (full year of internship),
experience and a third year major in Finance. In column 1, the effect of a full
year internship would be the same for students majoring in Finance and in other
major. Choosing to major in Finance is associated to a non-significant premia.
Concerning returns to experience, we note that returns are higher for students
majoring in Finance (around 5.4%), and small and non significant for a full year
of internship. Concerning returns to ability, a full year of internship would have
a positive effect to reveal abilities. In column 2, the effect of general ability is
null for students who have not made a full year internship but highly positive and
significant for others. In column 3, concerning specific abilities, we note that it
reveals mainly the mathematics abilities (there could be an adverse selection effect
for students who have not made a full year internship).
In our sequential decision framework, the internship take-up depends on future
expectations on wages and non-monetary benefits. Those gains can be explained
by several factors, such as heterogeneous preferences, beliefs, risk aversion, or indi-
vidual abilities. We control our econometrics analysis with schooling attainments,
which can be interpreted as a measure of individual ability. However, there may be
an omitted part of individual ability, and there may also be some error measure-
ments. Ability for theoretical courses does not say anything about communication
skills for example. If the omitted ability is positively correlated with the schooling
attainments (i.e. students with better schooling attainments have also a better
ability to communicate) and as students who take-up a full year internship have
lower schooling results, there would be a downward bias. However as the sign of
this correlation is unknown, the direction of the bias is uncertain. Furthermore, if
students who did a full year internship were those who have preferences for profes-
sional settings and lower preferences for non-monetary benefits, it would interact
with monetary and non-monetary benefits. Those students may engage in jobs
with better wages and lower working conditions, which may create an upward bias
in the wage equation. All in all, the bias may exist but the direction of the bias is
largely uncertain.
There are two endogenous variables in the analysis, undertaking or not a full year
of internships and majoring in Finance. They depend both on future expectations
on wages and non monetary benefits, which can be explained by several factors,
such as heterogeneous preferences, beliefs, risk aversion, or individual abilities. In
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an attempt to control endogeneity for the full year of internships and a major in
finance, we conduct an IV analysis. There are two main identifying assumptions
behind the IV equations.
The first one is that the instruments do not have to be correlated with the
dependent variable (i.e. the exogeneity condition), such as wage, the probability
to find a job before graduating or satisfaction at work. Our set of instruments is
the student age at the end of the 2nd year of the program, the year of admission,
a year of graduation higher than 2010 and the minor choice in 2nd year. Our
assumption is these variables are not correlated with wage, the probability to find
a job before graduating (except for the year of graduation) or satisfaction at work.
In France, each “Grande Ecole” is similar to a brand valuated by firms, for which
a shadow “ranking” is obtained according to the difficulties to be admitted. We
may assume that, as this school is highly selective, that employability and wages
do not depend of past experience such as being graduate from an other university
for example. The student age and the year of admission would be thus valid
instruments for undertaking a full year of internship. Similarly one may think
that firms consider mainly major choices and the “Grande Ecole” standing to fix
wages or to hire an employee. The minor choice would be thus uncorrelated with
wages and be a valid instrument to explain the major choice. Finally we may think
that the economic situation primarily affects employability but not wages which
are considered rigid even in a recession. A year of graduation higher than 2010
would be then a valid instrument for wages but not for the probability to find a
job before graduating. These assumptions are questionable. If violated, there will
be no endogeneity correction with an IV analysis. However, if there are as many
instruments as endogenous variables, this exogeneity condition cannot be tested.
If there are more instruments than endogenous variables, a Sargan-Hansen test of
overidentifying restrictions can be performed, whose the joint null hypothesis is
that the instruments are consistent instruments (i.e. the choice of instruments is
not invalidated).
The second condition is that the instruments have to explain the endogenous
variables (i.e. the rank condition), which is tested in the first stages regressions
of 2SLS. The student age at the end of the 2nd year of the program or the year
of admission is likely to be negatively correlated with the full year of internships.
It will be more expensive for older students to postpone their entry into the labor
market. Due to the implementation of laws banning unpaid internships starting in
2008, a year of graduation higher than 2010 (i.e. two years after the law) can be a
possible instrument too. The minor choice in 2nd year is a natural instrument for
the choice of major. All F-stat are higher than 10. As there are two endogenous
variables, a global F-stat is computed who gives the same conclusions. However, we
exclude potential instruments because they were found to be weak instruments,
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such as having a social scholarship or the value index for French banking and
insurance equities. With weak instruments, results can be indeed misleading. Due
do financial constraints and the fact that undertaking a full year of internships
implies postponing labor market entry of one year, having a social scholarship
could have been negatively correlated with the full year of internships dummy but
not correlated with wages. Furthermore, the choice of undertaking internships
during a full year or majoring in finance may depend on the conjuncture in the
banking and insurance sector. The value index (base 1 in December 2011) in June
for French banking and insurance equities (AXA, Societe Generale, Credit Agricole
SA, BNP Paribas) could have been used as alternative instruments.
For IV analysis on wages, we perform an iterative choice of instruments. We
begin with the student age and the minor choice, then we add the year of admission,
and at last a year of graduation higher than 2010. All tests conclude to the
consistency of instruments.
Results are reported in table 3.9 with different instruments, using 2SLS (GMM
estimators give consistent results). Columns 3, 4 and 5 are for the model with a
dummy for the full year internship and IV analysis. Columns 1 and 2 report the
OLS estimations with and without the instruments for comparison. The full year
of internships IV estimates are higher than the OLS ones, around 13.0-16.1% but
standard errors are often much higher too. Without taking into account the year
of admission (columns 3), the effect is not significant. The column (4) with all
instruments except year of graduation seems to be the best estimate (no over iden-
tification, higher KP F-stat for weak identification). With IV analysis, the wage
return of a full year of internships appears higher than a real year of professional
experience, but this result has only a local interpretation. All instruments (except
for the student age) and endogenous variables are indeed dummies variables. The
interpretation will be similar to a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), i.e.
restricted to a subpopulation. All first stages and the corresponding F-tests are
reported in table 3.10. Results are consistent. To be older of one year is associ-
ated with a decrease of taking-up a full year internship around 6-7%. Minoring in
mathematics is associated with an increase of majoring in finance between 45% and
57%. To be admitted in 2nd year decreases the probability of a full year internship
around 30-40% and the probability of majoring in finance around 14-17%. A year
of graduation higher than 2010 increases the take-up of internship of 31-36%.
Concerning duration of job search, table 3.11 shows that a full year internship
reduces this duration but not by revealing the ability of students (interaction
effects are not included but are close to 0 and non significant). With an interval
regression, this reduction of job search is estimated less than 2 months. IV analysis
with a linear probability model shows that the effect may be underestimated. The
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year of graduation has no effect on wages but the economic conditions have effects
on duration of job search.
3.5.3 Internships satisfaction at work outcomes
If internships enable students to learn about their preferences for a job, an indus-
try, and to adapt in consequence their orientation, one would expect that optional
internships would be associated with higher satisfaction once at work. The surveys
we use contain several questions on the degree of general satisfaction at work, and
satisfaction degrees regarding relations with remuneration, colleague, autonomy in
work, and work conditions. We construct an index of non-pecuniary satisfaction by
summing the 3 satisfaction variables regarding relations with colleague, autonomy
in work, and work conditions. Each satisfaction variable ranges from 1 (worst) to
5 (best). Tables 3.12 and 3.13 report OLS results of wages and non-pecuniary sat-
isfaction on similar characteristics as previously. Experience has a negative effect
on satisfaction, which shows that expectations are not fulfilled. Wages are highly
correlated with wage satisfaction but not with non-pecuniary satisfaction. Having
undertaken a full year of internships is positively related to non-pecuniary satis-
faction and negatively to wages satisfaction, but the effects are not significant. An
interesting point is that the non-pecuniary satisfaction is very difficult to explain.
Unobserved factors play an important role.
An absence of a link between internship and satisfaction may be possible if in-
creasing the satisfaction at work is not a selection criterion for doing an internship
as the potential gains in non-monetary utility may have other sources (prestige,
altruism or social utility of a job). We may argue that satisfaction at work may
be badly anticipated by workers, which is consistent with the negative correlation
between experience and satisfaction. However, three critics arise regarding these
results. First, tests lack of power. The non-significance may also be due to the
sample size. Second, questions are measured with a Likert scale, i.e. an ordered
opinion on a subject, which may create a measurement issue. Aggregating the
three components of non-monetary satisfaction is valid only if these three com-
ponents are highly correlated, which is only partly the case with a correlation
between 0.34-0.40. Furthermore, the point attributed is a normative choice. We
note that the response item 4 corresponds to a median response. What is impor-
tant is that workers are more satisfied than this median. As the response items 1
or 2, we may think too that they are more penalized situations, and so attribute
them lower points. In order to check these assumptions, we performed a disaggre-
gated analysis by estimating a model for each of the three components (autonomy,
working conditions and environment). We recoded the variable with lower points
for rare responses (-5 for 1, -3 for 2, -1 for 3, 0 for 4, and +1 for 5). We finally
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estimated probit models of a response item of 5 versus lower than 4. In all cases,
the effect of a full year of internship remains non-significant and low. The third
critic is that, as for wages, heterogeneous preferences can explain satisfaction at
work, but also the choice of doing a full year internship or majoring in finance. If
students who did a full year internship or choose a major in finance are those who
have preferences for professional settings and lower preferences for non monetary
benefits, those students could engage in jobs with better wage and lower working
conditions, which may create an downward in the satisfaction equations. Hence,
we performed an IV analysis similar to the one conducted for wages (first stage
regressions are close to the ones for wages). With this analysis, we find indeed
higher effects, with a significant 0.5 points increase of the full year internship for
the wage satisfaction and an insignificant 0.3 point increase for the non-monetary
satisfaction. Choosing a major in Finance is negatively correlated with satisfaction
in these IV analyses.
3.5.4 Internships and major choice
We examine the determinants of the 3rd-year major choice and the decision to
do a full year of internship. We assume that individuals choose their majors to
maximize the value function Vm, which is the sum of the non-monetary benefits
ν0m and the present value of expected earnings ν1m:
m? = argmax
m
Vm
The non-monetary benefits are assumed to be a linear function of observable
individual covariates (such as ability for a special topic, gender...). The year of
graduation and so on economic conditions do not impact this term.
ν0m = E3rdyear (αm +Xβm)
The present value of expected earnings ν1m can be modeled by
T+g∑
t=g
θt−gE3rdyearlog
(
Wm(t−g)
)
with θ the discount factor, g the year of graduation, T the length of active life,
Wmt the wages in year t given major m. Note that this is dependent of the year of
graduation and so, the economic conditions. Furthermore, graduates from Grandes
Ecoles usually perform very well in integrating quickly in the labor market, so we
neglect the risk of unemployment and focus on wages. One important aspect is
that ν0m and ν1m are unknown by the student and approximated when learning of
his own ability and preferences.
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There are 7 different majors in 3rd year of the program but due to the small
number of students per major, we group them in those related to Finance/Acturial
Sciences and those related to Economics/Social Sciences/Statistics. We explain the
3rd year major and the decision to do a full year of internship by students social
characteristics - sex, place of birth, parents occupations - students admission type,
schooling attainments in 2nd year - inverse ranking i.e. 100 for the best student,
0 for the worst, minor choices in 2nd year, and a dummy identifying those who
chose to undertake the optional full year of internships (for the major choice only).
The constant of the probit model for majoring in Finance can be interpreted as a
wage differential.
Table 3.14 reports the results of average marginal effects of a probit model es-
timation for a major choice in Finance. As there are only two major choices,
the constant captures the structural differences between the two majors such as
wage differences. However, these differences in wages may change depending on
the economic situation and may explain the choices of students. To help them
to make these decisions, the administrative staff informs them on the labor mar-
ket outcomes of former graduates by communicating about the results of the last
Integration of Graduates survey. But results are published two years after gradu-
ation and are not known over a long period (in particular before 2007). One other
solution is to add the year of graduation, which can measure the conjuncture.
Second year minor choice is naturally correlated with the 3rd year major one.
Students who chose a minor in applied maths are more likely to major in Finance in
3rd year with an average marginal effect of 26.0-44.5%. The minor choice is a first
expression of student’s preferences and expected abilities. As seen previously in the
descriptive statistics, students who undertook a full year of internships are more
likely to major in Finance. However, it is possible to refine the major choices when
several internships in different areas are made. Students whose at least one parent
is professional or work in the business sector are more likely to major in Finance
with an average marginal effect of 12%. 2nd year general ranking is positively
correlated with majoring in Finance, but the results are not significantly different
from 0. In contrast, the mathematics ability is highly correlated with majoring in
Finance.
A student chooses to do an internship if
E2ndyear [p1Vm1 (d = 1) + (1− p1)Vm2 (d = 1)]+λ > E2ndyear [p0Vm1 (d = 0) + (1− p0)Vm2 (d = 0)]
with λ the net value (wages minus cost of living) of doing one year of internships.
p1 (resp. 1−p1) is the probability of choosing the major m1 (resp. m2) after doing
a full year of internships. p0 (resp. 1− p0) is the probability of choosing the major
m1 (resp. m2) without doing a full year of internship. We can neglect here the
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cost of the studies, which is more than moderate and rather constant over time
(around 500 euros per academic year).
If a student did not complete a full year of internship, he will do a three months
internship between the two years of the master’s degree. Even without this full
year, the expected value function at the end of the second year (the first year of
the master’s degree) and at the beginning of the third year (the second year of the
master’s degree) could be different. Nevertheless, we may consider that they are
equal, E2ndyear [. . . /d = 0] = E3rdyear [. . . /d = 0].
Table 3.15 reports the results for the decision to do a full year of internship
(columns 3 and 4). We compute the predicted
E2ndyear [p1Vm1 (d = 1) + (1− p1)Vm2 (d = 1)]− E2ndyear [p0Vm1 (d = 0) + (1− p0)Vm2 (d = 0)]
using estimators of previous models, which are highly correlated with general abil-
ity. For each student, the probability of majoring in finance is computed with a
probit model, with (p1) or without (p0) doing a full year internship. The value
function Vm is assumed equal to the log of wage the first year after graduation
and is computed with information available at the first year of the master’s degree
with a major in finance (Vm1) or not (Vm2), and with (d = 1) or without (d = 0)
doing a full year internship. With this analysis, we want to know if the decision
of taking-up a full year internship can be rationalized in a cost-benefit framework.
There is no correlation between a full year internship and the predicted wage dif-
ferentials, without controlling with specific abilities. However, when controlling,
the predicted wage differentials have a positive effect compensated by the effect of
specific abilities. It would indicate that the predicted wage differentials could have
an heterogeneous effect, higher for low abilities students for whom the expected
wages are lower. Other results are consistent with the first stages of the IV anal-
ysis. In contrast the decision to do a full year of internship is not correlated with
the second year minor choice, the gender or the nationality. The admission in 2nd
year, age in 2nd year, to have a social scholarship and the rank have a significant
and negative effect. Increase its ranking of one decile decreases the probability of
2%.
3.6 Conclusion
This article tests different predictions of internships effects using the endogenous
selection process of an optional one year internship. Perform a full year of in-
ternship is less valued by employers as a real year of professional experience. In-
ternships are perceived as a signal of ability by employers more than a return to
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experience and a gain in human capital. This year of internship improves the abil-
ity to find a job faster. It has a small positive effect on job satisfaction (but only
significant with IV analysis and monetary component). It is possible to refine the
major choices when several internships in different areas are made. Those ques-
tions are to be related to public policies. It opens the debate on compensation of
internships, analyzing returns to education for early career professionals. It also
provides evidence on the time students need to make effective major choices, and
improve the social gain associated. Public policies implemented, which ban unpaid
internships or more than six months, appear consistent with our results.
Internships may reduce the uncertainty about the wage expectations for a given
major and may reveal the student preferences. But understanding the complete
learning process of preferences associated with doing a full year of internship is
a tricky issue. Furthermore, the role of non-market benefits such as working and
learning in a high level academic or professional environment or with international
experts is difficult to assess quantitatively. At last we do not model complete
careers even if internships may generate better matching on the labor market and
better long-term opportunities. These reduced-form results do not fully account
for the dynamic process of doing a full year internship, a major choice and entering
in the labor market. A structural model of schooling decision (Arcidiacono, 2004)
could be estimated to take into the learning process of preferences associated with
doing a full year internship.
To design effectiveness of internships, three actors are involved: firms, universi-
ties and students. Their expectations regarding internships have no reason to be
the same. Our approach focuses on the students size and partly on the firm point
of view. We leave for future research the understanding of the links between these
3 actors.
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Note: figures from Analyse de l’orientation et des poursuites d’études des lycéens à partir de la procédure
admission post-bac, Rapport n° 2012-123, Inspection générale de l’éducation nationale, p.53
Figure 3.1 : French higher education system
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Note: full grey line for students admitted in first year, dash grey line for students admitted in second year, full
black line for all students.
Figure 3.2 : Share of students undertaking a full year of internships.
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Total Full year No full year Mean Diff.
internship internship p-value
First year of master
(year 2) Mathematics 69.0 68.3 69.5 0.796
Economics 31.0 31.7 30.5
Second year of master
(year 3) Finance 53.8 61.1 48.9 0.011
Other 46.2 38.9 51.1
# Obs. 452 180 272
Note: data from the administrative education software.
Table 3.1 : Minor and major choices (%) with and without a full year of internships
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Total Full year No full year Mean Diff.
internship internship p-value
First year of master 50.3 46.1 53.0 0.012
(year 2) Minor
All Courses Mathematics 50.2 46.8 52.5 0.088
Economics 50.3 44.6 54.2 0.055
Main Courses Topics
Mathematics 52.2 49.9 53.7 0.111
Economics 52.7 50.8 53.9 0.168
2nd-year minor field Topics
Mathematics Mathematics 56.9 54.3 58.7 0.099
Main Courses Economics 51.9 52.1 51.7 0.889
2nd-year minor field Topics
Economics Mathematics 41.5 40.5 42.2 0.680
Main Courses Economics 54.4 47.9 58.9 0.007
# Obs. 452 180 272
Note: data from the administrative education software. For each 2nd year of the program, the best student
obtained the rank of 100, the worst gets 0. The global ranking is based on the average score during the year.
Specific rankings are based on the written individual evaluation. Courses included for the specific rankings have
been defined using a principal component analysis.
Table 3.2 : Ability of students (average ranking) with and without a full year of
internships
94
3.7 Tables and graphics
Total Full year No full year
internship internship
Number of internships (%)
1 74.8 36.7 100
2 22.1 55.6
3 3.1 7.8
Internships topics (%)
Total
Finance 45.6 50.0 42.7
Other 48.7 35.6 57.3
Various 5.7 14.4
2nd-year minor field
Mathematics Finance 58.0 61.0 56.1
Other 36.2 24.4 43.9
Various 5.8 14.6
Economics Finance 17.9 26.3 12.1
Other 76.4 59.7 87.9
Various 5.7 14.0
3rd-year major field
Finance Finance 72.4 73.6 71.4
Other 21.0 11.8 28.6
Various 6.6 14.6
Other Finance 14.3 12.9 15.1
Other 80.9 72.9 84.3
Various 4.8 14.3
# Obs. 452 180 272
Note: data from the administrative education software.
Table 3.3 : Features of internships
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Total Full year No full year Mean Diff.
internship internship p-value
Labor market status 6 months after graduation (%)
Employment 63.2 73.4 55.3 0.047
Job search 6.0 2.4 8.7 0.202
Further studies 15.8 11.3 19.3 0.171
Ph.d 14.0 12.1 15.5 0.436
No activity 1.0 0.8 1.2 0.913
# Obs. 285 124 161
Average annual wages bonus included(in euros)
Total 50.000 53.800 47.600 0.002
Months after
graduation 6 months 45.400 46.800 44.100 0.264
18 months 51.500 60.000 47.000 0.000
30 months 55.200 60.200 53.100 0.180
3rd-year major field
6 months after Finance 47.300 48.700 45.900 0.088
graduation Other 42.200 43.100 41.500 0.006
# Obs. 406 157 249
Satisfaction at work - 1 (worst) to 5 (best)
Total 4.10 4.16 4.06 0.152
Autonomy 4.03 4.14 3.95 0.061
Working conditions 4.17 4.16 4.17 0.969
Working environment 4.44 4.51 4.38 0.141
Wages 3.77 3.82 3.73 0.428
# Obs. 354 146 208
Note: data from the survey "integration of graduates" from 2007 to 2012 (2007 excluded for satisfaction variables).
The satisfaction variable is the average of satisfaction of working conditions, working environment, autonomy in
work, and satisfaction of the wages level. For each them, the scale ranges from 1 (worst) to 5 (best).
Table 3.4 : Labor market outcomes after graduation
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Total Full year No full year Mean Diff. Total Full year No full year Mean Diff.
internship internship p-value internship internship p-value
Wages Autonomy
1 (worst) 3.4 2.0 4.3 0.246 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.781
2 9.0 8.2 9.6 0.653 6.5 3.4 8.6 0.050
3 23.2 23.3 23.1 0.963 18.9 16.4 20.7 0.318
4 36.2 38.4 34.6 0.472 36.2 39.7 33.6 0.243
5 (best) 28.2 28.1 28.4 0.954 37.6 39.7 36.1 0.484
# Obs. 354 146 208 354 146 208
Working conditions Working environment
1 (worst) 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.721 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.403
2 5.6 3.4 7.2 0.129 2.3 1.4 2.9 0.347
3 13.0 14.4 12.0 0.516 8.8 8.2 9.1 0.765
4 35.9 39.0 33.6 0.299 31.1 28.8 32.7 0.434
5 (best) 44.3 41.8 46.1 0.416 57.6 61.6 54.8 0.201
# Obs. 354 146 208 354 146 208
Note: data from the survey "integration of graduates" from 2008 to 2012. For each satisfaction variable, the scale
ranges from 1 (worst) to 5 (best).
Table 3.5 : Satisfaction at work - Detailed distribution (%)
Total Full year No full year Mean Diff.
internship internship p-value
Before graduating 56.8 62.9 52.7 0.086
Less than 2 months 24.2 20.7 26.6 0.252
Between 2 and 4 months 6.3 6.9 5.9 0.740
Between 4 and 6 months 4.9 5.2 4.7 0.867
More than 6 months 7.7 4.3 10.1 0.075
# Obs. 285 116 169
Note: data from the survey "integration of graduates" from 2007 to 2012.
Table 3.6 : Duration of first job search (%)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
OLS OLS OLS OLS LAD
Full year intern. 0.086∗∗∗ 0.063∗ 0.061∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Experience 0.101∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
3rd year Major: Finance 0.088∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.020)
2nd year inverse rank 0.081 0.083 0.062∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.030)
Inverse rank - economics 0.123∗∗
(0.061)
Inverse rank - mathematics -0.024
(0.060)
Full year intern. - No experience 0.037 0.011
(0.037) (0.027)
No full year intern. - 1 year experience 0.076∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗
(0.027) (0.024)
Full year intern. - 1 year experience 0.168∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.030)
No full year intern. - 2 years experience 0.196∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.030)
Full year intern. - 2 years experience 0.265∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.042)
Women -0.030 -0.015 -0.013 -0.015 -0.001
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.018)
Foreign citizenship -0.087∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.023)
Working abroad 0.402∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.029)
Second job 0.038 0.035 0.045 0.035 0.015
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.025)
Public sector -0.122∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.056∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.025)
Fixed term contract -0.091∗∗ -0.083∗ -0.077∗ -0.083∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.023)
Constant 10.654∗∗∗ 10.566∗∗∗ 10.552∗∗∗ 10.581∗∗∗ 10.611∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.038)
Observations 444 444 444 444 444
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.364 0.365 0.362
Full year intern./Experience 85% 61% 60%
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the
OLS estimates, Column 5 the LAD estimates. Wages are deflated using price consumption index. The variance-
covariance matrix is clustered with the student identifier (except for the LAD estimator). Year of graduation used
as control variables.
Table 3.7 : Wages determinants - OLS and LAD
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(1) (2) (3)
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
OLS OLS OLS
Full year intern. 0.061 -0.021 -0.086
(0.050) (0.056) (0.080)
Experience 0.065∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
3rd year Major: Finance 0.058 0.093∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.031) (0.032)
Full year intern. x Finance -0.017
(0.065)
Finance x Experience 0.054∗
(0.028)
Full year intern. x Experience 0.015
(0.032)
2nd year inverse rank 0.076 0.002
(0.054) (0.070)
2nd year inverse rank x Full year intern. 0.185∗
(0.109)
Inverse rank - economics 0.067
(0.069)
Inverse rank - economics x Full year intern. 0.061
(0.141)
Inverse rank - mathematics -0.124
(0.083)
Inverse rank - mathematics x Full year intern. 0.233∗
(0.132)
Constant 10.590∗∗∗ 10.606∗∗∗ 10.639∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.066) (0.074)
Observations 444 444 444
Adjusted R2 0.365 0.370 0.372
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the
OLS estimates. Wages are deflated using price consumption index. The variance-covariance matrix is clustered
with the student identifier (except for the LAD estimator). Year of graduation and job characteristics used as
control variables.
Table 3.8 : Wages interaction effects - OLS
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage
OLS OLS IV 2SLS IV 2SLS IV 2LS
Full year intern. 0.056∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.151 0.160∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.034) (0.030) (0.108) (0.076) (0.053)
Experience 0.105∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
3rd year Major: Finance 0.093∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.080 0.085 0.085
(0.032) (0.030) (0.082) (0.072) (0.071)
2nd year inverse rank 0.074 0.078 0.092 0.093 0.088
(0.050) (0.052) (0.061) (0.059) (0.056)
Age in 2nd year -0.006
(0.015)
2nd year minor: applied maths -0.009
(0.040)
Admitted in 2nd year -0.034
(0.031)
Year of graduation > 2010 0.005
(0.032)
Constant 10.714∗∗∗ 10.554∗∗∗ 10.515∗∗∗ 10.507∗∗∗ 10.525∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.042) (0.099) (0.063) (0.057)
Observations 444 444 444 444 444
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.368 0.354 0.350 0.361
KP stat. for rank condition 20.642 36.673 27.443
pvalue 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen stat for overid. . 0.016 0.487
pvalue . 0.900 0.784
KP F for weak ident. 10.283 16.951 15.018
Instruments
Age in 2nd year X X X
2nd year minor: applied maths X X X
Admitted in 2nd year X X
Year of graduation > 2010 X
Note: Standard errors in parentheses data, ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Columns report the 2SLS
estimates with full year of internship and 3rd year Major in Finance as endogenous variables. Wages are deflated
using price consumption index. The variance-covariance matrix is clustered with the student identifier. Job
characteristics used as control variables.
Table 3.9 : Wage determinants - IV 2SLS
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full year Full year Full year 3rd year 3rd year 3rd year
intern. intern. intern. Major Major Major
Finance Finance Finance
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Age in 2nd year -0.119∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ 0.014 0.037∗ 0.037∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
2nd year minor: applied maths -0.032 -0.035 -0.039 0.451∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.069) (0.065) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067)
Admitted in 2nd year -0.308∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗ -0.142∗∗
(0.063) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059)
Year of graduation > 2010 0.314∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.055) (0.052)
Constant 3.392∗∗∗ 2.344∗∗∗ 1.834∗∗∗ -0.033 -0.518 -0.519
(0.536) (0.545) (0.552) (0.419) (0.451) (0.462)
Observations 444 444 444 444 444 444
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.222 0.313 0.430 0.444 0.443
F-Stat 13.98 19.63 33.78 22.63 19.57 14.95
Note: Standard errors in parentheses data, ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Columns report the 2SLS
first-stages estimates for full year of internship and 3rd year Major in Finance. Wages are deflated using price
consumption index. The variance-covariance matrix is clustered with the student identifier.
Table 3.10 : Wage determinants - IV 2SLS first-stages
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Before Before Full year 3rd year Duration
graduation graduation intern. Major: Finance
Probit IV 2SLS OLS OLS Int. Reg.
Full year intern. 0.133∗∗ 0.202 -1.334∗
(0.059) (0.142) (0.684)
3rd year Major: Finance 0.103∗ -0.177 -0.510
(0.061) (0.117) (0.603)
2nd year inverse rank 0.230∗∗ 0.265∗∗ -0.184∗ 0.075 -1.887∗
(0.097) (0.105) (0.098) (0.093) (1.041)
Graduating in 2008 -0.211∗∗ -0.214∗∗ 0.089 -0.099 2.527∗∗∗
(Ref. Grad. in 2007) (0.094) (0.099) (0.088) (0.094) (0.950)
Graduating in 2009 -0.077 -0.053 0.043 -0.030 1.498
(0.090) (0.089) (0.078) (0.079) (0.967)
Graduating in 2010 -0.130 -0.158 0.217∗∗ -0.118 1.422
(0.091) (0.096) (0.085) (0.085) (0.900)
Graduating in 2011 -0.151 -0.139 0.399∗∗∗ 0.021 1.813∗
(0.094) (0.103) (0.083) (0.085) (0.944)
Graduating in 2012 -0.275∗∗ -0.322∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ -0.056 2.861∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.129) (0.089) (0.106) (1.096)
Women 0.042 -0.020 -0.056 -0.137∗∗∗ -0.599
(0.060) (0.068) (0.053) (0.052) (0.597)
Foreign citizenship -0.159∗∗ -0.090 -0.057 0.146∗∗ 2.376∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.086) (0.074) (0.061) (0.863)
Age in 2nd year -0.069∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.023) (0.020)
2nd year minor: applied maths 0.016 0.569∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.055)
Admitted in 2nd year -0.335∗∗∗ -0.063 0.338
(0.053) (0.054) (0.636)
Constant 0.614∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗ -0.054 -1.012
(0.127) (0.536) (0.460) (0.950)
Observations 285 285 285 285 285
Pseudo R2 0.067
Baseline probability 0.563 0.563
Adjusted R2 . 0.216 0.321
KP stat. for rank condition 54.898 27.08 36.42
pvalue 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen stat for overid. 0.119
pvalue 0.730
KP F for weak ident. 26.644
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Column 1 is the average marginal
effects of a probit model for finding a job before graduation. Column 2 reports the 2SLS estimates with full year
of internship and 3rd year Major in Finance as endogenous variables and age in 2nd year, 2nd year minor-applied
maths and admitted in 2nd year as instruments. Columns 3 and 4 report the 2SLS first-stages estimates for full
year of internship and 3rd year Major in Finance. Column 5 is the estimates of an interval regression of the
duration of job search.
Table 3.11 : Duration of job search
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Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction Full year 3rd year
Wage Wage Wage Wage intern. Major
Finance
OLS OLS IV 2SLS IV 2SLS OLS OLS
Full year intern. 0.109 -0.027 0.599∗∗ 0.400
(0.141) (0.136) (0.252) (0.266)
3rd year Major: Finance -0.230 -0.296∗ -0.802∗∗∗ -0.846∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.161) (0.300) (0.271)
Experience -0.141∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.119 -0.270∗∗∗ 0.029 -0.019
(0.076) (0.078) (0.080) (0.086) (0.026) (0.022)
Working abroad 0.465∗ -0.198 0.652∗∗∗ 0.019 0.005 0.231∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.248) (0.245) (0.261) (0.107) (0.068)
Second job -0.038 -0.043 0.000 -0.012 -0.134∗∗ -0.102
(0.161) (0.151) (0.173) (0.163) (0.066) (0.069)
Public sector 0.317 0.438∗∗ 0.090 0.208 -0.117 -0.278∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.204) (0.257) (0.242) (0.098) (0.083)
Fixed term contract 0.097 0.118 0.030 0.048 -0.053 -0.098
(0.201) (0.187) (0.205) (0.188) (0.090) (0.070)
Log wage 1.533∗∗∗ 1.451∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.321)
Age in 2nd year -0.065∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.022) (0.021)
2nd year minor: applied maths 0.028 0.539∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.070)
Admitted in 2nd year -0.412∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.063)
Year of graduation > 2010 0.358∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.061) (0.058)
Constant 3.826∗∗∗ -12.407∗∗∗ 3.994∗∗∗ -11.352∗∗∗ 1.893∗∗∗ -0.320
(0.167) (2.890) (0.249) (3.354) (0.492) (0.489)
Observations 327 327 327 327 327 327
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.139 . 0.066 0.342 0.479
KP stat. for rank condition 31.840 33.055 41.39 22.33
pvalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen stat for overid. 0.732 0.704
pvalue 0.693 0.703
KP F for weak ident. 17.611 17.789
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Columns 1 and 2 report the
OLS estimates. Columns 3 and 4 report the 2SLS estimates with full year of internship and 3rd year Major in
Finance as endogenous variables and age in 2nd year, 2nd year minor-applied maths, admitted
in 2nd year, and year of graduation as instruments. Columns 5 and 6 report the 2SLS first-stages
estimates (without wage) for full year of internship and 3rd year Major in Finance. Wages are deflated using
price consumption index. The variance-covariance matrix is clustered with the student identifier.
Table 3.12 : Job satisfaction - Wage
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Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction Full year 3rd year
Non mon. Non mon. Non mon. Non mon. intern. Major
Finance
OLS OLS IV 2SLS IV 2SLS OLS OLS
Full year intern. 0.106 0.089 0.176 0.150
(0.092) (0.095) (0.152) (0.161)
3rd year Major: Finance -0.160 -0.169 -0.284 -0.290
(0.106) (0.108) (0.211) (0.213)
Experience -0.098∗∗ -0.118∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.115∗∗ 0.005 -0.034
(0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.028) (0.024)
Working abroad 0.174 0.091 0.214 0.132 -0.097 0.170∗∗
(0.149) (0.163) (0.159) (0.172) (0.112) (0.082)
Second job 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.006 -0.132∗∗ -0.101
(0.113) (0.112) (0.110) (0.110) (0.065) (0.068)
Public sector 0.210∗ 0.225∗ 0.159 0.173 -0.093 -0.264∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.117) (0.147) (0.146) (0.099) (0.086)
Fixed term contract -0.113 -0.111 -0.130 -0.128 -0.048 -0.095
(0.126) (0.125) (0.126) (0.124) (0.090) (0.072)
Log wage 0.191 0.188 0.229∗∗ 0.136
(0.196) (0.212) (0.110) (0.099)
Age in 2nd year -0.060∗∗∗ 0.032
(0.021) (0.022)
2nd year minor: applied maths 0.021 0.535∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.072)
Admitted in 2nd year -0.401∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.063)
Year of graduation > 2010 0.351∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.061) (0.057)
Constant 4.288∗∗∗ 2.266 4.341∗∗∗ 2.351 -0.654 -1.831
(0.101) (2.079) (0.158) (2.209) (1.355) (1.342)
Observations 327 327 327 327 327 327
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.027 0.019 0.020 0.350 0.481
KP stat. for rank condition 31.840 33.055 36.26 20.77
pvalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen stat for overid. 1.847 1.830
pvalue 0.397 0.401
KP F for weak ident. 17.611 17.789
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Columns 1 and 2 report the
OLS estimates. Columns 3 and 4 report the 2SLS estimates with full year of internship and 3rd year Major in
Finance as endogenous variables and age in 2nd year, 2nd year minor-applied maths, admitted
in 2nd year, and year of graduation as instruments. Columns 5 and 6 report the 2SLS first-stages
estimates (with wage) for full year of internship and 3rd year Major in Finance. Wages are deflated using price
consumption index. The variance-covariance matrix is clustered with the student identifier.
Table 3.13 : Job satisfaction - Non monetary components
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Major: Finance Major: Finance Major: Finance Major: Finance
Full year intern. 0.164∗∗∗ 0.096 0.090
(0.042) (0.071) (0.071)
Full year intern. Economics -0.340∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Full year intern. Economics and Finance -0.149∗∗ -0.139∗∗
(0.067) (0.066)
2rd year minor: applied maths 0.445∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.050) (0.052)
Full year intern. x applied maths -0.058 -0.048
(0.081) (0.080)
2nd year inverse rank 0.019 0.045 0.131∗∗
(0.067) (0.066) (0.058)
Inverse rank - economics -0.047
(0.080)
Inverse rank - mathematics 0.287∗∗∗
(0.076)
Women -0.101∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.033)
Foreign citizenship 0.230∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.046) (0.046)
One parent professional or retail trader 0.122∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.038) (0.038)
Observations 452 452 452 452
Pseudo R2 0.280 0.303 0.454 0.470
Baseline probability 0.536 0.536 0.537 0.537
Note: Standard errors in parentheses data, ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 are
the average marginal effects of the probit model for a third year major in Finance. Year of graduation used as
control variables.
Table 3.14 : Major determinants - probit average marginal effects
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full year intern. Full year intern. Full year intern. Full year intern.
2nd year inverse rank -0.200∗∗∗
(0.074)
Inverse rank - economics -0.142 -0.293∗∗
(0.098) (0.113)
Inverse rank - mathematics -0.071 -0.245∗∗
(0.099) (0.118)
Predicted Wage Differentials 0.026 1.114∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.414)
2rd year minor: applied maths 0.039 0.064 0.055 0.075
(0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049)
Women -0.038 -0.045 -0.048 -0.053
(0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Foreign citizenship -0.005 0.041 0.049 0.068
(0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
One parent professional or retail trader -0.023 0.001 0.015 0.004
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
Admitted in 2nd year -0.235∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
Age in 2nd year -0.093∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Social scholarship 0.027 -0.048 -0.051 -0.045
(0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
Observations 452 452 452 452
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.204 0.196 0.215
Baseline probability 0.396 0.397 0.397 0.399
Note: Standard errors in parentheses data, ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 are
the average marginal effects of the probit model for doing a full year of internship. Year of graduation used as
control variables.
Table 3.15 : Full year of internship determinants - probit average marginal effects
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Conclusion
This thesis provides ideas on data and methods used in applied economics. The
first article points out that without good data accuracy, it is not possible to obtain
robust results. It also shows that the method must be adapted to the nature of the
data. This first chapter sets the stage for theoretical advances on the economics
of natural disasters. The two other articles use original data, from the Internet or
administrative data sets. These new data provide answers to new questions and
allow the comparison of (different) econometric methods. The growing availability
of such data will allow for questioning the aggregation phenomena by comparing
the results of micro and macroeconometrics models, as discussed previously with
the example of fuel prices. Indicators, such as a measure of individual skill become
available which allows for better understanding of the impacts of a phenomenon
such as internships.
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Appendix. Interpretation of Censored Quantile Regression
Censored quantile regressions are models that explain conditional quantiles when
the dependant variable is censored. As for uncensored quantile regression, there
is no easy way to compute estimators for such models and only few empirical ap-
plications exist (Gustavsen et al. (2008), Fack et Landais (2009) for examples of
application). Some computational algorithms have been designed such as Fitzen-
berger (2007), but which are efficient only for low degree of censorship. For higher
rate of censoring, recent papers propose simple algorithms with asymptotic con-
vergence in the exogenous (Chernozhukov and Hong 2002) or the endogenous case
(Chernozhukov et al. 2011). Beyond computational difficulties, interpretation of
censored quantile regression remains unclear. Uncensored quantile regression often
appears as a solution to censorship when the point of censorship is exogenous. For
higher quantiles, observations are indeed all uncensored. This is obviously not the
case when censorship is endogenous.
To illustrate these difficulties, we simulate a Tobit I model yi = max (0, y∗i ) with
y∗i =
∑
i∈{1;2;3}
αi · 1 {Popi}+ xi + εi. y represents for example the consumption of a
durable good and x the income. We assume all observations are i.i.d., x ∼ N (0, 1)
and ε ∼ N (0, 0.333). There are 3 subpopulations. Pop1 has a high degree of
censoring (around 97 % with α1 = −2), Pop2 a medium degree (around 50 %
with α2 = 0) and Pop3 a low degree (around 3 % with α3 = 2). The overall
censoring rate is around 50 %. y∗ is a translation model. Quantile regression
won’t be useful in this particular case. However, the simple model is a good way
to illustrate properties of censored quantile model. To avoid convergence problems,
we use a random sample of 150.000 observations.
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Quantile regresssion is robust to misspecification of the error term, some types
of heteroscedasticity and outliers. It also allows different effects depending on the
quantile of the conditional distribution (which it is not the case in our example).
We implement uncensored and censored quantile regressions. Figure A1 illustrates
the results for quantile regressions in three cases. The solid black line represents the
uncensored model for all observations, the dashed black line the uncensored model
for positive observations and the solid grey line the censored model. Uncensored
estimators are biased, which is not the case for censored ones (estimated with the
tree step estimators of Chernozhukov and Hong 2002 and the Stata package cqiv).
They are equal to the parameter associated with y∗. To check the size of the bias in
terms of rate of censoring, we estimate with an uncensored quantile regression the
90 th quantile estimator in the model yi = max (0, y∗i ) with y∗i = αvariable + xi + εi
and a variable constant. The bias appears to be linear with the rate of censoring
in figure A2.
Interpretations of Tobit estimators depend on the economic questions (Wooldridge
2010). If it is a “true” issue of censoring as for example the observation of a
variable only below a threshold, you can compute marginal effects on the la-
tent dependent variable y∗, ∂E(y∗)
∂xk
= βk. If the model is the solution of a maxi-
mization problem and the censoring point a corner solution (as in our example),
you will be interested in the marginal effects on the expected value for y (cen-
sored and uncensored) ∂E(yi)
∂xk
= φ
(
xiβ
σ
)
βk where φ is the standard normal cdf
and in the marginal effects on the expected value for y for uncensored observa-
tions, ∂E(yi/yi>0)
∂xk
= βk
(
1− λ (α)
[(
xiβ
σ
)
+ λ (α)
])
where λ (α) is the inverse Mills
ratio. The marginal effects are not constant and depend of the predictors, average
marginal effects are so often used. Average marginal effects for y (censored and
uncensored) correspond to a scale factor of the estimators.
Concerning censored quantile regression, Chernozhukov et al. (2011) note that
∂Qyi/Xi,ci (τ)
∂xk
= 1 {xiβ (τ) + ε (τ) > ci} · βk (τ). The marginal effect corresponds to
a marginal change on the observed response y for the non-censored individuals.
Average marginal effects for y (censored and uncensored) correspond so to a scale
factor of the estimators. The scale factor will be higher for the higher quantiles
because for higher quantiles, the rate of censorship is lower. The use of aver-
age marginal effects will so increase the difference of estimates between extreme
quantiles.
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Three main conclusions can be done:
• Using uncensored quantile regression with endogenous censored data gives
biased estimators. This bias exists even for high quantiles, if for some value
of the predictor the dependent variable is almost always censored.
• The bias will be low if the rate of censoring is overall low.
• The censored quantile estimators are defined for the latent variable y∗. Com-
paring average marginal effects is difficult as these ones depend on parametric
choices for Tobit.
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Figure A1: OLS and Tobit results
Note: Abscissa are for the quantiles, ordinates for the estimators. The solid black line repre-
sents the uncensored model for all observations, the dashed black line the uncensored model for
positive observations and the solid grey line the censored model.
Figure A2: 90th quantile estimator in terms of rate of censoring
Note: Abscissa are for the rate of censoring in the model yi = max (0, y∗i ) with y∗i = αvariable+
xi + εi and a variable constant, ordinates for the 90th quantile estimators of X (which is equal
to 1 in theory) . The solid black line represents the uncensored model for all observations, the
dashed black line the uncensored model for positive observations.
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Appendix A. Likelihood function
The contribution to the likelihood function of price constancy in firm i at date
t is :
l1i,t = Pr(dpi,t,τ |dpi,t,τ = 0, pi,t−τ , Xit, pot )
= Pr(sit < pi,t−τ − p∗i,t < Sit)
= Pr(γisXit + ε2,it < pi,t−τ − αi − βipot − ε1,it < γiSXit − ε2,it)
= Pr(ε1,it + ε2,it < pi,t−τ − αi − βipot − γisXit; pi,t−τ − αi − βipot − γiSXit < ε1,it − ε2,it)
= Φ
[
pi,t−τ − αi − βipot − γisXit√
σ21i + σ22i
]
−Φ2
[
pi,t−τ − αi − βipot − γisXit√
σ21i + σ22i
; pi,t−τ − αi − βip
o
t − γiSXit√
σ21i + σ22i
; σ
2
1i−σ22i
σ21i+σ22i
]
(3.7.1)
where Φ is the c.d.f of the Gaussian distribution and Φ2is the bivariate c.d.f of the
Gaussian distribution.
The contribution to the likelihood function of a price increase in firm i at date
t is:
l2i,t = Pr(dpi,t,τ |dpi,t,τ > 0, pi,t−τ , Xit, pot )
= Pr
(
ε1,it = pi,t − αi − βip0t
)× Pr [pi,t−τ − p∗i,t ≤ sit, pi,t−τ − p∗i,t < Sit | ε1,it = pi,t − αi − βip0t ]
= 1
σ1i
φ
(
pi,t−τ − αi − βipot
σ1i
)
×Pr
[
pi,t−τ − αi − βip0t − ε1,it ≤ γisXit + ε2,it, pi,t−τ − αi − βip0t − ε1,it < γiSXit − ε2,it
| ε1,it = pi,t − αi − βip0t
]
= 1
σ1i
φ
(
pi,t−τ − αi − βipot
σ1i
)
× Pr [−dpi,t,τ − γisXit ≤ ε2,it, dpi,t,τ + γiSXit > ε2,it]
= 1
σ1i
φ
(
pi,t−τ − αi − βipot
σ1i
)
×
[
Φ
(
dpi,t,τ + γiSXit
σ2i
)
− Φ
(−dpi,t,τ − γisXit
σ2i
)]
(3.7.2)
where φ is the p.d.f of the Gaussian distribution and dpi,t,τ = pit − pit−τ .
The contribution to the likelihood function of a price decrease in firm i at date
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t is:
l3i,t = Pr(dpi,t,τ |dpi,t,τ < 0, pi,t−τ , Xit, pot )
= Pr
(
ε1,it = pi,t − αi − βip0t
)× Pr [pi,t−τ − p∗i,t > sit, pi,t−τ − p∗i,t ≥ Sit | ε1,it = pi,t − αi − βip0t ]
= 1
σ1i
φ
(
pi,t−τ − αi − βipot
σ1i
)
×Pr
[
pi,t−τ − αi − βip0t − ε1,it > γisXit + ε2,it, pi,t−τ − αi − βip0t − ε1,it ≥ γiSXit − ε2,it
| ε1,it = pi,t − αi − βip0t
]
= 1
σ1i
φ
(
pi,t−τ − αi − βipot
σ1i
)
× Pr [−dpi,t,τ − γisXit > ε2,it, dpi,t,τ + γiSXit < ε2,it]
= 1
σ1i
φ
(
pi,t−τ − αi − βipot
σ1i
)
×
[
Φ
(−dpi,t,τ − γisXit
σ2i
)
− Φ
(
dpi,t,τ + γiSXit
σ2i
)]
(3.7.3)
where φ is the p.d.f of the Gaussian distribution and dpi,t,τ = pit − pit−τ .
The likelihood function for an i.i.d. sample of a given firm i is thus:
lnLi(θ) =
Ti∑
t=1
(l1i,t × y1it + l2i,t × y2it + l3i,t × y3it)
where y1it = 1 if dpi,t,τ = 0 and 0 otherwise, y2it = 1 if dpi,t,τ < 0 and 0 otherwise
and y3it = 1 if dpi,t,τ > 0 and 0 otherwise.
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Figure B1: Average retail prices (individual data set), weekly retail
prices published by the Ministry of Economy and wholesale market
prices (Rotterdam)
a) Diesel
a) Unleaded petrol
Note: dashed line is for Rotterdam prices, black line is for the average of individual prices
collected in our data set and grey line is for the aggregate retail price series published
by the Ministry of Economy each Friday.
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Appendix C
Figure C1: Adjustment hazard functions
a) Diesel
b) Unleaded petrol
Note: Adjustment hazard functions are computed as the probability of price increases
or decreases as a function of the difference between log price of gasoline (p) and the
log frictionless price (p∗) (ie Rotterdam market price). For each retailer, the difference
p − p∗ is centered. Black points are for probability of price increases. Grey points are
for probability of price decreases.
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Appendix D: Pricing points
A possible explanation of the M-shape distribution of price changes might be
related to the number of digits used to display prices. A large majority of outlets
list their prices with three decimal places. So, in principle price changes could be
smaller than 1%. For example, if the diesel price (excluding taxes) is 0.45 euros
(i.e. close to the minimum price over our sample period), the retailer can decide
to increase its price by 0.001 euros and the price increase in percentage would be
0.22%. However, the distribution of the last digit in prices (including all taxes) is
not uniform: 31% of gasoline prices end with "9", 29% with "0", 9% with "5", 7%
with "4" whereas for other last digit figures this proportion is smaller than 5% (see
Table A) and the distribution of the penultimate digit appears uniform. Knotek
(2010) and Levy et al. (2011) provide similar evidence on different US products.
The timing of price changes might be modified by the presence of pricing points:
firms wait for large movements of wholesale prices before changing their prices
because they want to increase or decrease their prices by 0.10 or 0.05 euros. Price
durations for price points are longer (Table A) and small price changes are less
frequent.However, even if we restrict our sample to prices not ending in "9", "0",
or "5", we still find that the distribution of price changes exhibit an M−shape.
Literature cited
Knotek, Edward S. (2010) “The Roles of Price Points and Menu Costs in Price
Rigidity” Research Working Paper No. 10-18, Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City.
Levy, Daniel, Dongwon Lee, Haipeng Chen, Robert J. Kauffman, and Mark Bergen.
(2011) “Price Points and Price Rigidity.” Review of Economics and Statistics,
93(4), 1417-1431.
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Table D1: Distribution of Price Changes and Average Duration by
the Last Digit of Price
Diesel Unleaded Petrol
% of price Average price % of price Average price
trajectories duration (in days) trajectories duration (in days)
0 29.0 6.7 29.5 7.0
1 2.9 4.2 3.0 4.6
2 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.4
3 3.6 4.3 3.6 4.7
4 7.2 4.2 7.3 4.4
5 8.8 4.5 8.8 4.9
6 3.7 4.4 3.8 4.7
7 4.1 4.4 3.9 4.7
8 4.7 4.7 4.6 5.0
9 31.8 4.9 31.4 5.3
Note: We consider prices including all taxes, the proportion of price trajectories is
computed as the ratio of number of price trajectories ending with one figure on all price
trajectories and we compute the simple average duration. The last digit is the third one.
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Appendix E: Relating local competition, demand and gas stations
characteristics to estimated parameters.
From a theoretical point of view, local competition, in particular the number
of supermarkets, should have a negative effect on prices (Zimmerman 2012). Due
to competitive pressures, gas stations may reduce the share of other operating
costs, which has a positive impact on β the share of wholesale product in marginal
costs. According to Vita (2000), demand variables like the population density or
car density have an ambiguous impact on prices: a high density should decrease
the gasoline demand since alternative transportations are more developed and
transportation costs from wholesale rack to retailers are reduced. This would
imply that the share of wholesale gasoline in marginal costs is higher since the
share of other costs including transportation or labor costs is lower. However, in
high population density areas, land rental is also more costly, which should have
a negative impact on βi. Finally, services in gas stations like stores or restaurants
may imply to hire more employees, which may decrease the share of wholesale
gasoline in marginal costs.
Tables B and C present results of OLS regressions relating βi to those variables.
First, as expected, we find that supermarket density has a positive significant im-
pact on βi for both diesel and unleaded petrol. The degree of pass through of
gasoline stations on motorways is also lower on average since the degree of com-
petition on motorways is lower and the share of operating costs may be higher (in
particular rents). Gas stations using pricing points strategies tend to have signifi-
cant lower βi, competitive pressures may be lower for those stations since they are
able to set attractive prices. Local demand characteristics have a significant im-
pact on β. Gas stations in urban areas show larger pass-through coefficients than
in rural areas, which is consistent with lower transportation costs or effect of lower
demand. In Paris, we find lower values of βi since the share of operating costs (e.g.
rents) might be much higher. Another indicator of density is the share of house-
holds owning at least one car, this variable has a positive effect on βi, which is also
quite consistent with theoretical predictions on the effect of higher demand. Un-
expectedly, the unemployment rate tends to slightly increase βi. Finally, services
offered in gas stations have a negative impact on the share of wholesale gasoline in
costs. The presence of a store or car services may increase the share of labor cost
which has a negative impact on βi. However, for unleaded petrol, the presence of
a restaurant in the station has an unexpected positive effect.
Tables B and C also show further results on the determinants of heterogeneity
of αi among gas stations.11 We find that the degree of competition has a negative
significant effect on αi; Zimmerman (2012) obtains negative effect of the density of
11To control for possible differences among gas stations in "other costs" which reduce the esti-
mated mark-ups, we add controls for brand characteristics and regional dummies. We also
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supermakets on retail gasoline prices whereas Hosken et al. (2008) do not find that
competition indicators have a significant effect on stations’ margins. Population
or car density has a small effect: for diesel, markups are larger in Paris (where
gas stations are rare and the share of operating costs may be large due to rents)
whereas in big cities, for unleaded petrol, markups are lower since gas stations
density is higher. Car density has a negative effect on margins for diesel since a
high car density may also be related to a high density of gas stations. Finally,
the presence of a store, car services or high quality gasoline in the station tend
to have a positive effect on markup because those services might lead to a more
pronounced product differentiation.
Literature cited
Hosken, Daniel S., Robert S. McMillan, and Christopher T. Taylor.(2008) “Retail
Gasoline Pricing: What do we know?” International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 26(6), 1425-1436.
Vita, Michael G. (2000) “Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Con-
trol: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies.” Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 18(3), 217-233.
Zimmerman, Paul R. (2012) “The Competitive Impact of Hypermarket Retailers
on Gasoline Prices.” Journal of Law and Economics,55(1), 27-41.
run alternative specification including β as exogenous variables to correct for possible cross
section differences in cost structure and results remain similar.
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Table E1: Determinants of random (S,s) model parameters - Diesel
αi βi
|si|+|Si|
2
Distance to closest supermarket gas station (km) 0.010???
(0.003)
−0.001???
(0.000)
0.059???
(0.011)
Number of supermarket gas stationswithin 10 kms −0.008???
(0.002)
0.001???
(0.000)
−0.030???
(0.007)
Motorway 0.064
(0.059)
−0.105???
(0.002)
0.369?
(0.206)
Pricing points −0.025
(0.027)
−0.010???
(0.001)
1.324???
(0.096)
Households owning a car (%) −0.003?∗
(0.001)
0.000???
(0.000)
0.009?
(0.005)
Urban area with 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants −0.032
(0.035)
0.004???
(0.001)
−0.339???
(0.123)
Urban area with more than 100,000 inhabitants −0.078
(0.056)
0.004???
(0.002)
−0.205
(0.196)
Paris and its region 0.294???
(0.077)
−0.019???
(0.003)
−0.232
(0.271)
Unemployment rate (%) −0.003
(0.004)
0.001???
(0.000)
0.041??∗
(0.015)
Pump working with credit/debit cards −0.062??
(0.026)
0.002???
(0.001)
−0.098
(0.090)
Store 0.161???
(0.036)
−0.006???
(0.001)
0.325???
(0.125)
Restaurant 0.017
(0.034)
0.002∗
(0.001)
−0.455???
(0.118)
Car services 0.051∗
(0.028)
−0.003???
(0.001)
−0.264???
(0.099)
Premium gasoline 0.092??
(0.038)
−0.002
(0.001)
−0.097
(0.132)
Adjusted R2 0.496 0.796 0.322
Number of observations 7,456 7,456 7,456
Note: Columns report the OLS estimates for the time-varying (S,s) model parameters.
"Urban area with less than 20,000 inhab." is used as reference. "Motorway" is a dummy
variable equal to one if the gas station is on a motorway. "Pricing points" is a dummy
variable equal to one if more than 95% of prices end by 0 or 9. Local unemployment and
share of households owning at least one car come from the census 2008. "Pump working
with credit/debit cards", "Store", "Restaurant", "Car services" and "Premium gasoline"
are dummy variables equal to one if the service is provided in the gas station. Dummy
variables for 28 different brands and 22 regions are included. Significance level : ??? 1%,
?? 5%, ? 10%.
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Table E2: Determinants of random (S,s) model parameters - Unleaded
petrol
αi βi
|si|+|Si|
2
Distance to closest supermarket gas station (km) 0.009?
(0.005)
−0.000???
(0.000)
0.047∗∗∗
(0.013)
Number of supermarket gas stationswithin 10 kms −0.004
(0.003)
0.001???
(0.000)
−0.038???
(0.010)
Motorway 0.471???
(0.094)
−0.066???
(0.003)
1.621???
(0.269)
Pricing points 0.141???
(0.044)
−0.008???
(0.001)
1.685???
(0.125)
Households owning a car (%) −0.002
(0.002)
0.000?
(0.000)
−0.003
(0.007)
Urban area with 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants −0.048
(0.056)
0.005???
(0.002)
−0.817???
(0.160)
Urban area with more than 100,000 inhabitants −0.146
(0.089)
0.008???
(0.002)
−0.779???
(0.255)
Paris and its region 0.211∗
(0.124)
−0.011???
(0.003)
−0.468
(0.353)
Unemployment rate (%) 0.001
(0.007)
0.001???
(0.000)
0.047∗∗
(0.020)
Pump working with credit/debit cards −0.056
(0.041)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.055
(0.118)
Store 0.089
(0.058)
−0.008???
(0.002)
0.444???
(0.166)
Restaurant −0.003
(0.055)
0.004∗??
(0.001)
−0.731???
(0.156)
Car services 0.020
(0.045)
−0.003??
(0.001)
−0.219?
(0.130)
Premium gasoline 0.135∗∗
(0.061)
−0.002
(0.002)
0.022
(0.174)
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.659 0.339
Number of observations 7,262 7,262 7,262
Note: Columns report the OLS estimates for the time-varying (S,s) model parameters.
"Urban area with less than 20,000 inhab." is used as reference. "Motorway" is a dummy
variable equal to one if the gas station is on a motorway. "Pricing points" is a dummy
variable equal to one if more than 95% of prices end by 0 or 9. Local unemployment and
share of households owning at least one car come from the census 2008. "Pump working
with credit/debit cards", "Store", "Restaurant", "Car services" and "Premium gasoline"
are dummy variables equal to one if the service is provided in the gas station. Dummy
variables for 28 different brands and 22 regions are included. Significance level : ??? 1%,
?? 5%, ? 10%.
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Appendix F: Estimation results for alternative price rigidity models
Table F1: Estimation results - Fixed adjustment cost model
Diesel Unleaded petrol
Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 Mean Q25 Q50 Q75
α 2.63 1.56 2.39 3.68 -1.34 -2.58 -1.50 -0.27
β 0.78 0.72 0.80 0.84 0.69 0.64 0.69 0.73
σ1 2.72 2.31 2.63 3.04 3.38 2.81 3.25 3.80
γS 4.29 3.22 4.02 5.16 5.54 4.12 5.20 6.67
γs -4.36 -5.19 -4.15 -3.39 -5.37 -6.38 -5.07 -4.11
Note: We estimate for each individual gas station a fixed (S,s) model and then compute
statistics on the parameter estimates we obtained. We consider all gas stations with
more than 300 individual observations of prices (excluding Sundays).
Table F2: Estimation results - Calvo model
Diesel Unleaded petrol
Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 Mean Q25 Q50 Q75
α 2.23 1.22 2.00 3.20 -2.03 -3.18 -2.14 -1.02
β 0.77 0.71 0.79 0.83 0.67 0.62 0.68 0.72
σ1 1.82 1.62 1.78 1.98 2.22 1.92 2.16 2.43
λ1 -1.27 -1.43 -1.29 -1.12 -1.35 -1.51 -1.36 -1.20
λ2 1.28 1.13 1.29 1.44 1.28 1.14 1.29 1.43
Note: We estimate for each individual gas station a "Calvo" model and then compute
statistics on the parameter estimates we obtained. λ1 (resp. λ2) is the intercept trigger-
ring randomly price increases (resp. decreases). We consider all gas stations with more
than 300 individual observations of prices (excluding Sundays).
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Table F3: Estimation results - Fixed by duration (S,s) model
Diesel Unleaded petrol
Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 Mean Q25 Q50 Q75
α 2.58 1.52 2.37 3.64 -1.37 -2.61 -1.52 -0.30
β 0.78 0.72 0.80 0.83 0.69 0.64 0.69 0.73
σ1 2.64 2.25 2.56 2.94 3.30 2.75 3.17 3.69
1 day 12.10 3.49 4.73 6.67 8.38 4.24 5.94 8.59
2 days 6.77 3.13 4.11 5.79 7.27 3.91 5.28 7.46
γs 3 days 5.36 2.94 3.82 5.33 6.68 3.85 5.04 6.93
4 days 4.96 2.90 3.81 5.18 6.64 3.89 5.09 6.82
5 days 4.97 3.02 3.96 5.26 6.81 3.99 5.24 7.02
6 days 4.31 2.61 3.55 4.77 5.99 3.64 4.82 6.40
7 days 5.60 3.08 4.20 5.76 7.24 4.06 5.40 7.39
> 7 days 3.83 2.86 3.66 4.75 5.17 3.93 4.93 6.27
1 day -9.72 -6.16 -4.40 -3.29 -7.59 -7.86 -5.54 -4.12
2 days -6.50 -5.37 -3.94 -3.04 -6.67 -6.88 -4.99 -3.87
γS 3 days -5.12 -4.99 -3.73 -2.92 -6.07 -6.40 -4.69 -3.63
4 days -4.86 -5.08 -3.95 -3.13 -6.11 -6.42 -4.91 -3.85
5 days -5.19 -5.33 -4.24 -3.42 -6.30 -6.55 -5.11 -4.08
6 days -4.81 -5.15 -4.10 -3.24 -5.75 -6.20 -4.75 -3.69
7 days -6.14 -6.01 -4.69 -3.73 -7.19 -7.16 -5.43 -4.25
> 7 days -4.57 -5.32 -4.48 -3.78 -5.33 -6.34 -5.24 -4.29
Note: We estimate for each individual gas station a time-varying (S,s) model without
idiosyncratic shock ε2 and then compute statistics on the parameter estimates we ob-
tained. We consider all gas stations with more than 300 individual observations of prices
(excluding Sundays).
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Appendix: Internships, major choices and labor market outcomes of French
Grandes Ecoles graduates
Table A1: Major determinants - probit average marginal effects
Response Response
Probit Probit
Survey 2010 0.012 0.010
(Ref. Survey 2009) (0.049) (0.049)
Survey 2011 0.035 0.034
(0.045) (0.044)
Survey 2012 0.014 0.012
(0.048) (0.048)
Survey 2013 -0.145∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.046)
18 months after graduation -0.147∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(Ref. 6 months after graduation) (0.028) (0.028)
30 months after graduation -0.165∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039)
3rd year Major: Finance -0.178∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.032)
2nd year inverse rank 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Woman 0.021
(0.033)
Foreign citizenship 0.016
(0.045)
Age in 2nd year 0.020
(0.016)
Admitted in 2nd year -0.035
(0.039)
One parent professional 0.016
or retail trader (0.045)
Full year intern. 0.003
(0.037)
2nd year minor: applied maths 0.009
(0.045)
Observations 945 945
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.086
Baseline probability 0.713 0.713
Note: Standard errors in parentheses data, ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Columns 1 and 2 are the
average marginal effects of the probit model for the response to the survey.
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Table A2: Wage determinants - Unweighted and weighted regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Log wage Log wage Log wage
OLS OLS OLS
Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Full year intern. 0.063∗ 0.056 0.060∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Experience 0.102∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
3rd year Major: Finance 0.088∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
2nd year inverse rank 0.081 0.083 0.087
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Admitted in 2nd year -0.039 -0.048 -0.051∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Women -0.015 -0.021 -0.017
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Foreign citizenship -0.111∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Working abroad 0.383∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.085) (0.084)
Second job 0.035 0.032 0.033
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040)
Public sector -0.092∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.088∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040)
Fixed term contract -0.083∗ -0.089∗ -0.092∗
(0.045) (0.049) (0.049)
Admitted in 2nd year -0.039 -0.048 -0.051∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Constant 10.566∗∗∗ 10.591∗∗∗ 10.587∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
Observations 444 444 444
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.377 0.385
Note: Standard errors in parentheses data, ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Column1 reports the
unweighted OLS estimates. Column 2 reports the weighted OLS estimates with an unequal weighting scheme.
Column 3 reports the weighted OLS estimates with a stratified weighting scheme. Wages are deflated using price
consumption index. The variance-covariance matrix is clustered with the student identifier. Year of graduation
used as control variables.
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